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
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
A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS.



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लौकिकन्यायाञ्जलिः ॥

तृतीयो भागः ॥

A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS

CURRENT IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE.

COLLECTED BY

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INDIAN ARMY.

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of Hindu Pantheism," &c. &c.*

SECOND EDITION REVISED AND ENLARGED.

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Preface to First Edition.

It is with somewhat of a feeling of regret that I launch this third instalment of *nyāyas*; for I had hoped that they might be embodied in a revised re-issue of the first and second, so as to have the whole alphabetically arranged in one volume. There are not many, however, amongst India's two hundred and ninety millions, who take much interest in an effort of this kind, so we were compelled to follow a less ambitious course. To facilitate reference, I have prepared an index to the whole of the 430 *nyāyas* explained in the three volumes, and have written additional notes on several of those contained in the first and second. The latter will be found in the *Superaddenda*.

The present 'handful' differs materially from the two which preceded it in that it contains a goodly number of technical *nyāyas*; to wit, most of those representing important *adhikāraṇas* in the *Mīmāṃsā* system, as well as certain *paribhāṣās* from Patanjali and Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa. All of these appear to be quoted as *nyāyas* by writers on the various schools of philosophy; and I hope that such explanations of them as I have been able to give will prove of service to young students of these interesting works, and that the numerous references to the *Mahābhāṣya* will not be considered superfluous. That work, as presented in Benares editions, used to have a most forbidding aspect; for *sūtra*, *vārtika*, and *bhāṣya*, were crowded together, like sardines in a box, without numbers or any distinguishing marks to facilitate reference, and then this conglomerate was frequently (as in my own copy) sandwiched between two equally compressed portions of *Kaiyaṭa*! Dr. Kielhorn, however, has turned the impenetrable jungle into a well-laid-out park in which one can roam about with ease and comfort! Amongst other treasures, I was delighted to find there my two mango-tree *nyāyas*, namely, "आग्रसेकपितृतर्पण" and "आम्रान्मृष्टः कौविदारानाचष्टे."

Now for a word regarding the title of these pamphlets. I am by no means satisfied with 'maxim' as the equivalent of *nyāya*, but adopted it because many great scholars had already done so. As to the naturalness of such a course on my part let two Indian poets speak:—"यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः । स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते." "एकस्य कर्म संवीक्ष्य करोत्यन्योऽपि गर्हितम् । गतानुगतिको लोको न लोकः पारमार्थिकः" ॥ The *nyāyas* dealt with by me come under three distinct heads, and are either (1) Illustrations [*dr̥ṣṭānta*], (2) Rules, or principles [as in the case of *paribhāṣās* &c.], or (3) Topics [*adhikaraṇas*, as in the case of the *kapinjalanyāya* and others from the same source]. It would, therefore, be better, in my opinion, to adopt the term *nyāya* itself, without translating it into English.

This would seem to be the most suitable place for a note on the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, a work now in course of publication in *The Paṇḍit*, and from which I have occasionally quoted in the following pages. It has been stated by some Indian scholars of repute (beginning with Paṇḍit Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati, in 1871, in the preface to his edition of *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*), and the statement is now stereotyped in the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Government College, Calcutta, for the year 1900, that the Vācaspati who wrote the above work in refutation of S'ri Harsha's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, is identical with the celebrated philosopher Vācaspati Miśra. No reasons have been given for this assertion, and no evidence in its favour seems to be forthcoming from the work itself.

In a prefatory note by Mr. Arthur Venis, issued with the first part of the *Tārkikarākṣā* (in the *Paṇḍit* for Nov. 1899), he tells us that Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana were contemporaries, the *Nyāyasūcī* of the former having been written in 976 A. D., whilst the latter composed his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* in 984-5. He adds that Udayana was "probably much the younger man as his *Parīśuddhi* is a commentary on Vacaspati's *Tātparyā-*

ṭikā; and he may be supposed to have lived as late as 1050 A. D." Now, on page 13, the author of *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* quotes *Kusumāñjali* i. 19, prefaced with the words "तदुक्तमाचार्यैः," and, on the next page, cites i. 10 of the same, with the words "आचार्या अप्याहुः." On page 45, he refers to *Ātmatattva-viveka* in the same way. Is it in the least likely that a renowned Ācārya like Vācaspati Miśra would quote a *very junior contemporary* in such language as that, even if he condescended to notice him at all? Again, on page 25, the author of the *Uddhāra* says "विस्तरस्तु तत्त्वालोके मयैवोक्त इतीहोपरम्यते," but the author of the *Bhāmātī* has never been credited with a treatise of that name, though we know of his *Tattvasamīkṣā*. Lastly, on page 35, there is a reference to *विवरणमत*, and, on page 40, to *नरसिंहहरिशर्ममत*, which could hardly carry us back to the tenth century.

It has been suggested by some that S'ri Harsha, too, was a contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana,—but, since he quotes the former on page 354 of the *Khaṇḍana* (as I pointed out on page 29 of the Second Handful), and cites Udayana four times at least (see, especially, pages 633–637), this position can hardly be maintained. In 1871, Dr. Bühler, on the authority of a Jain writer named Rājas'ekhara, placed S'ri Harsha in the twelfth century; and, if that is correct, the question of the authorship of the *Uddhāra* is finally settled as far as Vācaspati Miśra is concerned. There was a prolonged discussion as to S'ri Harsha's date in the first three volumes (1872–4) of the *Indian Antiquary*, but nothing was conclusively established as against Dr. Bühler's view which is recorded on page 30 of the first volume.

On page 49 of *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* we read:—"अथ खण्डनकृत् षोडशपदार्थी खण्डयिष्यंस्तत्र मूर्धन्यं प्रमाणं खण्डयितुं तदुपधायिकां प्रमामादौ खण्डयति स 'तत्त्वानुभूतिः प्रमेत्युक्तम्.'" The passage in question will be found on page 143 of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, and

the commentator S'ankara Mis'ra ascribes this definition of *pramā* to the *Lakṣaṇamālā*, a work which the editor, in a footnote, attributes to S'ivāditya, the author of the *Saptapadārthī*. The latter was published in the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series in 1893, and in the Preface we have the same authorship of the *Lakṣaṇamālā* asserted on the authority of a *Citsukhīvyākhyā*, the date of which is not stated. In opposition to this, however, I would point out that Varadarāja quotes the *Lakṣaṇamālā* on pages 179 and 225 of his *Tārkikarakṣā*, and, in both cases, the famous commentator Mallinātha ascribes it to Udayana. The doubt expressed by Fitzedward Hall, on page 27 of his *Index* as to this being "the well-known commentator on the poems of Kālidāsa and others," is set aside by Mallinātha's quoting, on page 39, a portion of his commentary on *Raghuvams'a* ii. 34, and adding "इति स्फुटीकृतं चैतदस्माभिः पञ्चकान्यादिटीकासु 'अलं महीपाल तव श्रमेणेत्यादौ.' "

G. A. J.

REDHILL, SURREY. }
October 1904.

Preface to Second Edition.

With the re-issue of this 'Handful' the revision of the three is complete but by no means perfect; for I have been sore let and hindered by the presence of that powerful 'limiting adjunct' (upādhi) *Avidyā*. Many a struggle have I had with it over some of the nyāyas; but it is for scholars to say with whom the victory rests. Had it been possible to borrow Indra's *Vimāna* for a week-end visit to Poona, a quiet talk with old friends there would have speedily dispelled many doubts and difficulties. Especially helpful would it have been to have got their opinion regarding the nyāya “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः,” to which Kumārila and other writers on *Mīmāṃsā* appear to assign a meaning at variance with that of Patanjali as interpreted for me by Dr. Kielhorn,—an interpretation which seems to me to be the only reasonable one.

A comparison of this edition with the previous one will show that considerable changes have been made, especially in some of the technical nyāyas, and that twenty-two new ones have been added. I have abstained on the present occasion from appending supplementary notes, but will take advantage of this opportunity for making an interesting addition to the तैलपात्रधरन्याय in the Second Handful, by giving two important references to it. They are *Kathāsaritsāgara*, Book 6, chap. i. verses 43–52; and *S'āntiparva* 11696 (chap. 317, verse 22 in Bombay edition). For the former I am indebted to Mr. C. H. Tawney, and, for the latter, to Professor Washburn Hopkins.

An alphabetical list of the nyāyas contained in the three pamphlets is appended as before.

I would once more, on the conclusion of the reprint of the *nyāyas*, congratulate my friend the Proprietor of the Press, on the high standard of excellence still maintained by him. My acquaintance with the Press began nearly 30 years ago (in the time of its worthy Founder); and, if I may be allowed to apply to it a Vedantic 'great sentence' in a non-Vedantic sense, it still stands out amongst the Presses of the dear old Land of Bharata, as एकमेवाद्वितीयम्.

REDHILL, SURREY, }
October 1910. }

G. A. J.

A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS.

अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यात् ॥

A thing done at a wrong time [might as well be left undone, for it] *would be regarded as not done.* It occurs in the following passage of Mādhava's *Nyāyamālāvistara* 10. 1. 1:—"किं चतुर्धा-करणादूर्ध्वमावाह्यते किंवा प्रयाजेभ्यः पुरा । नाद्यः । अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यादिति न्यायेनावाहनस्य निरर्थकत्वात्."

Again, in S'abara on Jaimini 6. 2. 25, with reference to the times prescribed for the Agnihotra, and New and Full Moon sacrifices, we read "तस्मादन्येषु कालेषु अविहितत्वात्कृतमप्यकृतं स्यात्."

Compare the following which is quoted on page 284 of *Nyāyakandalī* :—

“स्वकाले यदकुर्वंस्तकरोत्यन्यदचेतनः ।

प्रत्यवायोऽस्य तेनैव नाभावेन स जन्यते” ॥

And somewhat similarly we have Patanjali 1. 2. 64 (vārt. 43):—"अशास्त्रोक्ते क्रियमाणे विगुणं कर्म भवति विगुणे च कर्मणि फलान्वाप्तिः" ॥

अक्षिपात्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the eyeball*. An illustration of *extreme sensitiveness*—in persons or things. The following from *Yogabhāṣya* ii. 15 (page 78) is an example of its application to a person:—"एवमिदमनादिदुःखस्रोतो विप्रसृतं योगिनमेव प्रतिकूलात्मकत्वादुद्वेजयति । कस्मात् । अक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वानिति । यथोर्णातन्तुरक्षिपात्रे न्यस्तः स्पर्शेन दुःखयति न चान्येषु गात्रावयवेष्वेवमेतानि दुःखान्यक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनमेव क्लिश्नन्ति नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारम्." This is very well put, also, in the *Manīprabhā* on the same sūtra. See, too, *Tātparyatīkā*, page 442, line 8. It looks as if this nyāya, like many others found

in orthodox works, came from a Buddhist source. Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin has kindly pointed out the following verses on page 476 of the *Madhyamakavṛitti*:—"ऊर्णापक्ष्म यथैव हि करतल-संस्थं न विद्यते पुंभिः । अक्षिगतं तु तदेव हि जनयत्यरतिं च पीडां च ॥ करतल-सदृशो बालो न वेत्ति संस्कारदुःखतापक्ष्म । अक्षिसदृशस्तु विद्वान् तेनैवोद्वेजते गाढम्." ॥ The word अक्षिपात्र is not in any of our dictionaries. In the *Yogavārtika* it is defined thus:—"अक्षः पात्रेणाधारेण गोलकेन तुल्यो विद्वानिति." ॥

अग्निहोत्रन्यायः ॥

The rule as to the *Agnihotra sacrifice* [consisting of morning and evening libations]. It forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 2. 23-26, where the injunction "यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति" is discussed. The interpretation put upon these words by the *pūrvapakṣin* is that the householder is to do nothing else but offer the Agnihotra during his whole life! Kunte thus summarizes his argument:—"From the time of the establishment of a sacred fire to the time of death the Agnihotra is to be performed continuously, without the remission of a moment. This is the duty of an *Ārya*. He cannot rest for a moment. The Agnihotra is not a constituent part of any other sacrifice. It is an independent sacrifice by itself. It therefore accomplishes the purpose of a person; and must therefore be unremittingly adhered to; and it does not matter if, in performing a principal act, minor acts are neglected. It is therefore reasonable to perform the Agnihotra-sacrifice alone continuously for life." The reply to all this is that the meaning of the *vidhi* is simply that it is to be offered every morning at daybreak, and every evening, according to the injunction "प्रदोषमग्निहोत्रं होतव्यं व्युष्टायां प्रातः." For a description of the Agnihotra, see *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa*, Kāṇḍa 2, Adhyāyas 3 and 4; also a very useful excursus of Kunte's on pages 410-420 of his *Śaṅkars'anacintanikā. Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 3. 4. 32 shows how Vedantists apply the injunction relating to the Agnihotra.

अङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिः ॥

Attempting to dispel the darkness with a lamp no bigger than your finger! Endeavouring to bring about a great result by the use of manifestly inadequate means. It occurs in the following passage of *Ātmatattvavivēka*, page 52:—"न चास्माकमिव तवाप्यत्र मूकतैव शरणं सर्वथा वचनविरोधे ह्युदासीनस्य सा शोभते । न चात्र विधौ विरोधः कश्चित् । न च त्वमुदासीनः प्रयोजने प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तस्मादलमङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिमनुष्ठाय." I am indebted to Mr. Arthur Venis for an explanation of this nyāya.

अङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यते ॥

The tip of a finger cannot be touched by itself. Akin to the sayings "A man cannot mount on his own shoulder," and "The edge of a sword cannot cut itself." It occurs in *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā* page 466, line 10 from bottom:—"यथाङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यते एवं ज्ञानं न तेनैव ज्ञानेन ग्रहीतुं शक्यते." Then in *Madhyamakavṛitti*, page 62, we have the double simile:—"यथापि नाम तस्यैवासिधारया सैवासिधारा न शक्यते छेत्तुं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण तदेवाङ्गुल्यग्रं शक्यते स्पृष्टुमेवमेव न तेनैव चित्तेन तदेव चित्तं शक्यं द्रष्टुम्." ॥ We meet with it again in Pārthasārathi's comment on the S'ūnyavāda section of the *S'lokavārtika* (page 288):—"न हि पाकः पच्यते छिदा वा छिद्यते । नापि करणकर्मत्वं कर्तृकर्मत्वं वा एकस्य संभवति । न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रेणैवाङ्गुल्यग्रं स्पृश्यते नाप्यङ्गुल्यग्रमात्मानं स्पृशति । तेनासां विधानां दृष्टान्ते कचिदप्यदर्शनाज्ज्ञानेऽपि नास्ति संभवः."

I do not understand the double statement here about the finger-tip. Pārthasārathi could not mean that the tip of one finger cannot be touched by the tip of another finger! The second part of the statement looks like a marginal gloss which has got into the text.

The following verse is found in *Prakaranapāṇcikā*, page 63, and in *Nyāyakanikā*, p. 268:—

अङ्गुल्यग्रं यथात्मानं नात्मना स्प्रष्टुमर्हति ।
स्वांशेन ज्ञानमप्येवं नात्मानं ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥

See also *Nyāyamakaranda*, pages 131, 183; *S'ribhāṣya* page 169; and *Sarvārthasiddhi*, page 391.

अङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते ॥

There are a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of my finger! This illustration of an absurdity occurs frequently. In *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 232 g, we read:—"अत्र केचिच्चोदयन्ति । व्यर्थोऽयं व्युत्पत्तिनिरूपणप्रयासः । शब्दस्यार्थासंस्पर्शित्वात् । न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इत्यादिशब्दैः कश्चिदर्थः प्रसीयते । यत्राप्तवाक्ये प्रसीयते तत्रापि मानान्तरनिबन्धना सा प्रमितिर्न शब्दनिबन्धनेति." Then in *Citsukhā* ii. 32:—"आप्तोदीरितवाक्येषु मालतीमाधवादिषु । व्यभिचारान्न तद्युक्तमाप्तत्वस्यानिरुक्तितः ॥ ३२ ॥ स्वकपोलकल्पितमालतीमाधवादिव्यभिचारवाक्येषु प्रामाण्याभावादतिव्याप्तिः । न हि पुराण एव सन्नाटकनाटिकादिप्रबन्धविरचनमात्रेणानाप्तो भवति भवभूतिः । उक्तं चैतदुम्बकेन 'यदाप्तोऽपि कस्यैचिदुपदिशति न त्वयाननुभूतार्थविषयं वाक्यं प्रयोक्तव्यं यथाङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति' । तत्रार्थव्यभिचारः स्फुटः." Compare *S'ālikā* p. 13, verse 4.

In the commentary on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, page 104, the saying is modified to "अङ्गुल्यग्रे करिशतं विहरति," and another of a like kind is added, namely "मम कर्णकुहरं प्रविश्य सिंहः क्रीडति;" and in *Ātmātattvavivēka*, page 65, Udayana gives us "मम कर्णे प्रविश्य गजो गर्जति भेषजमुच्यताम्." The Umbaka quoted above is perhaps the Umbeka* referred to by Hall (on page 166 of his

* Hall found this name (together with those of Prabhākara, Vāmana, and Revāṇa) in a verse of the *vṛitti* by Chāritra Sinha Gaṇi on the *Ṣaḍḍars'anasamuccaya*. What is manifestly the same verse is found also in the *vṛitti* ascribed to Maṇibhadra; but there the name Utpala is substituted for Umbeka. The verse is as follows:—"उत्पलः कारिकां वेत्ति तत्रं वेत्ति प्रभाकरः । वामनस्तूभयं वेत्ति न किञ्चिदपि रेवणः" ॥ From the fact that all the other authors and works mentioned in Gaṇi's *vṛitti* are found in the latter also, I am inclined to think that the two are identical.

Index) as an authority on *Mīmāṃsā*. In the *Catalogus Catalogorum*, the latter is identified with *Maṇḍanamis'ra*, which is one of the names by which *Sures'varācārya* is known.

अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः । दुर्बलैरपि
बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः ॥

Even very powerful men from town and country are held in check by weaker men who have the king's support. This verse from the Tantravārtika (page 863), found also, as a quotation, in Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa, page 35, is thus applied by Raghunātha:—“यत्र निर्बलेनापि प्रबलसहायेन प्रबलो बाध्यते तत्र ‘अत्यन्त-बलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः । दुर्बलैरपि बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः’ इति न्यायोऽवतरति । स्पष्टार्थोऽयम् । उदाहरणं तु श्रुत्यपेक्षया दुर्बलाया अपि स्मृतेराचमनरूपप्रबलपदार्थाश्रितत्वेन प्राबल्यम् । अतः श्रौतक्रमत्यागेन वेद-करणानन्तरं क्षुते आचमनमेव कार्यमिति दिक्.” We may compare with this the following from Sures'vara's large vārtika, page 753:—

“आशंसते बलीयांसमबलीयानपि स्वयम् ।
धर्मं बलं समाश्रित्य जेतुं लोके तथा यथा ॥
राज्ञा बलेनाल्पबलो बलीयांसं कुटुम्बिनम् ।
जेतुमाशंसते तस्माद्धर्मः स्याद्वलवत्तमः” ॥

अदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्वस्तनदिनभणन-
न्यायः ॥

The simile of the merchant who was unwilling to give, and who wrote every day saying that he would give on the morrow ! It occurs in the following passage of Malliṣeṇa's *Syādvādaman-jarī* (page 128):—“सौगताः किलेत्थं प्रमाणयन्ति सर्वे सत्क्षणिकं यतः सर्वे तावद्घटादिकं वस्तु मुद्गरसन्निधौ नाशं गच्छद्दृश्यते । तत्र येन स्वरूपेणान्यावस्थायां घटादिकं विनश्यति तच्चैतत्स्वरूपमुत्पन्नमात्रस्य विद्यते । तदानीमुत्पादानन्तरमेव तेन नष्टव्यमिति व्यक्तमस्य क्षणिकत्वम् । अथेदं एव स्वभावस्तस्य हेतुतो जातो यत्किञ्चिन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा विनश्यति । एवं तर्हि मुद्गरादिसन्निधानेऽपि एष

एव तस्य स्वभाव इति पुनरप्यनेन तावन्तमेव कालं स्थातव्यमिति नैवं विनश्येदिति सोऽयमदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्चस्तनदिनभणनन्यायः” ॥ Those who, in an Indian cantonment, have ever undertaken the thankless task of the collection of *promised* subscriptions to a fund, are very familiar with the “*kal āo*,” or “*parsoñ ke din āo*,” with which their messenger is often greeted, with perhaps stronger language superadded! Human nature is much the same everywhere. Compare *Proverbs* iii. 28.

अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

A truth or conclusion which implies another truth or conclusion. This is the third of four kinds of सिद्धान्त defined in *Nyāyasūtras* 1. 1. 28-31, the others being (1) सर्वतत्रसिद्धान्त, (2) प्रतितत्रसिद्धान्त, and (4) अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त. Ballantyne's rendering of the four is (1) a dogma of all the schools, (2) a dogma peculiar to some school, (3) a hypothetical dogma, and (4) a dogmatic corollary. In *Tārīkīkarakṣā* i. 29 (page 126) we have the following description of *manas*:—“युगपद्ज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति । एवं चाणुतयैव मनसः सिद्धिः । अन्यथा युगपदनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानाद्युगपद्ज्ज्ञानोदयप्रसंगात्” । On this, Mallinātha comments thus:—“एवं चेति । जगत्कर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वादिवन्मनसोऽणुत्वमधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायाद्वर्मिग्राहकादेव सिद्धमित्यर्थः” ॥ There is another example in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 83, line 9; and a third in Yāmunācārya's *Āgamaprāmānya*, page 17, line 1.

For an example of the three other kinds of siddhānta, see *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā*, page 36, lines 16-27.

अधिकारन्यायः ॥

The rule regarding the *qualifications* [required of a sacrificer]. Jaimini 6. 1. 1-3 deals with part of this. The decision is that he must be desirous of heaven, according to the vidhis “दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत,” “ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत.” The

principal thing here is the desire for heaven, whilst the sacrificial act is subordinate. The remainder of the pāda deals with the physical and social fitness demanded. See under आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां &c., below. For a full description of the four kinds of injunction, of which *adhikāraavidhi* is the third, see Laugākṣi-bhāskara's *Arthasangraha*, page 4, with Dr. Thibaut's translation, page 7 &c.

अनधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी । अधीतेऽपि
महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरी ॥

The Padamanjarī would be of no use to one who had not read the Mahābhāṣya, and would be equally useless [because unnecessary] if the latter had been read ! This saying is used by Raghunātha to illustrate the position of the Gāṇapatas who regard the worship of Gaṇapati as essential and all-inclusive. A portion of the argument is as follows:—“अतः श्रेयःकामैः सर्वैरपि स एवाराध्यः । तत्पूजां विनान्यपूजाया वैयर्थ्यस्मरणेन फलजनकत्वायोगात् । अवस्थापेक्षितानपेक्षितयोरपेक्षितं स्मरणीयमिति न्यायेन कृताकृतप्रसङ्गी यो विधिः स नित्य इति न्यायेन च तदाराधनस्यावश्यकत्वात् । कृते च तस्मिन्विद्यार्थी लभते विद्यां धनार्थी लभते धनम् । पुत्रार्थी लभते पुत्रान्मोक्षार्थी परमं पदमित्यादिवचनेभ्यः सर्वेष्टलाभसंभवेनानधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी । अधीतेऽपि महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरीति न्यायेनान्याराधने प्रयोजनाभावात्.” The second nyāya quoted here is a slight modification of Nāgōji's *paribhāṣā* xlii, “कृताकृतप्रसङ्गी नित्यं तद्विपरीतमनित्यम्.” In the Preface to vol. 2 of his edition of the Mahābhāṣya Dr. Kielhorn, referring to the above dictum of the Paṇḍits, says,—“Whatever truth there be in this remark, I can say for myself that I have been much assisted by Haradatta's learned work, even though it is based to a great extent on the Mahābhāṣya itself and on Kaiyaṭa's commentary”; and he points out that, though the Padamanjarī is primarily a commentary on the Kāśikā, yet its author discusses, often at great length, most of

the arguments advanced in the *Mahābhāṣya*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has several verses of the same type as that regarding the *Padamanjarī*. They will be found on pages 29, 39, 55, 61, 182, 447, and 448 of his *Nyāyamanjarī*. I quote that on page 182 as a sample:—

कार्यं चेदवगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ।

कार्यं चेन्नावगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ॥

अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वा ॥

[A rule containing] *an injunction or a prohibition* [enjoins or forbids only] *that which is nearest* [to it in some other rule]. Here is one of Raghunātha's grammatical *nyāyas*, included in both of his works. My translation is based on that of Dr. Kielhorn in his well-known edition and translation of the *Paribhāṣendus'ekhara*, where it appears as *Paribhāṣā* LXI. Nāgoji-Bhaṭṭa took it, of course, from the *Mahābhāṣya*, and I have noted the following ten instances of its occurrence:—1. 1. 43 (vārt. 3); 1. 2. 48 (vārt. 7); 1. 3. 12 (vārt. 7); 1. 3. 14 (vārt. 3); 1. 3. 58 (vārt. 3); 1. 4. 17; 3. 1. 67 (vārt. 5); 7. 1. 21 (vārt. 1); 7. 2. 3 (vārt. 2); and 7. 3. 85 (vārt. 4).

अनन्यलभ्यः शब्दार्थः ॥

The meaning of a word is that which cannot be known from any other source [such as implication &c.]. This is Mr. Venis' rendering (in the *Paṇḍit*, vol. vi, page 97) of the maxim in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (chap. iv. page 280). It occurs in *Tantravārtika* (page 340) in a more extended form, namely "यावानेव हि अनन्यलभ्योऽर्थः शब्दाद्गम्यते स सर्वः शब्दार्थः" ॥ Prof. Gangānātha Jhā (on page 474, line 10 of his translation) translates thus:—"In the case of any word, all that is not cognizable by means of any other word is held to be the meaning of that word." This, however, seems, to overlook the words

“शब्दाद्गम्यते.” The nyāya is found in its usual form in *Āgama-prāmānya*, page 35, line 10. In the *Pūrṇaprajna* section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 85 of Jivānanda's edition) we have the cognate nyāya “अनन्यलभ्यः शास्त्रार्थः”, “the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes is not to be taken from other sources than these” (Prof. Gough's translation, page 101).

A remark of Udayana's, as to word-meanings, may be of interest. It is found in *Kusumāñjali*, vol. 2, page 132:—“यः शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैरसति वृत्त्यन्तरे प्रयुज्यते स तस्य वाचको यथा स्वर्गशब्दः सुखविशेषे प्रयुज्यमानस्तस्य वाचकः” ॥

अनिषिद्धमनुमतम् ॥

That which is not objected to is agreed to. “Silence gives consent.” It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'isṭaparvan* vii. 36:—

एतस्याः संप्रदानं च श्रुत्वा संसोढवानसि ।

अनिषिद्धं ह्यनुमतमिति न्यायोऽपि वर्तते ॥

The nyāya is found in a slightly different form in *Nyāya-vārtika*, page 41:—“तन्त्रान्तरे मन इन्द्रियमिति पठ्यते । तच्चेह न प्रतिषिध्यते । अप्रतिषेधादुपात्तं तदिति । न । शेषाभिधानवैयर्थ्यात् । शेषाण्यपीन्द्रियाणि तैः परिपठितानि तस्मात्तान्यपि न वक्तव्यानि यद्यप्रतिषेधादुपादानं स्यादिति । न । तन्नयुक्त्यनवबोधात् । न भवता तन्नयुक्तिः परिज्ञायते । परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतमिति हि तन्नयुक्तिः” ॥

In his comment on this passage, Vācaspatimis'ra (on page 97 of *Tātparyatīkā*) quotes a line of Dignāga's:—“तद्वृत्तिं दिग्नागेन 'अनिषेधादुपात्तं चेदन्येन्द्रियरुतं वृत्ता'.” There is another example in *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 205.

अन्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलीयः ॥

Of the proximate [or, closely related] and the remote [or, distantly related], the former is the stronger. I find it most difficult to give a rendering of this nyāya. It seems to belong primarily to the grammarians, though found also in philosophical works. It is included in Śiradeva's list of paribhāṣās, but not in that of Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa. The terms अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग are, however, explained by the latter, under his paribhāṣa "असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे," in the following manner, and I subjoin Dr. Kielhorn's translation. As this eminent scholar gives no English equivalent of the two terms here described, it may fairly be assumed that no satisfactory one is to be found. "अन्तर्मध्ये बहिरङ्गशास्त्रीयनिमित्तसमुदायमध्येऽन्तर्भूतान्यङ्गानि निमित्तानि यस्य तदन्तरङ्गम् । एवं तदीयनिमित्तसमुदायाद्बहिर्भूताङ्गकं बहिरङ्गम्." "*Antaranga* is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within (or before) the sum of the causes of a *bahiranga* rule; in like manner (that rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie without (or beyond) the sum of the causes of that (*antaranga* rule) is *bahiranga*." The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—"अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग are two Bahuvrihi-compounds and denote a rule, or an operation, or that which is taught in a rule. The word अङ्ग here neither denotes a member of the body, nor is it the grammatical term अङ्ग as defined in P. I. 4. 13; but it is equivalent to उपकारक 'that which assists (an operation),' or, in other words, it denotes the निमित्त, that is, 'the cause' of an operation."

The nyāya is employed by Śābara on Jaimini 12. 2. 27, and by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 4; and there is another example of it in the following passage of the *Vivaraṇa-prameyasangraha* (page 15):—"कार्यस्य तावदुपादानापेक्षा प्रथममुत्पद्यते पश्चाद्विरोधिसंसर्गाभावापेक्षा तथा चान्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलवदिति न्यायेनान्तरङ्गोपादानविषयत्वमेव तयोर्न्याय्यम्" where Dr. Thibaut (in his translation in *Indian Thought*, vol. i, page 80) renders it

“the principle that what is intimately connected has greater force than what is remotely connected.”

It is quoted also by Ānandagiri in his comment on verse 367 of Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*—“अन्तरङ्गं हि विज्ञानं प्रत्यङ्गा-
त्रैकसंश्रयात् । बहिरङ्गं तु कर्म स्याद्वाह्यद्रव्याश्रयत्वतः” ॥ Mr. S. B. Aiyar's
rendering of the terms *antaranga* and *bahiranga* in this verse
is ‘subjective’ and ‘objective,’ respectively.

अन्यवेशमस्थिताद्भूमान्न वेशमान्तरमग्निमत् ॥

*From seeing smoke rising from one house we do not infer that there is a fire in another house. This is from Tantra-
vārtika (page 180, line 9) on Jaimini's sūtra “अनुमानव्यवस्था-
नात्तत्संयुक्तं प्रमाणं स्यात्” (1. 3. 15).*

अन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति ॥

*A thing, though made for one purpose, may also serve for another. This is found in Mahābhāṣya 1. 1. 23 (vārt. 4), 1. 3. 12 (vārt. 5), and 6. 1. 50, as follows:—“यत्तावदुच्यते न चान्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवतीत्यन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति । तद्यथा । शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्यश्च पानीयं पीयत उपस्पृश्यते च शाल्यश्च भाव्यन्ते.” It is quoted by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 220), and is referred to by Kumārila in his long and interesting discussion of शेष (an accessory—that which serves the purpose of something else) in the opening part of the third chapter of the *Tantra-vārtika*. On page 668, line 13, we read:—“न हि कश्चिदपि शालि-
कुल्यास्थमुदकं पिबन्मदर्थमेताः प्रणीता इत्यध्यवस्यति । तस्मादन्यत्तादर्थ्य-
मन्यश्चोपकार इति विज्ञायते.” Patanjali's illustration is found in *Pancapādikā*, page 45, and is employed by Vidyāranya in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 118, line 9), where it is styled कुल्याप्रणयनन्याय. Compare the nyāya “जामात्रर्थं श्रपितस्य सूपादेरतिथ्युपकारकत्वम्” in the Second Handful.*

अपच्छेदन्यायः ॥

The law regarding the *interruption* [of a procession of priests]. It is thus explained by Goldstücker:—"Used in the liturgical writings of the interruption of a procession of priests, caused by the inadvertence of one or several amongst them; thus, it being the rule that at the first Savana of the Jyotishtoma the priests must proceed one after the other 'in the black-ant fashion,' the one that comes after holding his preceeder by the hem of his garment, an interruption caused by the dropping of the hem, on the part of one priest would be एककर्तृकोऽपच्छेदः &c." This curious ceremony is discussed in Jaimini 6. 5. 49-56, where certain penalties are prescribed for letting go the garment (कच्छ-विमोचन). The matter is well and concisely put in the Nyāya-mālāvistara on the above portion of Jaimini, and much information is contained in Kunte's notes on the same sūtras.

The nyāya is employed by writers on Vedānta. It is found, for example, in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 10, line 8:—"ज्येष्ठस्यापीति । अपच्छेदन्यायेन पूर्वस्य परेण बाधमाशंक्य तदपेक्षस्येति विशेषितं तेनोत्तरस्य पूर्वापेक्षायामुपक्रमाधिकरणन्याय एव प्रवर्तत इति सूचितमित्यर्थः" ॥ The passage of the *Vedāntakalpataru* here explained is found on page 6, line 8:—"ज्येष्ठस्यापि पौर्वापर्यन्यायेन बाधमाशंक्याह तदपेक्षस्येति." The पौर्वापर्यन्याय is a part of the अपच्छेदन्याय, and derives its name from sūtra 54, namely "पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत्," the subject of the adhikaraṇa being that when the priests, walking in procession, let go their hold one after another, the one who does so last is liable to a penalty. This same sūtra is quoted in full in *Bhāmātī*, page 5, last line, and is immediately followed by a verse from Kumārila's *Tantravārtika*, page 819; where, however, the reading of the first line is पौर्वापर्यबलीयस्त्वं instead of the पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वं of the *Bhāmātī*. The same verse is quoted by Vācaspatimiśra at the bottom of page 59 of his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā*, where the reading agrees with that of the *Bhāmātī*. The अपच्छेदन्याय is found in Venkaṭanātha's *Sarvārthasiddhi*, pages 210, 359, and 374; and also in *S'ribhā-*

śya, page 143, where Dr. Thibaut (on page 26 of his translation) renders it "As in the case of the Udgātri and Pratihartṛi breaking the chain in succession." The whole ceremony is very clearly explained on page 156 of the *Tattvadīpana*, and the passage will repay perusal.

अपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्ते ॥

General rules are set aside by special ones. This well-known grammatical rule, found thus in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 1. 24 (vārt. 5) and in a variety of forms in *paribhāṣās*, is admitted to these pages chiefly because, in two of his poems, Kālidāsa has adopted it as a sort of *मात्स्यन्याय* to illustrate a phase of human affairs, namely the subordination of the weak to the strong.

One instance is in *Kumārasambhava* ii. 27:—

“लब्धप्रतिष्ठाः प्रथमं यूयं किं बलवत्तरैः ।
अपवादैरिवोत्सर्गाः कृतव्यावृत्तयः परैः” ॥

The other is in *Raghuvamśa* xv. 7:—

“यः कश्चन रघूणां हि परमेकः परंतपः ।
अपवाद इवोत्सर्गं व्यावर्तयितुमीश्वरः” ॥

In a note on this latter passage Mr. Shankar P. Paṇḍit says “Whatever may be the value of the simile as regards the similitude, it certainly cannot be said to be very poetical, being derived altogether from a pedant’s life.” At the end of his comment on the former verse, Mallinātha adds “इत्यलमतिगहनावगाहनेन”, which may possibly indicate some feeling of disapproval on his part also. It is on the principle enunciated in this *nyāya* that the law forbidding the taking of life is superseded by the Vedic ritual which demands animal sacrifices; and it is interesting to note the famous Jaina Hemacandra’s denunciation of the whole argument in the eleventh verse of his *Vītarāga-stuti*, the first half of which stands thus:—

“न धर्महेतुर्विहितापि हिंसा
नोत्सृष्टमन्यार्थमपोद्यते च” ।

In his vṛitti on the verse Malliṣeṇa states the case from the Mimāṃsaka's standpoint as follows:—"योऽयं न हिंस्यात्सर्वभूतानीत्यादिना हिंसानिषेधः स औत्सर्गिको मार्गः सामान्यतो विधिरित्यर्थः । ततश्चापवादेनोत्सर्गस्य बाधितत्वान्न श्रौतो हिंसाविधिर्दोषायोत्सर्गापवादयोरपवादो विधिर्बलीयानिति न्यायात्." (*Syādvādamanjarī*, page 84).

In connection with the above quotation from Hemacandra, see the डमरुकमणिन्याय.

अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत् ॥

Scripture attaches a meaning [to an act &c.] when such [a meaning] has not been established [and could not be established in any other way]. I take this to be the drift of this somewhat difficult nyāya which forms part of Jaimini's sūtra 6. 2. 18. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 18 there is a discussion as to the aim of certain S'rutis which prescribe the rinsing of the mouth, before and after eating, in connection with the *prāṇavidyā*. Were they intended to enforce आचमन as an act of cleanliness, and also as an act of ritual directed to prāṇa? The decision is that the former was already provided for by smṛiti, and that s'ruti merely attached to it its significance as a religious ceremonial. Bhāratīrtha sums up the case in *Adhikaraṇamālā* 3. 3. 9, as follows:—"इति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः 'अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्' इति न्यायेन मानान्तराप्राप्तमनग्नताचिन्तनमेव विधेयम्...आचमनं तु शुद्ध्यर्थतया स्मृतिबलादेव प्राप्तमिति न विधीयते...तस्मादाचमनस्य प्राप्तत्वादनग्नताबुद्धिरेव प्राणोपासकं प्रति विधेया." The nyāya is found also in *Tantravārtika*, page 145, line 3, and again on page 232; in *S'rībhāṣya*, page 554 (where it is rendered by Dr. Thibaut, on page 133 of his translation, "Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other means"); and in *Nyāyakandali*, page 5 (where Prof. Gangānātha Jhā's interpretation of it is "An injunction has its use only in a case where its object has not been accomplished by other means"). Other references to it are *Citsukhī* i. 7 (Paṇḍit, vol. iv. page

475); the Rāmānuja section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 69, line 12, of Jivānanda's edition); and *Sarvārthasiddhi* pages 93, 263. In *Tattvadīpana*, page 544, the nyāya is quoted as “अनधिगते शास्त्रमर्थवत्.”

अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वम् ॥

The more worthy should come first. These words form part of Patanjali's comment on a vārtika on Pāṇini's rule 2. 2. 34 in regard to the position of words in a dvandva compound. The whole sentence is as follows:—“अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वं निपततीति वक्तव्यम् । मातापितरौ श्रद्धामेधे” ॥ Its use is not restricted to grammar, however, as the following extract from the first paragraph of Sāyana's introduction to his commentary on the R̥gveda shows:—“ऋग्वेदस्य प्राथम्येन सर्वत्रास्मात्त्वादभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायेनाभ्यर्हितत्वात्तद्व्याख्यानमादौ युक्तम्” ॥ Again, at the commencement of the twelfth chapter of the *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara*, we read as follows:—“अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायमाश्रित्य तच्चप्रसङ्गप्रतिपादकयोरेकादशद्वादशाध्याययोः पूर्वोत्तरभाव उपपादितः” ॥ And in Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 4. 28:—“प्राधान्येन निरासे हेत्वन्तरमाह स चेति । न केवलमभ्यर्हितत्वात्तस्य प्राधान्यं स्मृतिमूलत्वादपीत्याह.”

अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

The principle of an *implied axiom* [or, dogmatic corollary], This is taken from *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 31 which Dr. Ballantyne rendered as follows:—“A ‘dogmatic corollary’ is the mention of a particular fact in regard to anything, not expressly declared in an aphorism, [our knowlege of the fact coming so immediately] from what is recognized [by the maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous—the fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogma].” The nyāya is applied by Udayana in *Kiraṇāvali*, page 20, line 4 from bottom. See also under अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्याय.

अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलावूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्ते ॥

Gourds sink in water, but stones float! This is often quoted as an illustration of an absurdity. It is as old as the *Mahābhārata* and appears at the end of chapter LXIV of the *Sabbhāparvan*:—“मज्जन्त्यलावूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते मुह्यन्ति नावोऽम्भसि शश्वदेव.” I have met with it twice in S’abara’s *bhāṣya*. In 1. 1. 5 (page 11):—“एवं-जातीयकं प्रमाणविरुद्धं वचनमप्रमाणम् । अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलावूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्त इति यथा.” In 4. 3 10:—“न चैवंजातीयकं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धं वचनं प्रमाणं भवति । यथाम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलावूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते पावकः शीत इति.”

Other references are *Sankṣepaśārīraka* ii. 2 (Paṇḍit, vol. vii, page 169); and, in *Prākṛita*, just after verse viii. 31 of *Bālarāmāyaṇa*.

अयमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोटः ॥

Here is another boil on the top of a previous one! An illustration of difficulty upon difficulty; trouble upon trouble. It occurs in *Bhāmatī* 2. 2. 37 as follows:—“न हीश्वराधीना जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण कपूर्यं कर्म कर्तुमर्हन्ति । तदनधिष्ठितं वा कपूर्यं कर्म फलं प्रसोतुमुत्सहते । तस्मात्स्वतन्त्रोऽपीश्वरः कर्मभिः प्रवर्त्यत इति दृष्टविपरीतं कल्पनीयम् । तथा चायमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोट इतरेतराश्रयः प्रसज्येत कर्मणेश्वरः प्रवर्तनीय ईश्वरेण च कर्मेति.” In the same form it is put into the mouth of Rākṣasa in *Mudrārākṣhaśa* v (page 220). The oldest examples, however, are in *Prākṛit*. In the opening part of *S’akuntalā* ii. we find it as “तदो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्डिआ संबुत्ता” (or, in Dr. Fischel’s edition, “जदो गण्डस्स उवरि विण्फोडओ संबुत्तो”); and in *Viddhaśāla-bhanjikā* i. (page 12), as “अवरो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्डओ संबुत्तो.”

अरुणैकहायनीन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a red [cow] one year old. This *nyāya*, found in *Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 41, in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 294 (line 2 from bottom), and in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 619

(line 4), is the आरुणिन्याय of Jaimini 3, 1. 12, and is based on the following words connected with the ritual of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice—"अरुण्या पिङ्गाक्ष्यैकहायन्या सोमं क्रीणाति," "he buys Soma with a red-coloured, yellow-eyed [cow] of a year old." The Mimāṃsaka delights in hair-splitting, and in trifling with language; and we have a typical instance of this idiosyncrasy in the way in which this simple sentence is dealt with. Because the cow is not actually mentioned, and the word अरुणा denotes a quality (redness), an objector says "how can one buy Soma with a mere quality?" S'abara's reply to this occupies ten octavo pages, whilst that of Kumārila fills twenty-nine! The objection is concisely put in the *Nyāyamālāvistara*, part of which is as follows:—

“अरुणाशब्दोऽरुणिमानं गुणमाचष्टे । गुणिविषयतया प्रयुज्यमानस्यापि 'ना-
गृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टे बुद्धिः' इति न्यायेन गुणबोधकत्वात् । अन्वयव्यतिरेका-
भ्यां गुणमात्रे तद्व्युत्पत्तेश्च । तस्य चारुणिमगुणस्य तृतीयाश्रुत्या सोमक्रयसाधनत्वं
प्रतीयते तच्चानुपपन्नम् । अमूर्तस्य गुणस्य वासोहिरण्यादिवत्क्रयसाधनत्वासंभ-
वात्” ॥ The reply to this is:—“यद्यप्यमूर्तो गुणस्तथापि हायनवदक्षिवच्च
गोद्रव्यमवच्छिनत्ति । तच्च द्रव्यं साधनमिति तद्वारा गुणस्य क्रयेणान्वयो भवति ।
एवं सति वाक्यभेदो न भविष्यति” ॥

There is a long discussion on the nyāya in Rāmānuja's *S'rībhāṣya* 1. 1. 13, commencing on page 813 of the Benares edition. See Dr. Thibaut's translation, page 222.

अवतप्तेनकुलस्थितम् ॥

A mongoose's standing on hot ground. Used of a fickle, changeable person who never sticks to a thing. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 1. 47, as follows:—“यथावतप्ते नकुला न चिरं स्थातारो भवन्त्येवं कार्याण्यारभ्य यो न चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यतेऽवतप्तेनकुलस्थितं त एतदिति.” It occurs a second time in 6. 2. 49 (vārt. 6), in company with the expression उदकेविशीर्ण. The compound तीर्थकाक which is found in 2. 1. 42, has much the same meaning. Patanjali says:—“यथा तीर्थे काका न चिरं स्थातारो भवन्त्येवं यो गुरुकुलानि गत्वा न

चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यते तीर्थकाक इति.” In Marāṭhī, however, the name is applied to “a person ever watchful after some booty or spoil,” a meaning which seems more in accord with the character of the crow than that assigned to it by Patanjali!

अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी ॥

For this paribhāṣā see under रथकारन्याय.. It is quoted by Kumārila in *Tantravārtika* 1. 4. 11, more than once, but one example will suffice:—“लब्धात्मिका हि समुदायप्रसिद्धिरवयवप्रसिद्धिं बाधते तस्यास्वात्मलाभो यत्र प्रमाणान्तरेण पूर्वानुभूतावयवार्थरहितेऽर्थे शब्द-प्रयोगो दृश्यते । यथाश्वत्कर्णत्वरहिते वृक्षेऽश्वकर्णशब्दस्य.” As a parallel to this, we might take our word cockroach, which is neither a cock nor a roach! For other examples of the paribhāṣā see *Tantravārtika* pages 538, 1002, 1048, and 1149.

I have met with another reference in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 150, line 12:—“अत्र च घ्राणादिशब्दाः पंकजादिपदवदवयवार्थं निमित्तीकृत्य क्वचित्क्वचित्सामान्यविशेषे वर्तन्ते अवयवार्थस्य प्रतीयमानस्यासति बाधके परित्यागायोगात् । अश्वकर्णादौ वृक्षविशेषवाचके वाजिकर्णयोगेन बाधकेनावयवार्थ-परित्यागात्.” See also *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 385, line 10; and page 534, line 15.

अविरविकन्यायः ॥

The principle of the words *avi* and *avika*. Though both mean ‘a sheep,’ yet a derivative in the sense of the flesh of a sheep (आविक) can be formed only from the latter. It occurs in *Mahābhāṣya* 4. 1. 88 (vārt. 2) as follows:—“तत्र द्वयोः शब्दयोः समानार्थयोरेकेन विग्रहोऽपरस्मादुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यत्यविरविकन्यायेन । तद्यथा । अवेर्मांसमिति विगृह्य अविकशब्दादुत्पत्तिर्भवति आविकमिति” ॥ Similarly in 8. 1. 89 (vārt. 6); 4. 2. 60; 4. 3. 131; 5. 1. 7; 5. 1. 28; and 6. 2. 11 (vārt. 2). This inaccurate compound is one of the instances brought forward by Kumārila of the way in which grammar &c. are set aside by learned writers. On this, see the nyāya “अश्वरूढाः &c.” below.

In *Nyāyamanjarī*, pages 413 and 414, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa joins in the attack on this irregular compound, and on grammatical deformities found in the works of such writers as Manu, As'valāyana, Vālmīki, and Dvaipāyana. The following is a portion of his comment:—"भाष्यकारोऽपि अविरविकन्यायेनेति द्वन्द्वगर्भे तत्पुरुषे प्रयुयुक्षिते 'सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः' इति प्राप्तमपि लोपं न कृतवान् । 'अन्यथाकृत्वा चोद्यमन्यथाकृत्वा परिहार' इत्यत्र च 'अन्यथैवंकथमित्यं सु सिद्धाप्रयोगश्चेत्' इति प्राप्तमपि णमुलमुपेक्ष्य त्वाप्रत्ययं प्रायुङ्क्त" ॥

The quotation "अन्यथाकृत्वा &c." is from Patanjali on *Pāṇini* 4. 1. 7 (vārt. 3), and the sūtra quoted is 3. 4. 27. See Kumārila's remarks on this expression in *Tantravārtika* page 201. They would apply equally to "कथंकृत्वा चोदितं &c." in 7. 1. 3 (vārt. 5).

अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः ॥

How could men of intelligence be mounted on horses and yet forget their horses ! Yet grammarians and others sometimes ignore their own rules ! In Tantravārtika 1. 3. 18 (according to the numbering of the Benares edition), Kumārila comments at great length on the corrupt forms of words employed by even learned writers. On page 200, he says "अन्तो नास्त्यपशब्दानामितिहासपुराणयोः" and then instances the curious word उभाभ्य which is made to mean "a blow given by an elephant with both tusks" (युगपदुभाभ्यां दन्ताभ्यां प्रहारः). On the following page he says:—"येऽपि व्याकरणस्यैव परे पारे प्रतिष्ठिताः । सुतरां तेऽपि गाव्यादितुल्यानेव प्रयुज्यते ॥ सूत्रवार्तिकभाष्येषु दृश्यते चापशब्द-नम् । अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः" ॥

A variant of this is found in *S'ālikā*, page 16, verse 41:—

“ नन्वेवं तुरगारूढस्तुरङ्गं विस्मृतो भवान् ।

वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थमुत्थितस्तत्प्रहीणवान्” ॥

Mallinātha probably had this in mind when, in his comment on Varadarāja's *Tārīkīkarakṣā* (page 20), he wrote:—"तदे-

तत्तुरगाधिरूढस्य तुरगविस्मरणं यद्वेदप्रामाण्यसाधने प्रवृत्तस्य मीमांसागुरो-
स्तत्प्रमाद इति सोपहासं परिहरति.”

It is very clear, however, that the nyāya came from a Buddhist source, since it is found in the following *kārikā* of Nāgārjuna's, on page 502 of the *Madhyamakavṛitti* (for the reference to which I am indebted to Prof. Poussin) :—

“ स त्वं दोषानात्मनीयानस्मासु परिपातयन् ।
अश्वमेवाधिरूढः सन्नश्वमेवासि विस्मृतः” ॥

In a footnote, the Professor gives a variant from another Buddhist work, namely, “घोटामेवाधिरूढः सन् &c.”

असाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति ॥

Names are given in consideration of some speciality. This was perhaps taken from *Sāṅkhyasūtra* V. 112:—“सर्वेषु पृथिव्युपादानमसाधारण्यव्यपदेशः पूर्ववत्.” “In all [bodies] earth is the material: in consideration [however] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case.” This is Dr. Ballantyne's rendering. The nyāya is found in the early part of the *Akṣapāda* section of *Sarvadars'ana-sangraha*, and I append Prof. Cowell's translation:—“ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थषोडशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते । सत्यम् । तथाप्यसाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्थानुमानापरपर्यायस्य सकलविद्यानुग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथा व्यपदेशो युज्यते.”

“But here an objector may say, ‘If these sixteen topics, proof &c., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name of the Nyāya S'āstra [as reasoning, *i. e.* *Nyāya*, or logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?’. We allow the force of the objection; still, as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name Nyāya was rightly applied to Gotama's

System, since 'reasoning', or inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit." See also *S'ālikā*, page 98, line 8; and *Bhāmatī* 1-3-14 (page 208).

असिधारामधुलेहनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *licking honey from the edge of a sword!* This is found in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvadarśanasangraha* (page 45 of Jivānanda's edn.), as follows:—"सदसद्वेदनीयस्य सुखदुःखोत्पादकत्वमसिधारामधुलेहनवत्," which Prof. Cowell renders, "An object recognized as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge—this is *vedanīya*." Compare *Bodhicaryāvatāra* vii-64:—"कामैर्न वृत्तिः संसारे क्षुरधारामधूपमैः"॥

अहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरम् ॥

Heartless words get heartless answer. Like receives like. This occurs in *Vedāntatattvavivēka*, (The Paṇḍit for May 1903), page 14, line 4 from bottom:—"तत्र चाहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरमिति न्यायेन सदन्यत्वं प्रपञ्चस्योक्तं न तु तत्त्वाभिप्रायेण." In the *Tātparyatīkā* it takes the form of "अहृदयवाचामहृदया एव प्रतिवाचो भवन्ति," and is combined with "यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिः". The passage will be found under that nyāya in the second Handful.

In his *Nyāyadīpāvalī*, page 2, Ānandabodhācārya quotes the nyāya in accordance with Vācaspatimīśra.

आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी ॥

Power [of understanding on the part of the hearer] co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense. This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyāya as it appears in Laugākshibhāskara's

Arthasangraha (page 16) in a passage explanatory of *adhikāra-vidhi*. The portion connected with the *nyāya*, and the translation, are as follows:—"एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायात्समर्थं प्रत्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः"॥ "In the same manner, capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power &c.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words 'power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense' (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it)." The commentator, Rāmes'vara S'ivayogibhikshu, explains that blind, deaf, and lame persons are excluded as being incapable of performing various parts of the sacrificial ritual.

A much earlier instance of the employment of the *nyāya* is met with in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*, verse 75, which I here subjoin, together with Ānandagiri's comment.

“सहकर्त्री भवेच्छक्तिरिति न्यायाद्भवेद्यदि ।

मनुष्यगोचरोऽपीति नाख्यातासंभवात्तथा ॥ ७५ ॥

आख्यातानामर्थं बोधयतामधिकारिशक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायाद्विधेयार्थानुष्ठानशक्तमधिकारिणं विना विधेर्विधित्वायोगात्काम्यादि मुमुक्षुर्वर्जयेदित्याख्यातस्य मनुष्यं प्रति स्वार्थं बोधयतो मनुष्यशक्तिसापेक्षत्वादेवमात्रगोचरत्वमस्यासिद्धमिति शङ्कते । सहकर्त्रीति । यत्राख्यातमस्ति तत्र तत्सहकर्त्री कर्तृशक्तिरिष्टा न च मोक्षकामी काम्यादि वर्जयेदित्याख्यातं ख्यात्यतो न मनुष्यगोचरतोक्तहेतोरिति समाधत्ते नाख्यातेति” ॥

The verse immediately preceding is the following:—"न तु यादृच्छिकी सिद्धिर्वक्तव्येह विपश्चिता । दैवगोचर एवैष न तु मानुषगोचरः" ॥ The two are rendered as follows in a translation (by Mr. S. V. Aiyar) which appeared in *The Pandit*:—"A wise man ought not to speak of success as depending on mere accident. Such a thing would be within the scope, not of human effort, but of destiny. It cannot be said that it is also within the scope

of human effort, on the principle that injunction implies endeavour; for there is no injunction (*ākhyāta*) to that effect."

The *nyāya* probably originated with S'abara who makes use of it in his *bhāṣya* on Jaimini 1. 4. 30, where the reading is आख्यातशब्दानामर्थे &c. The expression "सर्वाख्यातसहकारिशक्त्यनुसारेण" in *Tantravārtika* 2. 2. 27, page 558, line 9, incorporates the same *nyāya*.

आम्ने फलार्थे निमित्ते छाया गन्ध इत्यनूत्पद्येते ॥

Though a mango-tree is planted for the sake of its fruit, yet shade and fragrance are also incidentally produced. This illustration is employed by Āpastamba in his *Dharma-sūtra* 1. 7. 20. 3 which I quote together with Dr. Bühler's translation (in *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. ii):—"तद्यथाग्ने फलार्थे निमित्ते छाया गन्ध इत्यनूत्पद्येते। एवं धर्मं चर्यमाणमर्था अनूत्पद्यन्ते."

"Worldly benefits are produced as accessories to the fulfilment of the law, just as in the case of a mango-tree, which is planted in order to obtain fruit, shade and fragrance are accessory advantages." Plain and intelligible as this is, it is invariably misquoted, and instead of निमित्ते (from the root नि प्रक्षेपणे) we find निर्मिते, or the clearly impossible निमित्ते. The *nyāya* is found in S'ankara's *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 4. 3. 14, and in every edition known to me the text and comment stand thus:—"नच नित्यनैमित्तिकानुष्ठानात्प्रत्यवायानुत्पत्तिमात्रं न पुनः फलान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति प्रमाणमस्ति फलान्तरस्याप्यनुनिष्पादिनः सम्भवात्। स्मरति ह्यापस्तम्बः। तद्यथाग्ने फलार्थे निर्मिते छायागन्धावनूत्पद्येते एवं धर्मं चर्यमाणमर्था अनूत्पद्यन्ते इति." Then the *ṭikākāra* is made to say. "निमित्त आरोपिते सतीति यावत्." We find it again in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*, verses 96 and 97:—

“फलं नित्यस्य नापीह दुरितक्षयमात्रकम् ।

फलान्तरश्रुतेः साक्षात्तद्यथान्तरस्मृतेस्तथा ॥

‘आग्ने निमित्त’ इत्यादि ह्यापस्तम्बस्मृतेर्वचः ।

फलवत्त्वं समाचष्टे नित्यानामपि कर्मणाम् ॥”

Here, again, the unfortunate commentator is made to misquote the Sūtra, with निमित्ते for निमित्ते, and to give it the meaning belonging to the latter, namely “निहिते रोपिते.” The translator of the vārtika was apparently satisfied with the reading in verse 97, which he rendered “The mango being the cause &c.” But did Sures’vara really put it thus ?

Āpastamba’s simile is found also in Rāmatīrtha’s comment on the *Vedāntasāra*, page 90 of my edition.

I may add that the verb निमि occurs frequently in Vedic literature, and means *to set up, erect, or fix*. The root पद् in combination with the two prepositions अनु and उत् has no place in the dictionaries, and may be peculiar to Āpastamba.

आर्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते ॥

A wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind. This illustration is taken from the Jaina section of *Sarvādars’anasangraha* (page 44 of Jivānanda’s edn). The text, and Professor Cowell’s translation, are as follows:—यथार्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते तथा कषायजलार्द्रं आत्मा योगानीतं कर्म सर्वप्रदेशैर्गृह्णाति । यथा वा निष्टसायःपिण्डे जले क्षिप्तेऽम्भः समन्ताद्गृह्णाति तथा कषायोष्णो जीवो योगानीतं कर्म समन्तादादत्ते.” “As a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by *yoga*. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the *jīva*, heated by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by *yoga*.” In a footnote, the Professor adds:—“Yoga seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act.”

आषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठा ॥

When the wind is blowing in the month Āshāḍha [i.e. in the rainy season, when strong winds prevail] and the lordly elephant is being driven about, nothing but the sea can be the final resting place of the donkey. That is to say, if the mighty elephant can with difficulty withstand the force of the wind, the puny donkey must inevitably be blown into the sea! I am greatly indebted to Mr. D. Sundara Rājas'armā of Madras for giving me a reference to this nyāya in the Vedāntas'ikhāmaṇi (a work which I had not then read). It appears in a passage on page 393, and I append an extract from Amaradāsa's comment on it:—

“वामदेवादीनानुत्पन्नब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराणामप्यमुक्तावर्वाचीनानामाषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठेति न्यायेन मुक्तिर्दूरोत्सारिता स्यात्.”
 “आषाढवाते इति आषाढवायुसम्बद्धे द्विपेन्द्रे गजेन्द्रे चलति इतस्ततो दोलायमाने सति चक्रीवतो रासभस्य वारिधिरेव समुद्र एव काष्ठा विश्रामावधिरित्यर्थः” ॥

Raghunātha's application of the simile is somewhat different, and makes it the equivalent of the प्रधानमल्लुनिर्बहणन्याय. He says:—“यामिर्युक्तिभिरतिप्रबलशुक्तर्ककर्मशत्वेन प्रसिद्धोऽपि द्वैतसत्यत्वादी वैशेषिकादिर्जय्यस्ताभिरितरे क्षुद्राश्चार्वाकादयस्तु दूरतो निरस्ता भवन्तीति विवक्षायामाषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठेति न्यायप्रवृत्तिः । चलतीति सप्तम्यन्तं पदं देहलीदीपन्यायेनोभयत्र सम्बध्यते । चक्रीवान् गर्दभः । स्पष्टमन्यत्” ॥

In a manuscript of the *S'ikhāmaṇi* copied for me in Poona the nyāya stands thus:—“आषाढमासे वलद्विपेन्द्रे चक्रिवतोऽरे भवति युकाष्टावधिरेव काष्ठा.” Though partly inaccurate this clearly furnishes a variant of the simile. The reading of the India Office manuscript (No. 568, page 73 b) differs materially from above and seems hopelessly corrupt. It puts it as follows:—“आषाढमासे चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रिवतो धावतो धावति काष्ठवाहौरिति न्यायेन !” Does this, in spite of its inaccuracy, indicate the existence of another variant ?

इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी ॥

On one side a tiger, on the other a precipice! A serious dilemma! There is a good example in Hemacandra's Paris'ī-ṣṭaparvan iii. 166:—“कुटुम्बमपि मे प्रेयः प्रेयांस्त्वमपि हे सखे । किं करोमि द्विधाचित्त इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी.” Another is found in Syādvāda-manjarī, page 151:—“अवास्तवत्वग्राहकं प्रमाणं सांवृतमसांवृतं वा स्यात् । यदि सांवृतं कथं तस्मादवास्तवाद्वास्तवस्य शून्यवादस्य सिद्धिः प्राप्ता । तथा च वास्तव एव समस्तोऽपि प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारः । अथ तद्ग्राहकं प्रमाणं स्वयमसांवृतं तर्हि क्षीणाः प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारा वास्तवत्वप्रतिज्ञातेनैव व्यभिचारात् । तदेवं पक्षद्वयेऽपीतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटीति न्यायेन व्यक्त एव परमार्थतः स्वाभिमतसिद्धिविरोधः” ॥ In the following verse on page 896 of Upamiti-bhavaprapaṇcā Kathā we have the nyāya as a compound:—

“इतो हि मैथुनस्याज्ञा इतः सागरवारणम् ।

स व्याघ्रदुस्तटीन्यायः संजातो मे सुदुस्तरः” ॥

इष्यमाणस्यैव प्राधान्यं न त्विच्छायाः ॥

The thing wished for is of more importance than the wish. This occurs in Vedāntakalpataruparimala, page 56, as follows:—“ननु विध्यन्वयित्वेनाविवक्षितमपि प्रैषानुवचनमनुवाद्यतया यथाविधेयदण्डान्वयि एवमिच्छापि प्रारभ्यमाणब्रह्मज्ञानान्वयिनी सती ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य प्रयोजनत्वं ब्रह्मणः सन्दिग्धत्वं च गमयेत् । इच्छेप्यमाणसमभिव्याहारे चेप्यमाणप्राधान्यं यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादौ क्लृप्तम् । अत इहापीच्छाप्राधान्यं विहायेप्यमाणप्राधान्यमभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तम्” ॥ Again, on page 62 of the same:—“प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानमिति सामान्यन्यायादिच्छेप्यमाणसमभिव्याहृताविष्यमाणं प्रधानमिति स्वर्गकामपदादिषु क्लृप्तो विशेषन्यायो बलवानिति भावः” ॥ So too, in Rāmānuja's Sribhāṣya, page 31:—“ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । इच्छाया इष्यमाणप्रधानत्वादिष्यमाणं ज्ञानमिह विधीयते” ॥ This is repeated verbatim in the Rāmānuja section of Sarva-dars'anasangraha, page 69 (Jivānanda's edn).

उदरे भृते कोशो भृतः ॥

When his stomach is full his coffers are full. Used of a lazy fellow who has no ambition beyond his daily food. "Whose god is his belly." It occurs in Hemacandra's Paris'istaparvan iii. 113:—"दारिद्र्येण मदीयेन बिभर्ष्युदरमप्यदः । उदरे च भृते कोशो भृत इत्येव मन्यसे."

उपवासाद्वरं भिक्षा ॥

It is better to beg than to starve. This is one of Raghunātha's nyāyas and he applies it thus:—

“येषां तु धीमान्चाद्भूयो भूयः श्रूयमाणोऽप्यभेदो न बुद्धिमारोहति तैस्तूपवासाद्वरं भिक्षेति न्यायेन भेदबुद्ध्यापि स्वप्नेमास्पदविग्रहावच्छिन्नशाराधनं कार्यं तत्प्रसादान्मधोदये शालिसमृद्धौ कोद्रवाशनत्यागन्यायेन त्याज्या भेदधीः” ॥

It is found in Pancadas'ī ix. 119, 120:—

“अस्त्येवोपासकस्यापि वास्तवी ब्रह्मतेति चेत् ।
पामराणां तिरश्चां च वास्तवी ब्रह्मता न किम् ॥
अज्ञानादपुमर्थत्वमुभयत्रापि तत्समम् ।
उपवासाद्यथा भिक्षा वरं ध्यानं तथान्यतः” ॥

उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तोऽप्यपवाद उपसंजातनिमित्तमप्युत्सर्गं बाधते ॥

This is another of Raghunātha's grammatical nyāyas. It is not met with in the Mahābhāṣya, but forms one of Nāgoji-bhaṭṭa's paribhāṣās. The following is Prof. Kielhorn's rendering of it:—"An apavāda, even though the causes of its (application) are still to present themselves, supersedes a general rule the causes (of the application) of which are already present." In connection with this paribhāṣā we have the देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्याय which see below.

उभयतःपाशा रज्जुः ॥

A rope which binds at both ends. An embarrassing position ; a dilemma. The following is from the Jaimini section of Sarvadars'anasangraha (page 133, Bib. Ind., or 150 of Jivānanda's edition), with Professor Cowell's translation (page 198):—

“अभावः कारणमेव न भवतीति चेत्तदा वक्तव्यमभावस्य कार्यत्वमस्ति न वा । यदि नास्ति तदा पटप्रध्वंसानुपपत्त्या नित्यताप्रसङ्गः । अथास्ति किमपराद्धं कारणत्वेनेति । सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः” ॥

“If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not ? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its ‘emergent non-existence’ or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also ? So this rope binds you at both ends.”

The earliest occurrence of the nyāya is in Patanjali 6. 1. 68 (vārt. 2 and 5); and it is found in *Tantravārtika* 3. 6. 42 (page 1113) as follows:—“यद्यपि न बाधस्तथापि विकल्पस्तावत्प्राप्नोति न हि तुल्यार्थानां कचित्समुच्चयो दृष्टः सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः” ॥ Maṇḍanamis'ra used it in *Vidhiviveka*, page 83; and we find instances of it in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 436, line 16; in *Kusumāñjali* iii. 6 (page 374); in the same author's *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, page 56; in *Khaṇḍana*, page 530; and in the opening part of *Citsukhī* (Paṇḍit, vol iv. page 466).

एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत् ॥

A thing that is changed in one part does not thereby become something else (literally, like something else). For example, as Patanjali says under 1. 1. 56 (vārt. 10), the cutting of a dog's ears or tail does not turn it into a horse or a donkey, but it is still a dog ! Other passages of the Mahābhāṣya where this paribhāṣā occurs are as follows:—S'ivasūtra 2, vārtika 4 (i. e. vol. i. page 21); 2. 4. 85 (vārt. 10); 4. 1. 83; 6. 1. 69

(vārt. 3); 6. 4. 149 (vārt. 2); and 8. 3. 85. The paribhāṣā is No 37 in Dr. Kielhorn's edition of the *Paribhāṣendus'ekkhara*, and my rendering of it is based upon his. It is included in Raghunātha's list of nyāyas, and is quoted as such by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 589, line 6. For further illustrations of the paribhāṣā, see under *श्चा कर्णे वा &c.*

एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनेऽन्यसम्बन्धिस्मरणम् ॥

On seeing one thing we are reminded of others connected with it. The nyāya is found in this form in the *Nyāyapradīpa* on *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 44, where the presence of smoke is said to remind the spectator of the invariably connected fire. In Amaradāsa's *tikā* on *S'ikhāmani*, page 93, it is quoted as "एकसम्बन्धिज्ञानमपरसम्बन्धिस्मारकम्". In both of Raghunātha-varman's books it appears as एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनमन्यसम्बन्धिस्मारकम्, and, in the larger of the two, he illustrates it thus:—"यथा हस्तिपददर्शनं हस्तिस्मारकं तथा नद्यादिज्ञानस्य कुशकाशजलतुंबिकाजल्लूकानां तत्सम्बन्धिनां स्मरणहेतुत्वम्." Tārānātha (s. v. न्याय) quotes the saying in the form एकसम्बन्धिज्ञानम् &c. He reverses the above illustration by saying that the elephant reminds one of the driver; and adds that a word reminds one of its meaning, a statement which, in these degenerate times, is not universally true! See, too, *Tātparyatīkā*, page 167, line 18.

कपिञ्जलन्यायः ॥

The rule as to the *Kapinjalas* [a kind of partridge]. In *Vājasaneyi-Samhitā* xxiv. 20, we read वसन्ताय "कपिञ्जलानालभेत," and the question arises, *how many* of the birds are to be sacrificed? Jaimini devotes eight sūtras [11. 1. 38-45] to the discussion of this point, and finally decides that *three*, the lowest figure representing *plurality* (two being merely duality), will satisfy the requirements of the s'ruti. S'abara's lengthy argument is very concisely summed up in the *Nyāyamālā-vistara*, as follows:—

“कपिञ्जलेषु त्रित्वाद्या णेच्छिकास्त्रित्वमेव वा ।

आद्यो बहुत्वसाम्यान्न त्रित्वेनैव कृतत्वतः ॥

अश्वमेधे ‘वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभत’ इति त्रित्वचतुष्पादिसंख्यानां बहुत्व-
साम्यादिच्छया या काचिद्बहुत्वसंख्या स्वीकार्येति चेत् । न । त्रित्वेनैव शास्त्रस्य
कृतत्वात् । यो हि चतुष्पादिसंख्यामुपादत्ते तेन न तदन्तर्भूतं त्रित्वं वर्जयितुं शक्यं
त्रित्वमुपाददानेन त्वनन्तर्भूतं चतुष्पादिकं वर्जयितुं शक्यते अतोऽवश्यंभावित्वेन
प्रथमभावित्वेन लाघवेन च त्रित्व उपात्ते शास्त्रार्थसिद्धौ ततोऽधिकपक्षिर्हिंसायां
प्रत्यवायात् । तस्मान्त्रित्वमेवोपादेयम्” ॥

There is an admirable example in *Nyāyakandalī*, page 50, where, in commenting on Pras’astapāda’s “इहेदानीं चतुर्णां
महाभूतानां सृष्टिसंहारविधिरुच्यते,” S’rīdhara says:—“महाभूतानामित्युक्ते
त्रयाणामेव परिग्रहः कपिञ्जलानालभेतेतिवद्बहुत्वसंख्यायास्तावत्येव चरितार्थ-
त्वात् । अतश्चतुर्णामित्युक्तम्.”

It is found also in *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 12 (page 394), and
3. 5. 26 (page 1049); in *Parimala*, page 550, line 3; and in
S’ikhāmaṇi, page 303. Commenting on *Manu* viii. 105,
where certain offerings are directed to be made to Sarasvatī,
Kullūka decides that, in accordance with the *kapinjala-nyāya*
three are sufficient. The *nyāya* is clearly of the type of सकृत्कृते
कृतः शास्त्रार्थः and in accord with the Marāṭhī phrase शास्त्रापुरता.

कंबलनिर्णेजनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the cleansing of a coarse blanket* [by beating it
on the feet, and so dusting them at the same time]! One of the
numerous examples of the accomplishment of two objects by
one operation:—“killing two birds with one stone.” It is found
in S’abara 2. 2. 25:—“अपि च दधि उभयमसमर्थं कर्तुं फलं साधयितुं
होमं च । ननु कंबलनिर्णेजनवदेतद्विष्यति । निर्णेजनं हि उभयं करोति ।
कंबलशुद्धिं पादयोश्च निर्मलताम्” ॥ The कंबल (the कंबल of the
Marāṭhas) is made of extremely coarse and rough material, and

generally black or black and grey. In the case of the very poor, it is often their sole garment by day as well as their only covering at night.

करिबृंहितन्यायः ॥

The *nyāya* of the *trumpeting of an elephant*. The word करि is really redundant, since the whole meaning is conveyed by बृंहित alone—बृंहितं करिगर्जितमित्यमरः—but the addition, in this and similar cases, is made for some special purpose. Raghunātha defines it thus:—“विशिष्टवाचकानामपि पदानां सति पृथग्विशेषण-वाचकपदसमवधाने विशेष्यमात्रपरतायां करिबृंहितन्यायः प्रवर्तते.” This principle may be exemplified by the following verse from *Kāvyaaprakāśa* vii. 10:—

“सौन्दर्यसम्पत्तारुण्यं यस्यास्ते ते च विभ्रमाः ।

षट्पदान्पुष्पमालेव कान्नाकर्षति सा सखे” ॥

Here the author of the *Kāvya-pradīpa* remarks (page 295):—“मालाशब्दो यद्यपि पुष्पस्यैव स्रजि शक्तस्तथापि न पुष्पपदमपुष्टार्थम् । लक्षणयोत्कृष्टत्वप्रतिपादकत्वात् । अयमेव करिबृंहितन्यायः.” So too, the *Udāharaṇacandrikā*:—“अत्र निरुपपदान्मालाशब्दादेव पुष्पस्रक्प्रतीतेः पुष्पपदमुत्कृष्टपुष्पत्वे संक्रमितवाच्यम् । एवमेव करिबृंहितादिष्वपि बोध्यम्.”

The following additional *nyāyas* are cited by Raghunātha as belonging to the same class:—गजघटान्याय, नीलेन्दीवरन्याय, पर्वताधित्यकान्याय, पर्वतोपत्यकान्याय, वाजिमन्दुरान्याय, मृगवागुरान्याय. In each case the first word might be omitted without affecting the meaning.

कलञ्जन्यायः ॥

The law of [abstention from] the *flesh of an animal killed with a poisoned arrow*. “Some hold the Kalanja to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow; others, hemp or bhang;

others, a kind of garlic." (Cowell's note on page 81 of his translation of *Kusumāñjali*). But this can hardly be correct as the garlic and bhang are mentioned in addition. It may be noticed, however, that ताम्रकूट is given as an equivalent of कलञ्ज, the meaning of which is the tobacco plant. It is deduced from Jaimini 6. 2. 19, 20,—an adhikarāṇa designed to teach the evil result of doing forbidden things. The words "न कलञ्जं भक्षयितव्यं न लज्जनं न गृञ्जनं च" are discussed, and the question arises as to whether this is an instance of पर्युदास or of प्रतिषेध,—whether it means अभक्षणं कर्तव्यं or भक्षणं न कर्तव्यम्. The subtle intellect of the Mīmāṃsaka sees a great difference between these two, the former being something to be done, and the latter being something to be avoided! The siddhāntin decides in favour of the latter. I would advise my readers to study pages 39-41 of Dr. Thibaut's excellent translation of *Arthasaṅgraha*, in order to get, if possible, a clear understanding of this peculiar tenet. Many years ago, when in India, I heard a statement made by a Brahman, to the effect that the words "put no oil in the lamp," did not mean "don't put oil in the lamp," but rather "put in the lamp" some "no-oil"; in other words, it was not a prohibition of an act but an injunction to do something! This is just the position of the Mīmāṃsaka, who, in regard to the rule that a Snātaka must not look at the rising or setting sun, says that "not-looking is something to be done." The above nyāya is quoted by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 4. 28, and 4. 1. 13, and is found in *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, i. 417-420, and in *S'rībhāṣya* 1. 1. 4 (page 687).

कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम् ॥

Like the erection of a temple including the pot-shaped finial [which is placed on the summit at its completion]. Used ironically of one who considers that he is doing something as meritorious as the building of a complete temple.

In a footnote to page 73 of his translation of *Prabandha-cintāmaṇi*, Mr. Tawney says :—"Dr. Burgess informs me that *kalas'a* is really the finial of the spire, which is shaped like a vase or urn." Then, on page 135, there is the following footnote:—"Mr. Cousens writes in a letter, which Dr. Burgess has kindly shown me, 'I understand that the term *kalas'adanda-pratiṣṭhā* refers solely to the setting up of the *kalas'a* or pot-finial, the *danda* being the pole or stick which supports the finial and upon which it is set up. With a small *kalas'a* made solid, it would not be required, the neck of the same taking its place, but it is always required with the larger and more complex *kalas'as*, especially those made of hollow metal." Frequent mention is made by Merutunga of the erection of a कलश and ध्वज as the completion of a temple. The two are mentioned on pages 119 and 211, whilst on pages 219 and 222 we have the कलशदण्डप्रतिष्ठा referred to above. On pages 120 and 224, the कलश is mentioned alone. In Hemacandra's *Paris'istaparvan* i. 14, we find कुम्भ for कलश—"तत्र चैत्येषु सौवर्णध्वजकुम्भमरीचयः". The illustration occurs in S'ārngadhara's *ṭikā* on Udayana's definition of *dravya* in his *Lakṣaṇāvali* (page 4). The definition is—"तत्र गुणात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणं द्रव्यम्," and, whilst explaining it, the commentator attacks the views of Citsukha Muni as follows:—"यत्तत्र तत्त्वप्रदीपिकाकारेणोत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षणे अव्याप्तिमुद्भाव्य गुणवत्त्वात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वे च परिहारमाशङ्क्योत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षणविशिष्टे कदाचिदपि गुणानुदयात्पुनरव्याप्तेस्तदवस्थत्वाच्चैवमिति परिहृतम् । तत्कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम्." It is necessary here to bear in mind the tenet of the logicians—"उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणं तिष्ठति." The *Tattvapradīpikā*, better known as *Citsukhī*, is described by Hall as "a confutation of the Nyāya philosophy, on the basis of the Vedānta." The wrath of the logicians would of course, therefore, be kindled against it. The passage complained of above is the s'loka ii. 4 with the vṛitti. The former stands thus:—"अव्याप्तेरप्यतिव्याप्तेर्द्रव्यं नैव गुणाश्रयः । आद्ये क्षणे गुणाभावाद्गुणादावपि वीक्षणात्."

काकदधिघातकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a crow as a destroyer of curds*. An example of *upalakṣaṇa*, where one represents many, or a part stands for the whole. So if any one were warned to keep the crows off the curds, it would imply that all other possible raiders were also to be warded off. It is thus put by Bhartṛihari in *Vākya-padīya* ii. 314:—

“काकेभ्यो रक्ष्यतां सर्पिरिति बालोऽपि चोदितः ।

उपघातपरे वाक्ये न श्वादिभ्यो न रक्षति” ॥

This is reproduced, with slight variations, in *Tantravārtika*, page 731, and is quoted in the same form in *Bhāmatī* 1. 4. 3 (page 287). Raghunātha's application of it is as follows:—

“तदुक्तमीश्वरगीतायाम् । ‘ये त्विमं विष्णुमव्यक्तं मां च देवं महेश्वरम् । एकीभावेन पश्यन्ति न तेषां पुनरुद्भवः’ इति । अत्र हरिहरयोर्ग्रहणं काकदधिघातकन्यायेन विधेरप्युपलक्षणम्” . The *Īśvaragītā* forms part of the *uttarabhāga* of the *Kūrma Purāṇa*, and the verse here quoted is xi. 8. In the fourth chapter of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (page 285) this is given as an example of *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā*.

“जहदजहल्लक्षणोदाहरणं तु काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यादिकमेव । तत्र शक्यकाकपरित्यागेनाशक्यदध्युपघातकत्वपुरस्कारेणाकाके काके च काकशब्दस्य प्रवृत्तेः” ॥ This kind of *lakṣaṇā* is termed *bhāgalakṣaṇā* in *Vedāntasāra* 23; and *bhāgatyaḡgalakṣaṇā* in *Vivaraṇaprameya*, page 229. In the *ग्रहैकत्वन्याय*, too, a part represents the whole.

काकाधिकरणत्वन्यायः ॥

The being *something on which a crow is perched*. This illustration seems to have originated with Patanjali, and is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 26 (vārtikas 3 and 4):—“अनुबन्धोऽन्यत्वकर इति चेत्तन्न । किं कारणम् । लोपात् । लुप्यतेऽत्रानुबन्धः । लुप्तेऽत्रानुबन्धे नान्यत्वं भविष्यति । तद्यथा । कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम् । अदो यत्रासौ

काक इति । उत्पतिते काके नष्टं तद्गृहं भवति । एवमिहापि लुप्तेऽनुबन्धे नष्टः प्रत्ययो भवति । यद्यपि लुप्यते जानाति त्वसौ सानुबन्धकस्येयं संज्ञा कृतेति । तद्यथा । इतरत्रापि कतरदेवदत्तस्य गृहम् । अदो यत्रासौ काक इति । उत्पतिते काके यद्यपि नष्टं तद्गृहं भवत्यन्तस्तमुद्देशं जानाति.”

It occurs in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 195) in the course of a discussion on Bādarāyaṇa's second sūtra:—“ततः कारणसंबन्धिनो जन्मादेरलक्षणत्वमिति चेन्मैवम् । काकाधिकरणत्ववदुपपत्तेः । काकाधिकरणत्वं हि न गृहेऽन्तर्भवति । तथा च सति काकविगमे गृहैकदेश-भङ्गबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । अतो गृहस्याधिकरणत्वं नामौपाधिको धर्मः स च परि-शेषालक्षणे एवान्तर्भवति । तन्निरूपकस्य काकस्य यथा लक्षणत्वं तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि कारणत्वमौपाधिको धर्मो लक्षणान्तःपाती.” Similarly in *Saṅkṣepa-s'ārīraka* i. 206:—“यत्रैष काक इदमेव तु देवदत्तवेश्मेति लाक्षणिकवृत्ति-रिहाभ्युपेता । काकास्पदत्वमवधीर्य तथापि वेश्ममात्राकृतिर्भवति लाक्षणिकी तु बुद्धिः” ॥ With slight modifications it is found also in *Tantra-vārtika*, page 277, line 8:—“यथानभिधीयमानमपि काकनिलयनं देव-दत्तगृहशब्दस्य स्वार्थमभिदधतश्चिह्नभूततां प्रतिपद्यते तद्वाकृतिश्चिह्नं व्यक्त्य-भिधाने भविष्यति.” See, also, *Khaṇḍana*, page 502.

काचिन्निषादी पुत्रं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निषादस्तु कषायपायी ॥

A Niṣādi gives birth to a son, and a Niṣāda drinks the decoction of herbs [prepared for her]! For the context of this आभाणक see under “मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते.”

काण्डानुसमयन्यायः ॥

The law relating to “the performance of all prescribed acts of ritual in orderly succession for a particular object before performing the same acts in the same order for a second object.” This is Sir Monier-Williams' definition based on the commen- tary on Āsvalāyana's *Gṛīhyasūtra* 1. 24. 7 which prescribes certain gifts commencing with विष्टर and ending with गो. The

commentator says “ऋत्विजां मधुपर्कदाने द्वे गती संभवतः । पदार्थानुसमयः काण्डानुसमय इति । तत्र पदार्थानुसमयो नाम सर्वेषां वरणक्रमेण विष्टरं दत्त्वा ततः पाद्यं ततोऽर्घ्यमिति । काण्डानुसमयो नाम एकस्यैव विष्टरादिगोनिवेदनान्तं समाप्य ततोऽन्यस्य सर्वं ततोऽन्यस्येति.” In a case of this kind, where there is merely a bestowal of gifts, and not the performance of sacrificial ritual, the definition given by Molesworth is more suitable:—“The order, when a suit or set of things is to be given to each individual of a multitude, *of giving at once* all the articles composing the suit or set, as distinguished from पदार्थानुसमय.”

The nyāya represents the purport of Jaimini 5. 2. 3. Kunte says that the word अभ्यावृत्ति used in the sūtra means *kāṇḍānu-samaya*. His notes on sūtras 1–3 contain some very interesting items of information, of especial value to us of the West. See पदार्थानुसमयन्याय, below.

कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायः ॥

The figure of *the laying down of a water-course for irrigation*. An example of a thing made for one purpose subserving other purposes also. It is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 118, line 9:—“अतो न विधेयप्रत्यये तात्पर्यमिति कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायेनोभयार्थत्वाविधेयत्वात् । यथा शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्य एव पानीयं च पीयते तद्वत् ॥”

For the source of this nyāya, see अन्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति.

कूटकार्षापणन्यायः ॥

The simile of [the unwitting employment of] *base money* [in one's business]. It is used by Kumārila (in *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 3, page 95) in the course of an argument on the relative value of S'ruti and Smṛiti. He maintains that if any teaching of the latter is found to be in opposition to that of the former, it must be given up; just as a man who finds that he has been

using counterfeit coins must at once abstain from so doing. The portion containing the nyāya is as follows:—“यो हि कूटकार्पापणेन कंचित्कालमज्ञो लोकमध्ये व्यवहरति न तेन विवेकज्ञानजनितव्युत्पत्तिनापि तथैव व्यवहर्तव्यम्.”

In *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 8 (page 149, line 3 from bottom), Kumārila compares words to coins which can be tested by intelligent people. He says:—“शब्दापभ्रंशवदेव गौणभ्रान्त्यादिप्रयोगनिमित्ता अर्थापभ्रंशा भवन्ति ते शास्त्रस्थैरेवाविष्णुतार्थक्रियानिमित्तपुण्यार्थभिः शक्यन्ते साध्वसाधुकार्पापणमध्यादिव तत्परीक्षिभिर्विवेक्तुम्.”

The nyāya is found in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 162, as follows:—“नापि बाधकाभावपरिच्छेदात्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स हि तात्कालिको वा स्यात्कालान्तरभावी वा । तात्कालिको न पर्याप्तः प्रामाण्यपरिनिश्चये । कूटकार्पापणादौ किंचित्कालमनुत्पन्नबाधकेऽपि कालान्तरे तदुत्पाददर्शनात्.” It occurs again on page 169, line 3, on page 187, line 4 from bottom, and on page 531, line 1.

कूपखानकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the well-digger*. It is applied by Raghunātha as follows:—“यथा कूपखानके पतितं पंकादि कूपान्निःसृतेनाम्भसा प्रक्षाल्यते तथा तत्तद्विग्रहावच्छिन्नेशभेदबुद्धिजो दोषस्तदुपासनाजन्यसुकृतमहिम्नोत्पन्नेनाद्वैतबोधेन समूलं निवर्त्यत इति ज्ञेयम्॥” The illustration is as old as Patanjali who made use of it in the introductory chapter of the *Mahābhāṣya* (vol. i. page 11) when discoursing on the importance of the study of grammar, and on the merit which accrues to the user of correct words. He says:—“अथवाभ्युपाय एवापशब्दज्ञानं शब्दज्ञाने । योऽपशब्दज्ञानाति शब्दानप्यसौ जानाति । तदेवं ज्ञाने धर्म इति ब्रुवतोऽर्थादापन्नं भवत्यपशब्दज्ञानपूर्वके शब्दज्ञाने धर्म इति । अथवा कूपखानकवदेतद्भविष्यति । तद्यथा कूपखानकः कूपं खनन्यद्यपि मृदा पांसुभिश्चावकीर्णो भवति सोऽप्यु संजातासु तत एव तं गुणमासादयति येन स च दोषो निर्हण्यते भूयसा चाभ्युदयेन योगो भवत्येवमिहापि यद्यप्यपशब्दज्ञानेऽधर्मस्तथापि यस्त्वसौ शब्दज्ञाने धर्मस्तेन स च दोषो निर्हण्यते भूयसा चाभ्युदयेन योगो भविष्यति.”

कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षा ॥

This is identical in meaning with मुण्डितशिरोनक्षत्रान्वेषणम् for which see the Second Handful. It occurs in *Nyāyaman-jarī*, page 164:—“अनिश्चितप्रामाण्यस्य तु प्रवृत्तौ पश्चात्तन्निर्णयो भवन्नपि कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षावदफल एवेत्युक्तम्.” Lower down on the same page, there is another nyāya of similar import, in the following verse:—

“समर्थकारणज्ञानाद्योऽपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चयम् ।
ब्रूते सोऽपि कृतोद्वाहस्तत्र लग्नं परीक्षते.” ॥

कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

The rule that “whenever it may appear doubtful whether an operation has reference to that which is expressed by the technical or to that which is expressed by the ordinary meaning of a particular term, the operation refers (only) to that which is expressed by the technical meaning of the term in question.” This is Professor Kielhorn’s rendering of the nyāya as quoted in Nāgojibhaṭṭa’s vṛitti to Paribhāṣā ix:—“ननु संख्याग्रहणे बद्धादीनामेव ग्रहणं स्यात्प्रकरणस्याभिधानियामकत्वसिद्धात्कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति न्यायात्” ॥ It is taken from the *Mahābhāṣya* where it appears several times. In 1. 1. 23 (vārt. 3), it is followed by the example “लोके गोपालकमानय कटजकमानयेति यस्यैषा संज्ञा भवति स आनीयते न यो गाः पालयति यो वा कटे जातः”. Sīradeva includes it in his collection of paribhāṣās.

केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून् भ्रामयन् ॥

Like an impecunious debtor deceiving the money-lenders with empty promises. This occurs in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 20, as follows:—“अवस्तुत्वादिति चेन्नन्वेतदपि कुतः सिद्धम् । सर्वसामर्थ्य-विरहादिति चेत्सोऽयमितस्ततः केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून्भ्रामयन्प-रस्परश्रयदोषमपि न पश्यति”.

क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्तु ॥

Action may vary, but substance cannot. This is plainly set forth in *S'āṅkarabhāṣya* 1. 1. 2 (page 37) as follows:—
 “कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म । यथाश्चेन गच्छति पञ्चामन्यथा वा न वा गच्छतीति ।न तु वस्त्वेवं नैवमस्ति नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते”. Similarly in 2. 1. 27 (page 471):—“क्रियाविषये हि..... विकल्पाश्रयणंइह तु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः संभवत्यपुरुष-तन्त्रत्वाद्वास्तुनः”.

Then, in Ānandagiri's comment on 1. 4, 1 (page 325), we find the expression क्रियायामिव वस्तुनि-विकल्पाभावात्,” and on page 359, “न हि वस्तुनि विकल्पोऽस्ति.” It occurs also on the first page of the Rāmānuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—“न च सदसत्त्वयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोः समुच्चयासंभवे विकल्पः किं न स्यादिति वदितव्यं क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्त्विति न्यायात्.” “Nor should any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence, there being the rule that it is action, not *Ens*, that alternates?” This rendering is Professor Gough's. The nyāya is found, too, in *S'āstradīpikā* 1. 3. 8 (page 154, line 6), and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iii. 82.

कोष्टः क्व च नीराजना ॥

What connection has a camel with the lustration of arms? None at all; and the phrase is used to indicate that certain things are not connected. The नीराजनाविधि (as described in chapter 267 of the Agni Purāṇa) was a ceremony performed by kings or generals before going forth to battle, and consisted of the purification of the component parts of the army, including that of the horses, the elephants, and the weapons. The वाजिनीराजनाविधि is mentioned in *Raghuvamś'a* iv. 25, on

which Mallinātha remarks:—"वाजिग्रहणं गजादीनामप्युपलक्षणं तेषामपि नीराजनाविधानात्." The illustration appears in *Upamiti-bhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 522:—"नद्यादिवस्तुभेदार्थं कथितं मे कथानकम् । त्वयेदं तत्र मे भाति क्रोद्धो नीराजना क च" ॥

क्षते क्षारमिव ॥

Like salt on a wound. "क्षारं क्षते क्षिप् has become proverbial, and means 'to aggravate the pain which is already unbearable,' 'to make bad worse,' 'to add insult to injury'." (Āpte's Dictionary). He cites *Uttararāmacarita* iv. 7:—"य एव मे जनपूर्वमासीन्मूर्त्तौ महोत्सवः । क्षते क्षारमिवासह्यं जातं तस्यैव दर्शनम्." Also *Mricchakatika* V. 18. I have met with it again in *Upamiti-bhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 5, verse 42:—"कथां कामार्थयोस्तस्मान्न कुर्वीत कदाचन । कः क्षते क्षारनिक्षेपं विदधीत विचक्षणः" ॥ There is another example on page 993 of the same.

गर्गशतदण्डनन्यायः ॥

The figure of the infliction of a fine of one hundred on the *Gargas*. There are two *paribhāṣās* which are frequently found together in the *Mahābhāṣya*, viz. "प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः" and "समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः." Professor Kielhorn (in his translation of *Nāgojibhaṭṭa*) renders them (the latter slightly modified) thus:—"What is stated (in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of each of them separately." And "sometimes (it) also (happens that what is stated in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of all of them collectively." Patanjali's illustration of the former is "देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्रा भोज्यन्ताम्," where, of course, each separate person is to be fed; and his illustration of the latter is "गर्गाः शतं दण्ड्यन्ताम्" where the *Gargas* collectively are to be fined a hundred. The passages where these occur are 1. 1. 1 (vārt. 12); 1. 1. 7 (vārt. 1); 2. 1. 4; 2. 3. 46; 6. 1. 5 (vārt. 2); 8. 3. 58; and 8. 4. 2 (vārt. 3).

The two paribhāṣās and examples are quoted by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 223), and the second one is referred to as follows by Kumārila in his vārtika on the same passage (page 712):—" पुरः पुनराह सत्यमेष न दोष इति । क्रियाप्राधान्ये तु तद्व-
शीकृतविशेषणसमुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः । गर्गशतदण्डनहोमाभिषवभक्षवदिति
परिहारः । न तु दण्डस्य दण्ड्यसंस्कारत्वाद्भोजनादिवत्प्रतिगर्गमावृत्तिः प्राप्नोति ।
नैष दोषः ।

शारीरो निग्रहो यत्र तत्र प्रत्येकभिन्नता ।

हिरण्यादानदण्डस्तु समुदाये समाप्यते" ॥

This paribhāṣā occurs also in *Tantravārtika* 1. 4. 3 (page 294, line 15), and in 1. 4. 8 (page 300); whilst the former one is quoted in 1. 4. 18 (page 314).

गर्तस्थमृतसर्पन्यायः ॥

The simile of a snake lying dead in a hole. It is employed by Vijnāna Bhikṣu (in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 1. 2, page 36) when explaining the line " प्राक्सृष्टेः प्रलयादूर्ध्वं नासीत्किंचि-
द्विजोत्तम " from the *Nārasimha Purāṇa*. He says " नासीदिति
विरतव्यापारतया कारणरूपेण गर्तस्थमृतसर्पवद्विलीनमासीदित्यर्थः ॥ " Again,
on page 96 of the same:—" एवं सर्वत्र तां च प्रकृतिं गुणत्रयरूपिणीं
नित्यामपि निर्व्यापारतया गर्तस्थमृतसर्पवत्करणकारणविविक्ते चिन्मात्रे विलाप-
यन्ति." On the next page we have it again, in a similar con-
nection, as मृतसर्पवत्.

गार्हपत्यन्यायः ॥

The rule as to the [application to the] *Gārhapatya-fire* [of a
mantra in which reference is made to Indra]. This represents
Mīmāṃsāsūtras 3. 2. 3, 4 where the Vedic mantra " निवेशनः
सङ्गमनो वसूनामित्यैन्द्रया गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते " is discussed. The question
is raised whether, since the mantra makes mention of Indra,
the adoration is addressed to him or to the *Gārhapatya* (one

of the three sacred fires perpetually maintained by a householder, and from which fires for sacrificial purposes are lighted). Jaimini's decision is in favour of the latter on the ground that direct enunciation (*s'ruti*) is stronger than suggestive power (*linga*). The following extract from *Arthasangraha* page 6, with Dr. Thibaut's translation (page 11), will explain this:—"सेयं श्रुतिर्लिङ्गादिभ्यः प्रबला ।...अत एव ऐन्द्र्या लिङ्गान्नेन्द्रोपस्थानार्थत्वम् । किंतु ऐन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठत इत्यत्र गार्हपत्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्या गार्हपत्योपस्थानार्थत्वम्." "Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestive power and the other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to another); ...for this reason we do not conclude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (apparently) addressed to Indra (that is, a verse containing a mention of Indra's name, or one of his attributes &c.) is really to be used for addressing Indra; but rather decide if we find at the same time a direct enunciation as, for instance, 'with a verse bearing Indra's mark he addresses the Gārhapatya', that in consequence of the direct enunciation of the second case termination (Gārhapatyam) the verse is subsidiary to the act of addressing the Gārhapatya-fire." The words "निवेशनः सङ्गमनो वसूनाम्", which, amongst other places, are found in the *Atharvasamhitā* x. 8. 42, are rendered by Professor Whitney "The reposer, the assembler of good things"; and by Mr. Griffith, "Luller to rest, and gatherer up of treasures." As quoted in *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa* 7. 2. 1. 20, Prof. Eggeling translates it "The harbourer and gatherer of riches"! Who shall decide between these learned doctors? The Gārhapatyanyāya is explained and applied in *Bhāmati* 3. 3. 25 (page 613), and in other works on Vedānta. Owing to the word ऐन्द्री in sūtra 3, the adhikaraṇa is sometimes styled ऐन्द्रीन्याय.

गोदोहनन्यायः ॥

The simile of the *milk-pail*. It is laid down that a sacrificer who wishes for cattle must bring the water for his sacrifice in a milk-pail. But that is not done in other cases. The *godohana* is therefore used as an illustration of something which is *occasionally*, and not universally, connected with an act or performance as an essential part of it. It occurs in *S'ānkarabhaṣya* 3. 3. 42, as follows:—"सन्ति कर्माङ्गव्यपाश्रयाणि विज्ञानानि 'ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत' इत्येवमादीनि । किं तानि नित्यान्येव स्युः कर्मसु पर्णमयीत्वादिवदुत्तानित्यानि गोदोहनादिवदिति विचारयामः". Then, at the close of the same:—"तस्माद्यथा कृत्वाश्रयाप्यपि गोदोहनादीनि फलसंयोगादनित्यान्येवमुद्गीथाद्युपासनानीत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्." It appears again in 3. 3. 65; 3. 4. 45, and in 4. 1. 6. Sures'vara quotes it also in his *vārtika* on the *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3. 3. 51:—"न च गोदोहनन्यायः काम्यकर्मसु युज्यते । तेषां मुक्तिफलत्वे हि न मानं विद्यते यतः" ॥

For the mantra regarding the use of this pail, see S'abara and *Nyāyamālāvistara* on Jaimini 4. 1. 2. Other references to the *nyāya* are *Tantravārtika* 3. 6. 43 (page 1118); and *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 166, line 4, in connection with which a verse is quoted from *S'lokavārtika* (page 63) where mention is made of the *godohana*. Kunte's long note on the *sūtra* of Jaimini referred to above will be found useful.

गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

When a word has both a primary and a secondary meaning, an operation takes effect (only) when the word conveys its primary meaning. This is an abridgment of Professor Kielhorn's rendering of Nāgojibhaṭṭa's fifteenth *paribhāṣā*; and the following extracts from the *vṛitti* may help to explain it:—"A word which is employed in a secondary sense is so

employed (only) because (the character of that which it denotes in) its primary sense is ascribed (to that which it denotes in a secondary sense)." "For example, the word गो 'ox' conveys the secondary meaning 'one who is only fit for bearing burdens, an unintelligent person,' because (such a person has) certain qualities such as stupidity &c. (in common with an ox)".

The nyāya appears in the above form in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 15, and 6. 3. 46; but in 1. 4. 108, and in 8. 3. 82, the word कार्य is omitted. In this shortened form it is quoted by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 2. 13 (page 185), and 1. 3. 14 (page 246). Then in 4. 3. 12, S'ankara says "परं हि ब्रह्म ब्रह्म-शब्दस्य मुख्यमालम्बनं गौणमपरम् । मुख्यगौणयोश्च मुख्ये संप्रत्ययो भवति". In *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 346, line 3, we read:—"ननु सन्दिग्धं वस्तु प्रायदर्शनान्निर्णीयते । गौणमुख्यग्रहणविषये च मुख्ये सम्प्रत्ययः".

In S'abara's bhāṣya on Jamini 3. 2. 1 (which deals with the *Barhirmnyāya*) we have a very interesting discussion on गौण and मुख्य, in the course of which he says "नह्यनभिधाय मुख्यं गौणमभिवदति शब्दः". The conclusion arrived at is thus expressed:—"तस्मान्मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति सिद्धम्."

ग्रहैकत्वन्यायः ॥

The illustration furnished by [the mention of the washing of] *one cup only*. This is the title of the adhikaraṇa comprising *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* 3. 1. 13-15 in which the passage relating to the cleansing of the soma-cups is discussed. The direction given is "दशपत्रेण ग्रहं संमार्ष्टि", "he cleanses the cup with a fringed filtering-cloth." But there are many such *grahas* in use; is only one of them to be washed? The decision is that all may be cleansed; and this, according to Mādhava (who is closely followed by Kṛiṣṇa Yajvan in the *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*), is

because one represents the whole, and also on the ground of the rule that "a subordinate act is to be repeated in the case of each principal thing." The cup is here the 'principal,' and the act of cleansing is 'subordinate,' and is therefore to be repeated until each one has been cleansed. The passage stands thus in the *Nyāyamālāvistara*:—"ग्रहमिति द्वितीयया ग्रहस्योद्देश्यतया प्रयोजनवत्तया च प्राधान्यं गम्यते । ग्रहं प्रति गुणः संमार्गः । 'प्रति प्रधानं च गुण आवर्तनीय इति*' न्यायेन यावन्तो ग्रहाः सन्ति ते संमार्जनीयाः" ॥

Kumārila explains this in the following *kārikā* of *Tantravārtika* 3. 1. 14:—

“व्यक्तीरुद्दिश्य यत्कर्म स्वजात्याद्युपलक्षिताः ।

विहितं गुणभावेन तत्सर्वार्थं प्रतीयते”

For further applications of the *nyāya* by him, see pages 339 (line 4 from bottom) and 551 (line 13). For its use outside the *Mīmāṃsā*, see *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 287, line 4; and *Vedāntas'ikhāmaṇi*, page 120. The grammarian Nāges'abhaṭṭa, too, in his exposition of Kaiyaṭa on 1. 1. 14 (page 319) writes thus:—"ग्रहं संमार्ष्टीत्यादौ तु ग्रहार्थत्वात्संमार्गस्य ग्रहस्य प्राधान्यमिति न तद्गतसंख्या विवक्षितेति भावः" ॥ See, too, Kaiyaṭa on the closing part of Patanjali 1. 1. 69 (vol. i. p. 169 *b* of Benares edition; or page 450 (column 1) of the *Nirṇayasāgar* edition of 1908).

प्राग्नि रेखेव ॥

Like a delineation on stone. Used of something unalterably fixed. "तन्मां वज्रकुमाराय सम्प्रदत्तान्यथा तु मे । मरणं शरणं तात प्राग्नि रेखेव गीरियम्." *Parīṣiṣṭaparvan* xii. 275. Compare Job's words (xix. 23):—"Oh that my words were now writtenthat with an iron pen and lead they were graven in the rock for ever."

* For this, see below.

चन्दनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *Sandal-oil*. Bādarāyaṇa uses this as an illustration in sūtras 2. 3. 23, 24. As the application of a drop of the oil to one part of the body produces a pleasant sensation in the whole of it, so soul, abiding in one part, namely in the heart, is yet perceived as present in the entire frame. S'ankara's exposition of the former sūtra is as follows:—

“यथा हरिचन्दनबिन्दुः शरीरैकदेशसंबद्धोऽपि सन्सकलदेहव्यापिनमाह्लादं करोत्येवमात्मापि देहैकदेशस्थः सकलदेहव्यापिनीमुपलब्धिं करिष्यति । त्वक्संबन्धाच्चास्य सकलशरीरगता वेदना न विरुध्यते । त्वगात्मनोर्हि संबन्धः कृत्स्नायां त्वचि वर्तते । त्वक्च कृत्स्नशरीरव्यापिनीति”.

चित्राङ्गनान्यायः ॥

The simile of *a woman in a picture*. An illustration of that which has only an appearance of reality. Raghunātha connects with this the चित्रानलन्याय and चित्रामृतन्याय, and, in his larger work, भगवान्वसिष्ठः is quoted as follows:—“चित्रामृतं नामृतमेव विद्धि चित्रानलं नानलमेव विद्धि । चित्राङ्गना नूनमनङ्गनेति वाचाविवेकस्त्वविवेक एवेति”. Like his other quotations from Vasīṣṭha, this, too, is from the *Yogavāsīṣṭha*, where it stands as verse 4. 18. 69. Others of a like nature are 4. 1. 11 and 12:—“चित्रोद्यानमिवोत्फुल्लमरसं सरसाकृति । प्रकाशमपि निस्तेजश्चित्रार्कानलवत्स्थितम् ॥ अनुभूतं मनोराज्यमिवासत्यमवास्तवम् । चित्रपद्माकर इव सारसौगन्ध्यवर्जितम्” ॥ Also 6. 57. 28:—“चित्राग्निदाहो विज्ञातो यथा दाह्येषु निष्फलः । तथाहंभावसर्गादिज्ञातं निष्फलतामियात्” ॥

छायापिशाचीन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *a shadow mistaken for a she-goblin*! It is found in Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī's commentary on the last section of the *Vedāntasāra*, as follows:—“नन्वप्राप्तस्य क्रियासाध्यस्य

वस्तुनो विद्यमानानर्थनिवृत्तेश्च पुरुषार्थत्वं दृष्टमत्र तदभावात्कथं पुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेन्न तयोरेव पुरुषार्थत्वमिति नियमाभावात्स्वच्छायायामारोपितरक्षसो विस्मृत-
कण्ठगतचामीकरस्य भ्रान्तपुरुषस्याप्तवाक्येन तयोर्निवृत्त्याहयोरपि पुरुषार्थत्वदृष्टेः ।
अत्र संग्रहः । 'आत्माज्ञानमलं निरस्तममलं प्राप्तं च तत्त्वं परं कण्ठस्थाभरणादिव-
द्भवशाच्छायापिशाची यथा । आप्तोक्त्यासिनिवृत्तिवच्छ्रुतिशिरोवाक्यादुरोरुत्थि-
ताङ्गस्तध्वान्तनिरासतः परसुखं प्राप्तं तयोरुच्यत' इति ॥

जलतुंबिकान्यायः ॥

The simile of a gourd in water. The idea is that of a gourd, thickly covered with mud, and therefore sinking in the water, but gradually resuming its buoyancy as the mud is washed off. The Digambara Jains use the figure to illustrate the release of the soul from the encumbrance of the body. Raghunātha puts it thus:—"यथा पंकलिप्ता तुंबिका नदीसमुद्रादौ मज्जन्ती पंके क्षीणेऽवकाश आगत्य तिष्ठति तथा जीवो देहादिपंके क्षीणेऽलोकाकाशे गत्वा तिष्ठति । अयमेव तस्य मोक्ष इति दिगम्बराः । इति जलतुंबिका-
न्यायः" ॥

This description, without mention of the nyāya, is found in very similar language in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvadarśana-sangraha* (page 48 of Jivānanda's edition), and also in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, for which see the पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्याय below. The former passage is as follows:—"यथा वा मृत्तिकालेप-
कृतमलाबुद्रव्यं जलेऽधःपतति पुनरपेतमृत्तिकाबन्धमूर्ध्वं गच्छति तथा कर्मरहित आत्मा असङ्गत्वादूर्ध्वं गच्छति बन्धच्छेदादेरण्डबीजवच्चोर्ध्वगतस्वभावाच्चाग्नि-
शिखावत्." The figure of the castor-oil seed is found in the *Parimala* passage also. The term अलोकाकाश which appears in Raghunātha's definition, is the name of a subdivision of one of the five categories (*astikāya*) of the Jaina system. It is explained as follows by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 33 (page 563):—"आकाशास्तिकायो द्वेधा लौकिकाकाशोऽलौकिकाकाशश्च । लोकानामन्तर्वर्ती लोकाकाशः । तदुपरि मोक्षस्थानमलोकाकाशः". This is

referred to in a verse quoted by Mādhava in the immediate context of the passage already cited from the *Sarvadars'ana-sangraha*, namely :—"गत्वा गत्वा निवर्तन्ते चन्द्रसूर्यादयो ग्रहाः । अद्यापि न निवर्तन्ते त्वालोकाकाशमागताः" ॥ Professor Cowell's rendering is:—"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest; but never to this day have returned any who have gone to Ālokākāś'a." This should of course be Alokākāś'a, as the long vowel includes the preposition आ 'up to,' 'as far as,' "those who have *reached* Alokākāś'a" (आ अलोकाकाशम्).

जातेष्टिन्यायः ॥

The law regarding *the oblation on the birth of a son*. This is the subject of Jaimini 4. 3. 38, 39. The question arises whether the offering is for the benefit of the father or the son (तत्र सन्देहः किमात्मनिःश्रेयसाय उत पुत्रनिःश्रेयसाय), and the answer is that it benefits the latter. In the commentary on *Lakṣanāvali* this is applied as follows:—"नहि चैत्रानुष्ठिताग्निहोत्रजनितमपूर्वं चैत्रसमवेतं मैत्रं स्वर्गफलभागिनं कर्तुमुत्सहते । पुत्रेष्टिपितृयज्ञवदेतत्स्यात् । न । तत्राप्यतिशयस्य पुत्रादिसमवेतत्वेनैवाभ्युपगमात्."

जामातृशुद्धिन्यायः ॥

The story of *the son-in-law's revision* [of a book]. This is the original of the Marāṭhī जांवईशोध which Molesworth defines as "A phrase, founded on a popular story, to express the examination of a piece of a composition by a shallow-witted fellow incapable of discerning its merit." The popular story, as given on pages 6-9 of Merutunga's *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, is to the effect that Vararuci, having been instructed by Vikramāditya to find a suitable husband for his daughter, the princess Priyanguṃmanjarī, he in revenge for a supposed insult offered

him by her when his pupil, palmed off upon her an ignorant cowherd as a man of learning! The king accepted him, and he became his son-in-law. "In accordance with the advice of the paṇḍit, the herdsman preserved unbroken silence; but the princess, wishing to test his cleverness, entreated him to revise a newly-written book. He placed the book in the palm of his hand, and with a nail-parer proceeded to remove from the letters in it the dots and the oblique lines at the top indicating vowels, and thus to isolate them, and then the princess discovered that he was a cowherd. After that the 'son-in-law's revision' became a proverb everywhere." This quotation is from Mr. C. H. Tawney's admirable translation of Merutunga's work; the original being as follows:—"पण्डितो-पदिष्टं सर्वथा मौनमेवाल्म्बमानो [महिषीपालः] राजकन्यकया तद्वैदग्ध्य-जिज्ञासया नवलिखितपुस्तकस्य शोधनायोपरुद्धः । करतले पुस्तकं विन्यस्य तदक्षराणि बिन्दुमात्रारहितानि नखच्छेदिन्या केवलान्येव कुर्वन् राजपुत्र्या महिषीपाल एव निर्णीतः । ततःप्रभृति जामातृशुद्धिरिति सर्वतः प्रसिद्धिरभूत्."

In the subsequent part of the story we are informed that the cowherd eventually became the famous poet Kālidāsa! For a similar account from a Buddhist source, see *Indian Antiquary*, vol iv. page 103; also vol vii. page 116.

ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकम् ॥

Knowledge [of Brahma] abolishes nothing but the ignorance [which obscures that Impersonality]. This is a bit of Vedantism pure and simple, and has scant claims to a place amongst popular maxims. It is admitted solely because Raghunātha includes it in his list. His explanation is as follows:—"अस्मिन्श्चाध्यासेऽज्ञानं कारणम् । तत्त्वज्ञानेन वातदीपन्यायेन तन्निवृत्तावस्त्रेहदीपन्यायेन तदध्यासोऽपि निवर्तते । न च ज्ञानेनैवोभयनिवृत्तिः कुतो न स्यात् । ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति न्यायविरोधात् । द्विविधा हि निवृत्तिः । विरोधिना सामग्रीनिवृत्त्या च । यथा वातादिना दीपनाशो यथा च तैलवर्त्यादिनिवृत्त्या दीपनिवृत्तिः । तत्राद्या निवृत्तिरज्ञानस्य द्वितीया कार्यवर्गस्येति बोध्यम्" ॥

The so-called nyāya is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 8, line 9, and in *Pāncapādikā*, page 1.

डमरुकमणिन्यायः ॥

The डमरुक or डमरु, is a sort of small drum, shaped like an hour-glass, and held in one hand: The मणि is, I suppose, the small piece of wood attached to the string tied round the middle of the drum, which strikes each end alternately as it is shaken in the hand, and thus fulfils a double purpose. The gārūḍis, or conjurors, use a drum of this kind; and Apte's dictionary tells us that the Kāpālikas carry one. (For a description of the latter, see Wilson's *Religion of the Hindus* Vol. i. pages 21 and 264.) The nyāya is found in *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 84, where in explaining the words “नोत्सृष्टमन्यार्थमपोद्यते च” in Hemacandra's eleventh kārīkā, Malliṣeṇa says, “अन्यार्थमिति मध्यवर्ति पदं डमरुकमणिन्यायेनोभयत्रापि सम्बन्धनीयम्.” See the nyāya “अपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्ते” and compare also, the घण्टालोलान्याय on page 35 of *Syādvādamanjarī*.

तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोतन्यायः ॥

The simile of a young bird which [has got out to sea on a floating log and] is unable to discover the shore. Its application is obvious. It occurs in the second line of verse 19 of Hemacandra's in *Syādvādamanjarī*, as follows:—“ततस्तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोतन्यायात्त्वदुक्तानि परे श्रयन्तु.” Malliṣeṇa explains it thus:—“तदं न पश्यतीति तटादर्शी यः शकुन्तपोतः पक्षिशावकस्तस्य न्याय उदाहरणम् । तस्माद्यथा किल कथमप्यपारपारावारान्तःपतितः काकादिशकुनिशावको बहिर्निर्जिगमिषया प्रवहणकूपस्तंभादेस्तटप्राप्तये मुग्धतयोड्डीनः समन्ताज्जलैर्कार्णवमेवावलोकयंस्तटमदृष्ट्वैव निर्वेदादावृत्त्य तदेव कूपस्तंभादिस्थानमाश्रयते गत्यन्तराभावादेवं तेऽपि कुतीर्थ्याः प्रागुक्तपक्षत्रयेऽपि वस्तुसिद्धिमनासादयन्तस्त्वदुक्तमेव चतुर्थे भेदाभेदपक्षमनिच्छयापि कक्षीकुर्वाणास्त्वच्छासनमेव प्रतिपद्यन्ताम्.”

तत्क्रतुन्यायः ॥

The principle of *meditation on that* [*viz.* Brahman]. Or, *one who meditates on that*. This is taken from *Brahmasūtra* 4. 3. 15, “अप्रतीकालंबनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथाऽदोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च”. The bhāṣya on the last term is as follows:—“तत्क्रतुश्चोभयथाभावस्य समर्थको हेतुर्दृष्टव्यः । यो हि ब्रह्मक्रतुः स ब्राह्ममैश्वर्यमासीदेदिति श्लिष्यते ‘तं यथा यथोपासते तदेव भवति’ इति श्रुतेः । न तु प्रतीकेषु ब्रह्मक्रतुत्वमस्ति प्रतीकप्रधानत्वादुपासनस्य । नन्वब्रह्मक्रतुरपि ब्रह्म गच्छतीति श्रूयते यथा पञ्चाम्निविद्यायां ‘स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयति [छं° ५. १०. २] इति । भवतु यत्रैवमाहृत्यवाद उपलभ्यते तदभावे त्वौत्सर्गिकेण तत्क्रतुन्यायेन ब्रह्मक्रतूनामेव तत्प्राप्तिर्नैतरेषामिति गम्यते”. I subjoin Dr. Thibaut’s rendering, with a few additions of my own in parentheses. “The words, ‘and the meditation on that,’ state the reason for this twofold relation [*viz.* of those who meditate on Brahman with qualities, and those who worship by means of symbols or images]. For he whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, ‘In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves.’ In the case of symbols, on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation.—But scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge [rather, the *doctrine* (*vidyā*)] of the five fires, ‘He leads them to Brahman.’—This may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. We only mean to say that, where there is no such declaration, the general rule is that those only whose purpose is Brahman [*i. e.* whose mind is fixed on B.] go to it, not any others.” This is a noteworthy passage. It practically condemns the use of symbols, or images, in worship, by declaring that the mind of the upāsaka is directed to the *pratīka*, and not to Brahman (or *Īśvara*). The *s’ruti*, “तं यथा यथोपासते &c.,” which is quoted also in 3. 4. 52, may mean much more than S’ankara sees in it; for it is an undoubted fact that, *in*

the present life, the worshipper becomes assimilated to the object of his worship; that the characteristics of that object, as conceived by him, become his own characteristics; and that a man never rises above the moral or spiritual level of that which he worships. This was clearly set before the Jewish nation in the teaching of Psalms CXV and CXXXV, where, with reference to the making and worshipping of images, we read "They that make them shall be like them, every one that trusteth in them" (Revised version).

The तत्कृत्यन्याय, which, in its full form seems to be तत्कृत्यस्तद्वति (as in Ānandagiri on the closing part of 4. 3. 15), is constantly quoted in the *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*. It will be found on pages 229 (three times), 230 (line 9), 235 (line 11), 246 (line 6), 478 (line 1), 591 (line 4 from bottom), 669 (line 10), and 730 (lines 9 and 15). Also *Pancadaśī* ix. 145.

तत्प्रख्यन्यायः ॥

The principle that *there is another scriptural passage declaratory of it* (namely, of the *secondary* matter connected with a sacrifice, such as the *deity* to whom it is offered, the *materials* to be used, &c). The nyāya represents Jaimini's sūtra 1. 4. 4 (तत्प्रख्यं चान्यशास्त्रम्), and is one of the four means by which Mimāṃsakas prove that an injunction comes under the head of नामधेय ('name'), and is not a गुणविधि ('an injunction relating to the *accessories* of the sacrifice,' provision being made for them in other scriptural passages). The three other tests are styled मत्वर्थलक्षणा ('possessive indication') वाक्यभेद ('split of the sentence' caused by the inclusion of two or more distinct topics), and तद्व्यपदेशन्याय (which see below).

The following extracts from the *Arthasangraha*, with Dr Thibaut's renderings, illustrate the nyāya.

"कर्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधको विधिरूपत्तिविधिः । यथामिहोत्रं जुहोतीति । ... ननु

यागस्य द्वे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च । तथा च रूपाश्रवणेऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्ति-
विधिः । अग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्प्रत्ययन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न । रूपाश्रवणेऽ-
प्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात् । अन्यथा रूपश्रवणाद्वा जुहोतीत्ययमेवोत्पत्तिविधिः
स्यात् । तथा चाग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति वाक्यमनर्थकं स्यात् ॥ (Page 4)

“ That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called ‘originative injunction,’ as, for instance, the passage ‘He is to offer the Agnihotra oblation.’ But it may be objected, the two forms (aspects) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage ‘He is to offer the Agnihotra-oblation,’ in which neither of these two forms is mentioned, be considered an originative injunction, the word Agnihotra (which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice, *viz.* Agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it. To this objection we reply:—The passage is an originative injunction although neither of the two forms of the sacrifice is mentioned in it. Otherwise the passage ‘He is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk’ would have to be considered as the originative injunction (of the Agnihotra) as it contains a statement of one of the two forms (*viz.* the material), and then the passage ‘He is to offer the Agnihotra’ would be purposeless.” (Page 7).

Again on page 20 of the same:—

“एवं च प्रयाजेषु समिदादिदेवतानां समिधः ‘समिधो अग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्तु’
इत्यादिमन्त्रवर्णेभ्यः प्राप्तत्वात् । समिधो यजतीत्यादिषु समिदादिशब्दास्तत्प्रत्य-
शास्त्रात्कर्मनामधेयाः” ॥

“ In the same manner the pieces of firewood called *samidh* and other things are established as the divinities of the Prayāja oblations by means of the Mantras ‘the *samidhs* may partake of the butter &c.,’ and therefore the words ‘*samidh*’ &c. which occur in the injunctions ‘He sacrifices the *samidh* &c.’ are to

be taken as names of certain sacrifices (not as denoting secondary matters) on account of another scriptural passage declaratory of it."

The nyāya is explained in almost identical language in Āpadeva's work *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, and is applied in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 150, line 7. We find it, also, in Nāges'a's *Uddyota* (vol. 3. page 623), under sūtra 2. 3. 3.

तत्स्थानापन्ने तद्धर्मलाभः ॥

One who takes the place of somebody else takes upon himself also the functions of the latter. This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the maxim as found in Nāgajibhaṭṭa's comment on paribhāṣā CXVI. It may have originated with Kaiyaṭa. On Pāṇini's sūtra 1. 1. 56 (स्थानिवदादेशः &c.) Kātyāyana says "स्थान्यादेशपृथक्त्वादादेशे स्थानिवदनुदेशो गुरुबहुपुत्र इति यथा." Patanjali follows with the remark "लोकत एतत्सिद्धम्। तद्यथा। लोके यो यस्य प्रसंगे भवति लभतेऽसौ तत्कार्याणि। तद्यथा। उपाध्यायस्य शिष्यो याज्यकुलानि गत्वा अग्रासनादीनि लभते." Then Kaiyaṭa says "लोकत इति। लोके हि वचनमन्तरेणापि तत्स्थानापत्त्या तद्धर्मलाभो दृष्टः" ॥ Under sūtra 1. 1. 4, Nāges'a Bhaṭṭa prepares us for this with the remark (on page 209 of his *Pradīpoddīyota*) "अशास्त्रीयस्यापि तस्य 'तत्स्थानापन्ने तद्धर्मलाभ' इति लोकन्यायेनातिदेश इति स्थानिवत्सूत्रे वक्ष्यते".

तदन्तापकर्षन्यायः ॥

This nyāya, which is found in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 581, line 9, and again in line 8 of the next page, is taken from the तदादितदन्तन्याय of Jaimini 5. 1. 23, 24, the अनुयाजाद्युत्कर्ष-प्रयाजान्तापकर्षाधिकरण, which Kunte renders "The subject of the forward transference of acts which follow the Anuyāja-offerings and the backward transference of acts which precede Prayāja-

offerings together with the offerings themselves." Regarding the तदादितदन्तन्याय he says:—"Tadādi signifies the first part of that; the Tadanta signifies the last part of that. These are Bahuvrīhi compounds, and therefore signify that of which the first part is taken, and that of which the last part is taken. When forward transference is to be made, the Tadādi is taken and when backward transference is to be made, the Tadanta is taken. The following illustration will explain this. When the Anuyāja-offerings are to be transferred in point of time, the Sūktavāka and the Shanyuvāka which follow it, are to be transferred along with it, because the Anuyāja is the first part. Again, when Prayāja-offerings are to be transferred in point of time, the Āghāra and the Sāmidheni which precede it, are to be transferred along with it, because the Prayāja is the last part."

तदागमे हि तद्दृश्यत इति न्यायः ॥

The law that *a certain thing is seen to appear when a certain other thing appears* [thus establishing a connection between them]. Raghunāthavarman expounds it thus:—"जाग्रदादौ बुद्धौ सत्यां दुःखादयो दृश्यन्ते सुषुप्त्यादौ तन्निवृत्तौ नोपलभ्यन्त इति तद्धर्मा एव नात्मधर्माः सुषुप्तावप्युपलब्धिप्रसंगादित्यत्र तदागमे हि तद्दृश्यत इति न्यायोऽवतरति । दृश्यते हि तैलादनुद्भूतस्पर्शतेजोऽवयवागमे सन्तापोपलब्धिरिति तद्धर्म एव न तैलादिधर्म इति." I have met with it in the following passage of the *Tantravārtika* (page 348), and quote Prof. Gangānāth Jhā's translation of it:—

“तथा क्रमवतोर्नित्यं प्रकृतिप्रत्ययांशयोः ।

प्रत्ययश्चुतिविलायां भावनात्मावगम्यते ॥

न केवलमेतावेवान्वयव्यतिरेकौ यौ परस्परपरित्यागेन लक्ष्येते तस्मिन्नेव हि पदे तदागमे हि तद्दृश्यत इत्यनेन न्यायेन विवेकोऽवधार्यते”.

“The Root and the Affix are always found to appear in a definite order of sequence; and, as a matter of fact, we find

that it is only when the Affix is heard to be pronounced, that we have an idea of the *Bhāvanā*; and this, too, leads us to the conclusion that the *Bhāvanā* is denoted by the affix. Because the invariable concomitance of any two objects is not only such that one cannot exist in the absence of the other, but also of a kind which we find in the present case, where we find that it is only where a particular word—the Affix for instance—is pronounced that there is a denotation of the *Bhāvanā*; and as such, in accordance with the rule that when one object is always seen to appear when another appears, there is always an invariable concomitance between the two, we must admit that the *Bhāvanā* is denoted by the Affix.” (p. 483).

I may add that the passage here cited from the *Tantra-vārtika* is closely connected with that quoted under the *nyāya* “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थे सह ब्रूतः” which see below.

तद्व्यपदेशन्यायः ॥

The principle of a name indicating resemblance to something. This is the title of Jaimini's sūtra 1. 4. 5, where the sentences “अथैष श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेत”, “अथैष सन्दंशेनाभिचरन्यजेत” and “अथैष गवाभिचरन्यजेत” are discussed, and it is decided that श्येन, सन्दंश, and गो are not the materials of the various sacrifices, but their names. This is well put in Colebrooke's Essay on the *Mimāṃsā*:—

“It is a question whether the hawk-sacrifice (*s'yenayāga*) which is attended with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a maxim that ‘a term intimating resemblance is denominative.’ *Hawk*, then, is the name of that incantation; ‘it pounces on the foe as a falcon on his prey.’ So *tongs* is a name for a similar incantation; ‘which seizes the enemy from afar as with a pair of tongs’; and *cow*, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations.”

This *nyāya*, as pointed out under *तत्प्रख्यन्याय*, is one of the proofs applied in the *Mīmāṃsā* in support of the *नामधेय* division of the *Veda*, and *Laugākṣibhāskara* (on page 20) explains it thus:—

“इयेनेनाभिचरन्यजेतेत्यत्र इयेनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं तद्व्यपदेशात् । तेन व्यपदेशादुपमानात्तदन्यथानुपपत्तेरिति यावत् ।...यदा तु इयेनसंज्ञको यागो विधीयते तदार्थवादेन इयेनोपमानेन तस्य स्तुतिः कर्तुं शक्यत इति इयेनशब्दः कर्मनामधेयं तद्व्यपदेशादिति” ॥

In this passage, and in a similarly worded one in *Āpadevī*, *उपमान* is given as the equivalent of *व्यपदेश*, whilst *Kumārila* employs *सादृश्य*. The dictionaries, however, are silent as to any such sense of the word. In his translation Dr. Thibaut renders it “comparison.”

तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यते ॥

Hot goes with hot. Like loves like. This is found in the following passage of *Bhāmātī* 3. 3. 25 (page 620):—“न च सन्निधानमपि संबन्धकारणम् । अयमेति पुत्रो राज्ञः पुरुषोऽपसार्यतामित्यत्र राज्ञ इत्यस्य पुत्रपुरुषपदसन्निधानाविशेषान्मा भूद्विनिगमना । तस्मादाकांक्षा निश्चय-हेतुर्वक्तव्या ।.....सत्यपि सन्निधाने आकांक्षाभावादसंबन्धः । तथा चाभाणकः । तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यत इति । तथा चाकांक्षितमपि न यावत्सन्निधाप्यते तावन्न संबध्यते ॥” Mr. M. R. Telang has given me another excellent example in *Vikramorvas'ī* ii. 16:—“साधारणोऽयमुभयोः प्रणयः स्वरस्य तप्तेन तप्तमयसा घटनाय योग्यम्.” Compare, too, “रत्नं रत्नेन सङ्गच्छते” of *Mṛicchakatika*; (page 40). It might be used as the equivalent of “Birds of a feather flock together”?

तप्तायःपीताम्बुवत् ॥

The simile of [a drop of] *water consumed by hot iron* [when thrown upon it]. *Rāmtīrtha* employs it when expounding the words “न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति” in the last section of the *Vedāntasāra*. He says:—

“निर्गुणब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारवतः प्राणा नोत्कामन्ति किन्तु प्रत्यग्रहण्येव तप्तायः-
पीताम्बुवल्लीयन्त इत्यत्र प्रमाणमाह न तस्येति.” In Nṛsiṃha-
sarasvatī's comment on the same portion the nyāya is expanded
and made clearer:—

“अस्य जीवन्मुक्तस्योपाधिविगमसमये प्राणाख्यं लिङ्गशरीरमतितप्तलोहक्षिप्त-
नीरबिन्दुवत्प्रत्यगभिन्नपरमानन्दे लीनत्वात्स्थूलशरीरं नोत्तिष्ठतीति । अत्र श्रुतिमाह
न तस्येति.”

Neither of them, however, was the originator of the simile;
for it is clearly an adaptation of the line “सन्तप्तायसि संस्थितस्य
पयसो नामापि न ज्ञायते” which forms the commencement of
Pancatantra i. 250, and also of Bhartṛihari's *Nītiśataka* 67.

तमःप्रकाशनिदर्शनम् ॥

The illustration [of the co-existence] of *light and darkness*.
It is found in *Pancapādikā*, page 3, as follows:—“कोऽयं विरोधः
कीदृशो वा इतरेतरभावोऽभिप्रेतो यस्यानुपपत्तेस्तमःप्रकाशवदिति निदर्शनम् ।
यदि तावत्सहानवस्थानलक्षणो विरोधस्ततः प्रकाशभावे तमसो भावानुपपत्तिः ।
तदसत् । दृश्यते हि मन्दप्रदीपे वेश्मन्यस्पष्टं रूपदर्शनमितरत्र च स्पष्टम् । तेन
ज्ञायते मन्दप्रदीपे वेश्मनि तमसोऽपीपदनुवृत्तिरिति”.

The substance of this is reproduced in *Vivaraṇaprameya-
sangraha*, page 10.

तृणभक्षणन्यायः ॥

The custom of *taking grass in the mouth* [*lit.* of eating
grass], as a token of submission. This interesting illustration
is found in *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 93:—“वैरिणोपि हि मुच्यन्ते
प्राणान्ते तृणभक्षणात् । तृणाहाराः सदैवैते हन्यन्ते पशवः कथम्.” Mr.
Tawney renders it thus:—“Since even enemies are let off, when
near death, if they take grass in their mouths, how can you slay
these harmless beasts [deer &c.] which always feed on grass?”
In a note on page 210, it is stated that we have here an allusion
to a most ancient custom. There is a reference to it in *Harṣa-*

carita (Bombay edn. 1892) page 132, line 11, on which, the translators, Cowell and Thomas, remark, "To carry a straw in the mouth was a sign of surrender; compare Acworth's Marāthā Ballads, page 43:—

‘And’ twixt the teeth a straw is fit
For curs who arm but to submit.’”

These two lines are deduced from the three words “व्यावें तोंडांत तृण” of the original.

Merutunga refers to this custom again on page 300:—“नाथो नः परमर्धनेन वदनन्यस्तेन संरक्षितः । पृथ्वीराजनराधिपादिति तृणं तत्पत्तने पूज्यते.” “Grass is now worshipped in Paramardin’s city, because, when taken in the mouth, it preserved our lord Paramardin from Prithvirāja, the king of men.” (Tawney’s translation, page 189).

The late Colonel Meadows Taylor, who was so thoroughly acquainted with Indian life, put the following into the mouth of one of his characters in *Seetā* (chapter XLVII):—“We have a good many prisoners, for I could not kill the wretches *who had put grass in their mouths* and were crying for quarter.”

तैलकलुषितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमः ॥

The certainty of the non-appearance of shoots from grains of rice spoilt by [contact with] oil. It occurs in *Vedānta-kalpataru*, page 545, line, 17:—“क्रियाभोगशक्तयोः सत्योरपि तत्प्रति-बन्धात्कार्यानुदयः संभवति तैलकलुषितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमवत्”. In *S’ānkarabhāṣya* 2. 3. 31, we read:—“यथा लोके पुंस्त्वादीनि बीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव बाल्यादिष्वनुपलभ्यमानान्यविद्यमानवदभिप्रेयमाणानि यौवनादिष्वाविर्भवन्ति नाविद्यमानान्युत्पद्यन्ते षण्ढादीनामपि तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्.” Of the आदि in षण्ढादीनाम् Ānandagiri says:—“तैलकलुषितबीजादि-ग्रहार्थमादिपदम्.” See also *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 60. Compare the मूषिकभक्षितबीजादावङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थना, in Second Handful.

दग्धबीजन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the burnt seed*. An illustration of that which has for ever ceased to be an operative cause. It appears in a verse of *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 208 :—

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नांकुरः ।

कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवांकुरः ॥

The following is from the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 206 :—

राजप्रतिग्रहदग्धानां ब्राह्मणानां युधिष्ठिर ।

दग्धानामिव बीजानां पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

Merutunga ascribes it to a Purāṇa. Vijnāna Bhikṣu quotes from some Smṛiti another of a like kind, under *Yogavārtika* ii. 3:—

बीजान्यभ्युपदग्धानि न रोहन्ति यथा पुनः ।

ज्ञानदग्धैस्तथा क्लेशैर्नात्मा सम्पद्यते पुनः ॥

See also a verse ascribed to a Chārvāka in *Prabodhacandrodāya*, page 35.

दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यते ॥

That which is given once is received back a thousand times. This is found in Merutunga's work, page 266, and I append Mr. Tawney's rendering:—"अथ वीरधवलस्यायुःपर्यन्ते प्रतितीर्थं प्रस्थितेन दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यत इति रूढेः श्रीतेजःपालेन जन्मसुकृतं ददे." "Then, when Vīradhavalā's life was approaching its termination, Tejapāla, who was on his way to a holy place, in accordance with the proverb that what is given once is received back a hundred (?) times, gave him the merits of his last birth." Though the illustration is fable, the principle is true. "Give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom." Among the Turks there is the saying "Who gives alms sows one and reaps one thousand." (Rev. T. Long's *Eastern proverbs and emblems*, page 187).

दत्तर्णाधमर्ण इव स्वप् ॥

To sleep like a debtor whose debt has been paid. To sleep like a top! It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'isṭaparvan*, ii. 563:—
“इति स्नुपाया दौःशील्यामर्पचिन्तां विहाय सः । सुप्वाप दत्तर्ण इवाधमर्णस्तत्र निर्भरम्.”

दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः ॥

Curds and cucumber are fever personified! That is, they cause fever. This is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 59 (vārtika 6), and 6. 1. 32 (vārt 6), as follows:—“अन्तरेणापि निमित्तशब्दं निमित्तार्थो गम्यते । तद्यथा । दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः । ज्वरनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । नडूलोदकं पादरोगः । पादरोगनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । आयुर्धृतम् । आयुषो निमित्तमिति गम्यते”॥ This closely resembles Raghunātha's दधिपयसी प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः which I have not yet met with anywhere. See आयुर्धृतं and लाङ्गलं जीवनम् in Second Handful.

दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च ॥

The forest-fire which destroys the seeds of the Ratan is also [by that means] the promoter of the growth of another form [namely, the plantain]. This is found in *Citsukhī* i. 15, as follows:—“यथा च दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च तथा दोषाणामपि यथार्थज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वमयथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वं च किं न स्यात्.” The same idea, with the express mention of the plantain tree, is found under i. 14, and also in the following passage of the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā* page 57:—“दृष्टं च दुष्टानामपि कारणानामौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रतिबन्धेन कार्यान्तरोत्पादकत्वम् । तद्यथा वेत्रबीजानां दावाग्निदग्धानां कदलीप्रकाण्डजनकत्वं भस्मकदुष्टस्य चौर्दयस्य तेजसो बहुतराक्षपानपात्रकत्वम्.” The same passage is found in *Bhāmatī* page 18, line 7; and, one of the same nature, in *S'ikhāmaṇi*, page 134, line 8; whilst, in *Sarvārthasiddhi* ii. 46 (page 207), Venkaṭa says “दग्धवेत्रबीजस्य रम्भाङ्कुरारम्भकत्वं दृश्यते.” See also *Maṇiprabhā* iii. 14 (page 55), and *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 75, line 6.

दीर्घशङ्कुलीभक्षणन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the eating of an elongate* [confection called] *S'ashkulī* [said, by the commentator on *Yājñavalkya-smṛiti* i. 173, to be स्नेहपक्वगोधूमविकारः]. The *nyāya* is well defined in the following extract from the *Viśiṣṭādvaitin* (vol. i. p. 102), for which I am indebted to my friend Dr. Grierson:—
 “*S'ashkulī* is a stick-like edible, which a person begins to eat from one end. While he so eats there are several sensations present, such as the hardness or the softness of the thing; its surface, round, square &c., uniform or indented; its taste, smell, color &c. All the sensations do not affect the person simultaneously, but one after another. When he is intent on the taste, he is non-intent on the color; when he is intent on the smell he is non-intent on the surface; though all the sensations seem to come to him simultaneously, by reason of the infinitesimal interval of time dividing one sensation from another.”

Nyāyasūtra i. 16 defines *Mind* as that in which knowledge [of more things than one] does not arise simultaneously; and we find the following in Mallinātha's comment on *Tārīkikarāhṣā* 29, where that sūtra is referred to:—“न च दीर्घशङ्कुलीभक्षणादौ ज्ञानयौगपद्यसंभवादसंभवि लक्षणमिति वाच्यम् । शतपत्रशततनवदाशुभावनिबन्धनो यौगपद्याभिमानो यत इति सर्वमवदातम्” ॥ Again, in the *Nyāya-pradīpa* on the definition of *मनस्* in *Tārīkabhāṣā* (p. 126) we read:—
 “अण्विति । विभुत्वे दीर्घशङ्कुलीं भक्षयतः पुंसो रूपरसाद्यनेकविषयाणि ज्ञानानि युगपज्जायेरन् । आत्मेन्द्रियविषयसंबन्धात्मिकायाः सामग्र्याः सत्त्वादणुत्वे त्विन्द्रियाप्राप्तेर्न युगपज्ज्ञानानि भविष्यन्तीति भावः” ॥

In a discussion on the same subject in *Nyāyamanjarī* page 497, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa brings forward three examples of *apparent* simultaneity, the first of which is quaintly versified as follows:—

“सुगन्धि शीतलां दीर्घामश्नन्तः पृथक्शङ्कुलीम् ।
 कपिलब्राह्मणास्सन्ति युगपत्पञ्चबुद्धयः” ॥

दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *distant trees* [i. e. of two trees standing apart, but which, owing to their distance from the spectator, seem to be one]. It is contained in the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* (IO MS. 582, page 219 a), but not in the smaller work. Its author most probably derived it from *Oitsukhī*, where the following passage is found at the beginning of the second chapter :—“ ननु क्षीरनीरयोर्विद्यमानभेदयोरपि स्वरूपग्रहणे भेदग्रहो न दृश्यत इति चेन्मैवं तत्र समानाभिहारलक्षणदोषप्रतिबन्धादेव तदग्रहोपपत्तेः । एतेन दूरस्थवनस्पत्योरपि भेदग्रहप्रसंगः प्रत्युक्तः ” ॥ The Muni then quotes *Sāṅkhyakārikā* vii. “ अतिदूरात् &c. ”; and the same *kārikā*, with a somewhat similar context, is cited in the *Pūrṇaprajna* section of *sarvādars'anasangraha*. The simile of the two trees is met with in the much older work *Saṅkṣepas'ārīraka* (i. 44), namely :—“ दूरस्थयोर्ननु वनस्पतिवस्तुनोस्तद्भेदो न दृष्टिविषयोऽवगते च ते नः ” ॥ We have it again in the *Pāncapādikā* (page 7, line 13).

It is interesting to compare with Īśvarakṛiṣṇa's causes of *anupalabdhi* those assigned by Patanjali in *Mahābhāṣya* 4. 1. 3 (vol. ii. page 197). He says :—“ षड्भूमिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनुपलब्धिर्भवत्यतिसंनिकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तरव्यवधानात्तमसावृतत्वादिन्द्रियदौर्बल्यादतिप्रमादादिति. ”

देवदत्तशौर्यन्यायः ॥

The figure of *Devadatta's bravery*. Equivalent to Horace's “ *Cælum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt.* ” The illustration is used by S'ankara in his *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* 3. 3. 10 :—“ एकस्यामपि शाखायां श्रुता गुणाः श्रुता एव सर्वत्र भवन्ति गुणवतो भेदाभावात् । न हि देवदत्तः शौर्यादिगुणत्वेन स्वदेशे प्रसिद्धो देशान्तरं गतस्तद्देशैरविभाषितशौर्यादिगुणोऽप्यतद्गुणो भवति । यथा च तत्र परिचयविशेषाद्देशान्तरेऽपि देवदत्तगुणा विभाव्यन्ते ” ॥ The *देवदत्तशौर्यनिदर्शन* is mentioned again in the *bhāṣya* on the next *sūtra*. Compare with this the following from *Tantravārtika*, 3. 6. 41 (page 1108) :—“ यथैव देवदत्तस्य स्थानोपवेशनगमनशयनाद्यवस्थाभेदेऽपि देवदत्तत्वं

नापैति &c.” See, also, *Slokavārtika*, page 780 ; and compare the following from *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 1 (vārt. 13) :—“ननु च भो अभेदका अपि गुणा दृश्यन्ते । तद्यथा । देवदत्तो मुण्ड्यपि जठ्यपि शिष्यपि स्वामाख्यां न जहाति.” Commenting on this, Kaiyaṭa says :—“मुण्डेन हि कृते चौर्ये कुंतलित्वावस्थायामपि चौरोऽयमिति व्यपदिश्यते.”

देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्यायः ॥

The illustration of the *slaying of the murderer of Devadatta*. The point is that the death of the murderer does not bring his victim to life again. It is applied by Raghunātha as follows :—“नन्वज्ञानबाधके ज्ञाने विनष्टे पुनरज्ञानोदयेन बन्धप्रसङ्ग इति शंकायां देवदत्त-हन्तृहतन्यायावतारः । यथा देवदत्तहन्तरि हतेऽपि न देवदत्तस्य जीवनं तथा प्रकृतेऽपि.” He probably took it from Nāgojibhaṭṭa’s comment on *paribhāṣā* LXIV [उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तः &c., which see above] where it reads thus :—“अत्र देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्योन्मज्जनं नेति न्यायस्य विषय एव नास्ति । हते देवदत्त उन्मज्जनं न । देवदत्तहननोद्य-तस्य तु हनने भवत्येवोन्मज्जनम्” ॥ Nāgojī, on the other hand, derived it from the *Mahābhāṣya*, where (in 1. 1. 57, vārtika 4) it appears as “न ह्यन्यस्यासिद्धत्वादन्यस्य प्रादुर्भावो भवति । न हि देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्य प्रादुर्भावो भवति.” So, too, in 6. 1. 86 (vārt. 3). It is quoted in the consolidated form in *Pradīpodyota* 1. 1. 5 (page 213).

धारावाहिकबुद्धिः ॥

A persistent state of cognition. This is Mr. Arthur Venis’ rendering of the expression as it occurs in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv., page 105), and he elucidates it in a foot-note as follows :—“It may be described as a series of states throughout which the same object is presented in consciousness. Each state of consciousness lasts only for a moment, a *kṣaṇa* or unit of appreciable time, and perishes. A second state then succeeds and is lost, and so on.” We find the expression (in the plural) in the *Prakaranapancikā*, page 127, and as धारावाहिकज्ञानानि on page 40; whilst, on page 56, the author

refers to it as the धारावाहिकन्याय. I have met with it elsewhere also. Yet, strange to say, the Vācaspatyam is the only Sanskrit dictionary that contains it. The term धारावाहिन् (with °वाहिक also) is there defined as “सन्तत्या पातुके क्रमेणाविच्छेदेन जायमाने च,” and then follows a quotation from Vedāntaparibhāṣā which immediately succeeds that referred to above:—“किञ्च सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थले न ज्ञानभेदः [किन्तु यावद्धटस्फुरणं तावद्धटाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिरेकैव न तु नाना]” “Moreover, according to (Vedantic) tenet, there is no variation of knowledge in the case of a persistent cognition; but as long as there is a presentation of the jar so long the modification of the internal organ in the form of the jar is one and the same and not various” (Venis). As found in Marāṭhī, it has the meaning “Closeness or intentness of thought; undiverted and unintermitting prosecution (of any subject of meditation or study)” (Molesworth). Strictly speaking, I ought not to include this expression in my pages; but as Böhtlingk, Monier-Williams, and Apte have ignored it, I admit it in the hope that it may assist some perplexed student of Indian philosophy. And let me add that readers of Mr. Venis’ excellent translations will find there many valuable explanations of technicalities, which they will search for in vain elsewhere.

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ॥

Acts which impel others to action are not always of the same kind. This is the first line of a verse in Kumārila’s *Śloka-vārtika* (page 710), the context of which is as follows :—

“न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।
 चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुंक्ते छेदनं प्रति ॥
 सेनापतिस्तु वाचैव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।
 राजा सन्निधिमात्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन” ॥

A remark of S'ankarāchārya's in his comment on *Muṇḍaka-Upanishad* 3. 1. 1, illustrates this. He says:—"स त्वनश्चन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति पश्यत्येव केवलम् । दर्शनमात्रेण हि तस्य प्रेरयितृत्वं राजवत्."

नङ्गलोदकं पादरोगः ॥

Water in a bed of reeds is disease of the feet. That is, it causes disease in the feet. See under दधिन्नपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः ।

नर्तकन्यायः ॥

The simile of a dancer. One dancer gives pleasure to many spectators, just as one lamp gives light to many persons. It occurs in *Jaiminiyanyāyamālāvistara* 11. 1. 10 as follows:—

“प्रत्यङ्गिकार्याण्यङ्गानि तन्त्रेणोताङ्गिनो यतः ।
एकैकस्योपकारत्वं तस्मात्प्रत्यङ्ग्यनुष्ठितिः ॥
विधानवदनुष्ठानं सकृदेवोपकारकम् ।
तद्देशकालकर्तृणामेकत्वान्नर्तकादिवत्” ॥

The last pāda is thus explained:—"यथा बहूनां पुरतो नृत्यन्नर्तकः सर्वेषां सुखं युगपन्निर्वर्तयति तद्वत्" ।

Of the same kind, apparently, is the following expression of the *Nyāyavārtika* i. 10 (page 70):—"कृतसंकेतानां वृद्धानामेकस्मिन्नर्तकीभ्रूक्षेपे युगपदनेकप्रत्ययवत्", which is reproduced in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā*, page 354 (line 9 from bottom) in these words:—"उक्तमेतद् यथा नर्तकीभ्रूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन्बहूनां प्रति-सन्धानमिति."

नसि प्रोतोष्ट्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of a camel with a rope fastened in its nostrils. It is found in verse 78 of *Tattvamuktāvalī* :—

“माया यस्य वशं गता बलवती त्रैलोक्यसंमोहिनी
विज्ञेयः प्रभुरीश्वरः स भगवानानन्दसच्चिद्रनः ।
यस्तस्या वशमागतः खलु नसि प्रोतोष्ट्रकल्पः सदा
ज्ञातव्यः स हि जीव इत्थमनयोरस्त्येव भेदो महान् ” ॥

“He under whose control is that mighty illusion which deceives the three worlds, He is to be recognized as the Supreme Lord, the adorable, essentially thought, existence, and joy ; but he who is himself always under her control, like a camel drawn by a string through his nostrils, is to be recognized as the individual soul,—vast indeed is the difference between the two.” The translation is Prof. Cowell's. The dictionaries give references to three works where the figure is used, but always as नस्योत, and, either in text or comment, applied to a bullock, not to a camel. The passages will be found in *Tait. Saṃhitā* 2. 1. 1. 2, *Vanaparva* xxx. 26, and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 6. 3. 12. The second one reads thus :—“ईश्वरस्य वशे तिष्ठेन्नान्येषां नात्मनः प्रभुः । मणिः सूत्र इव प्रोतो नस्योत इव गोवृषः” ॥

Compare, too, *Māgha* xii. 10, with its description of a vain attempt to load a pack-bullock though held by its nose-cord (नस्या).

न हि करकंकणदर्शनायादर्शपेक्षा ॥

One does not need a looking-glass in order to look at a bracelet on the wrist. The nearest approach to this that I have met with is in the *Karpūramanjari*, page 17, line 2 :—“अहवा हस्तकंकणं किं दम्पणेन पेक्खीअदि,” which is, in Sanskrit, “अथवा हस्तकंकणं किं दर्पणेन दृश्यते.”

न हि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते ॥

If a man has lost a cowrie he does not spend a kārshāpana in the search for it. That would be like expending a sovereign in order to recover a farthing! It occurs in the following portion of S'abara's bhāṣya 4. 3. 39:—“न हि कपाले नष्टे तदन्वेषणार्था इष्टिर्युक्ता । न हि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते” ॥

न हि क्वचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते ॥

A thing's not being heard in one place does not get rid of the fact of its being heard elsewhere. This is applied by S'ankara in Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 2. 4. 1 (page 681) as follows:—“ननु केषुचित्प्रदेशेषु न प्राणानामुत्पत्तिः श्रूयत इत्युक्तं तदयुक्तं प्रदेशान्तरेषु श्रवणात् । न हि क्वचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते.” It is quoted as a nyāya in Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā 2. 3. 2 (sūtra 8). Compare with it S'loka-vārtika iv. 161:—“न क्वचित्संकराभावात्सर्वत्रैव निवर्तते । क्वचिच्च संकरं दृष्ट्वा संकरोऽन्यत्र कल्प्यते,” and see Dr. Gangānāth Jhā's rendering of that and the previous verse.

Compare too a saying of Vācaspatimis'ra's on *Yogabhāṣya* ii. 22:—“न हि रूपमन्धेन न दृश्यत इति चक्षुष्मतापि दृश्यमानमभावप्राप्तं भवति.”

न हि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति ॥

An Iguana creeping along does not on that account become a snake. This is found in Mahābhāṣya 1. 1. 23 (4) as follows:—“न खल्वप्यन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति न हि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति ।यदप्युच्यते न खल्वन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति न हि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति भवेद्व्येष्वेतदेवं स्यात् । शब्दस्तु खलु येन येन विशेषेणाभिसंबध्यते तस्य तस्य विशेषको भवति.” The same passage reappears in 1. 3. 12 (5), and in 6. 1. 50.

न हि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरण्यस्थ इवाशास्ते ॥

A man who is already in a village does not express a longing to get there, such as a man might who was out in the jungle ! This is found in, *Bṛihadāraṇyakabhāṣya* 1. 3. 28, page 87:—
“न हि प्राणात्मन्युत्पन्नात्माभिमानस्य तत्प्राप्ताशंसनं सम्भवति । न हि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरण्यस्थ इवाशास्ते । असंनिकृष्टविषये ह्यनात्मन्याशंसनं न तत्स्वात्मनि सम्भवति.”

न हि त्रिपुत्रो द्विपुत्र इति कथ्यते ॥

A man who has three sons could not be designated as a man with two sons. Therefore, if an order were given to bring the father of two sons, it would not do to bring one who had three ! This *nyāya* of Raghunāthavarman's, taken from the *Kāś'ikāvṛitti* (with the substitution of कथ्यते for व्यपदिश्यते), is based on the words “न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते,” which form part of Patanjali's comment on Pāṇini's sūtra 6. 4. 96 (छादेर्घेऽद्भुपसर्गस्य). The meaning of that sūtra is that when the affix घ्र (i. e. the *kṛit*- affix अ) follows, the root (technically described as छादि) is shortened to छद when there are *not two* upasargas. So we say प्रच्छद, and दन्तच्छद; but समुपच्छाद because there *are two* upasargas. But would the root vowel be shortened if there were *more than two* upasargas ? No; for we say समुपाभिच्छाद. Yet the sūtra seems to make no provision for this. Patanjali comments on it as follows:—
“अद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम् । इहापि यथा स्यात् । समुपाभिच्छाद इति । तत्तर्हि वक्तव्यम् । न वक्तव्यम् । यत्र त्रिप्रभृतयः सन्ति द्वावपि तत्र स्तस्तत्राद्भुपसर्गस्येत्येव सिद्धम् । न वा एष लोके सम्प्रत्ययः । न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते । तस्मादद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम्” ॥

Patanjali was fond of this kind of illustration. The following one is employed again and again in various parts of the *bhāṣya*, and always in connection with the *paribhāṣā* नञिव्युक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा ह्यर्थगतिः । It reads thus:—“अब्राह्मणमानयेत्युक्ते

ब्राह्मणसदृश आनीयते नासौ लोष्टमानीय कृती भवति.” It occurs in 3. 1. 12 (vārt. 4); 3. 3. 19; 6. 1. 45; 6. 1. 71 (vārt. 7); 6. 1. 135 (vārt. 12); 6. 3. 34 (vārt. 7); 7. 1. 37 (vārt. 7). The words अब्राह्मणमानय appear also in 2. 2. 6. The paribhāṣā just quoted is rendered by Prof. Kielhorn thus:—“(An expression) formed by the addition of the negative नञ् or (of the particle of comparison) इव (to some word or other) denotes something which is different from and yet similar to (what is denoted by the latter), because it is so that (such expressions) are (generally) understood (in ordinary life).” With the paribhāṣā, Nāgojī has also taken the illustration. In Kaiyaṭa’s comment on a portion of the bhāṣya under sūtra 1. 1. 57 we find the expression “न हि त्रिपुत्रो द्विपुत्रव्यपदेशं लभते.”

**न हि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनोऽप्रसिद्धगोश्रवणात्कुदा-
दिमदर्थप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति ॥**

From hearing the unfamiliar word ‘cow’, an inhabitant of Cocanut Island would gain no perception of an object possessed of a hump &c. This sentence is found in the Nyāya-vārtika on sūtra 3. 1. 67. Again, in Pras’astapāda’s Vais’esika-bhāṣya, page 182, we read:—“अनुमानविषयेऽपि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनः सास्त्रामात्रदर्शनात्को नु खल्वयं प्राणी स्यादित्यनध्यवसायो भवति.” The commentator, S’rīdhara, remarks on this:—“नारिकेलद्वीपे गवाम-भावात्तत्रत्यो लोकोऽप्रसिद्धगोजातीयः.”

With some hesitation I have admitted the above into my collection of ‘inferences from familiar instances,’ on account of the reference to the unfamiliar Cocanut Island, and its cow-less condition! The following passage from Professor Beal’s translation of Hiuen Thsang’s work (Vol. ii. page 252) is supposed to refer to this island:—“The people of this island are small of stature, about three feet high; their bodies are those of men, but they have the beaks of birds; they grow no grain, but live only

on cocoanuts." The editor and translator of Itsing's Record thinks that the island in question is one described by that pilgrim as lying to the north of Sumatra, and therefore probably one of the Nicobar group. See page xxxviii of that work.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refers more than once to the ignorance of these islanders. See *Nyāyamanjarī* page 118, line 5; page 121, line 23; and page 391. Also *Tātparyatīkā*, p. 66. In *Sarvārthasiddhi*, page 561, amongst strange things found in ordinary life, Venkaṭanāth includes "नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनामपक्वात्रेनैव देहधारणम्." It is interesting to note that, according to Pras'astapāda (page 267, line 6), the people of south India were at that time as unacquainted with the *camel* as those islanders were with the cow! Sridhara says:—"उष्ट्रो दाक्षिणात्यस्यात्यन्ताननुभूताकारत्वादाश्चर्यभूतोऽर्थः" ॥

न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हति ॥

It is not likely that a man who could flee on his feet would crawl on his knees. This is a part of S'ankara's argument on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 1. 10:—"तस्मात्कर्मैव शीलोपलक्षितमनुशयभूतं योन्यापत्तौ कारणमिति कार्ष्णजिनेर्मतम् । न हि कर्मणि संभवति शीलाद्योन्यापत्तिर्युक्ता । न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हतीति." "It is, therefore, the opinion of Kārṣṇājini that the remainder of works only—which is connoted by the term 'conduct'—is the cause of the soul's entering on new births. For as work may be the cause of new births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause. If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will surely not creep on his knees." This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering.

न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदत्तौ धृतम् ॥

Even cow's milk would cease to be pure if placed in a vessel made of dogs skin. This nyāya of Raghunātha's is found in the following passage of *Jaiminiyanyāyamālāvistara*, 1. 3. 4:—

“शाक्योक्ताहिंसनं धर्मो न वा धर्मः श्रुतत्वतः ।

न धर्मो न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदत्तौ घृतम् ॥

ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसां चापरिग्रहं च सत्यं च यत्नेन रक्षेदिति श्रुतावहिंसादिधर्मत्वेनोक्तः । स एव धर्मः शाक्येनाप्युक्तः । तस्माच्छाक्यस्मृतिधर्मे प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । स्वरूपेण धर्मस्यापि गोक्षीरन्यायेन शाक्यसंबन्धे सत्यधर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तदीय-ग्रन्थेनाहिंसादिर्नावगन्तव्यः । तस्मान्न सा स्मृतिधर्मे प्रमाणम्” ॥

Mādhava, no doubt, took it from Kumārila's *vārtika* on sūtra 7 of the same *adhikaraṇa*, where he speaks of the moral teaching of S'ākyas and others as “श्वदत्तिनिक्षिप्तक्षीरवदनुपयोग्यविस्त्रंभणीयं च.” The simile in this form is found, too, in Yāmuna-cārya's *Āgamaprāmānya*, page 11 line 8, in a context of the same import. Colebrooke's excellent summary of the teaching of this part of the *Mīmāṃsādars'ana*, given in his *Essays* (i. 337), may be usefully quoted here:—“Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (*s'ruti*) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (*smṛiti*) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded on the Veda, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents...The *S'ākyas* (or *Bauddhas*) and *Jainas* (or *Ārhatas*), as Kumārila acknowledges, are considered to be Kshatriyas. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their *recollections* were founded upon a Veda which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in *revelation* for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the S'ākyas are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice, tainting what else is virtuous.” Raghunātha uses the *nyāya* as a warning to a *guru* to be careful in the selection of his disciples; for असत्पात्रे सदुपदेशोऽप्यपवित्रतां याति. On this point see *Vishnu-smṛiti* xxix. 9, and Manu ii. 114.

न हि भिक्षुको भिक्षुकान्तरं याचितुमर्हति सत्यन्यस्मि-
न्नभिक्षुके ॥

A beggar ought not to ask alms of another beggar, so long as there is any one [to beg from] who is not a beggar! The saying appears in this form in S'āstradīpikā 8. 3. 5; but S'abara, in the same adhikaraṇa (sūtra 11), puts it thus:—"न च भिक्षुका भिक्षुकादाकांक्षन्ति सत्यन्यस्मिन्प्रसवसमर्थेऽभिक्षुके." See, also, the Nyāyamālāvistara on the same portion. The following, from Ivanhoe (Chap. xi), runs parallel with the nyāya:—"He is too like ourselves for us to make booty of him, since dogs should not worry dogs where wolves and foxes are to be found."

न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दुष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि
तदवभासते ॥

Not even to a man whose sight is defective does a lotus on the ground appear to be in the sky! It appears in Citsukhī i. 17 (Paṇḍit, vol. iv, page 594):—"न च देशान्तरे सत्त्वादत्रासत्त्वाच्च ख्यातिबाधयोरन्यथाप्युपपत्तिः । अन्यत्र सत्ताया इह प्रतीत्यहेतुत्वात् । न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दुष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि तदवभासते."

न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव
भुञ्जानस्यापि भवति ॥

The position occupied by Devadatta when eating is not that which he occupies when fighting! The force of this dṛṣṭānta is best seen from the dārṣṭāntika in Tantravārtika, p. 575:—

“एकत्वेऽपि हि शब्दस्य शक्तिभेदः प्रयोजने ।

तत्र कार्यान्तरस्थानं न स्यात्कार्यान्तरेष्वपि ॥

न शब्दैकत्वेन यत्किञ्चित्कार्यं स्थानं दृष्टसामर्थ्यं तदेवान्यत्रापीति शक्यते वक्तुम् ।
न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव भुञ्जानस्यापि भवतीति
गम्यते । कार्यप्रयुक्ता हि स्थानविशेषादयो न स्वरूपप्रयुक्ताः” ॥

न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन ॥

Not even a hundred injunctions could move a man to action as readily as the desire for gain does. This is found in Tantra-vārtika 3. 4. 34 (page 999):—

“ऋत्विग्भ्यो दक्षिणां दद्यादिति दानं विधीयते ।

लोभादेवार्जनाङ्गत्वात्प्राप्तस्तेषां प्रतिग्रहः ॥

न हि दद्यादित्यस्य प्रतिगृह्णीयादित्ययमर्थो भवति । भवेदपि सामर्थ्याद्यदि तदाक्षेपमन्तरेण दानविधिर्नोपपद्यते । स तु लोभप्राप्तप्रतिग्रहबलेनोपपद्यमानो न शक्नोत्याक्षेप्तुम् । न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन” ॥

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (on page 361) puts the matter quaintly thus:—

“चपेटापरिहाराय मोदकप्राप्तयेऽपि वा ।

प्रवर्तते बटुर्नासौ जुहुधीति नियोगतः” ॥

Compare *Nyāyakanikā*, page 407:—“न च विधिमात्रमपि प्रवृत्तिहेतुः । अनिच्छतो विधीनां शतेनाप्यप्रवृत्तेः” ॥ See, too, verses 1040 and 1041 of *Sambandhavārtika*, and *Anubhūtiprakāśa* xiii. 277.

But many centuries before any of these worthies the same view had been expressed by Patanjali in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 3 72:—“क्रियाफलं कर्तारमभिप्रैति । याजका यजन्ति गा लप्स्यामह इति । कर्मकराः कुर्वन्ति पादिकमहर्लप्स्यामह इति.” See another quotation from the same source under the *nyāya* “प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य &c.”

न हि सर्वः सर्वं जानाति ॥

Everybody does not know everything. Near the end of the *Laukikanyāyasangraha* Raghunātha describes his effort in the following verse:—

“व्याख्यातं न्यायवृन्दं निजमतिमनतिक्रम्य यावन्मयाप्तं

पारं प्राप्तुं तु शक्तो न हि भवति गुरुः कः पुनर्मादृशो ना ।

सर्वः सर्वं न वेत्ति प्रथितमिदमतो नास्ति मेऽत्रापराधः

शिष्टा ज्ञेयाः स्वयं वै सुविमलमतिभिः सम्यगाराधितायैः” ॥

He then connects various *nyāyas* with the *pādas* of the

above; namely, यावत्तैलं तावद्ब्रह्माख्यानम् and यावत्स्नाता तावत्पुण्यम् with the first pāda, and, the maxim which we are now considering, with the third. I think the second of these should read यावत्स्नानं. In the larger work the reading is यावत्स्नातं. Our present nyāya is found in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 501, as follows:—“विमर्शः प्राह नैवात्र कोपः कार्यस्त्वया यतः । सर्वः सर्वं न जानीते सिद्धमेतज्जगत्रये ” ॥ On the other hand, we have the following query in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 94:—“तथापि चानुभवकल्पनायां सर्वः सर्वदा सर्वं जानाति न तु निश्चिनोतीति किं न स्यात्.”

न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥

If a power is not of itself present [in a person or thing], it cannot be supplied by another. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 24 we have part of a discussion as to Brahman's ability to produce the world without extraneous aid. It is urged that he has this power in himself, just as the power to produce curds resides in milk. The objection is then raised that since curds are not produced without the action of heat, milk is not independent of other agencies, and so the argument breaks down. The reply is as follows:—“यदि स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यान्नैवौण्यादिनापि बलाद्धिभावमापद्येत । न हि वायुराकाशो वौण्यादिना बलाद्धिभावमापद्यते । साधनसामग्र्या च तस्य पूर्णता संपाद्यते.” On this last clause Ānandagiri says:—“साधनेति । न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यत इति न्यायाद्विद्यमानैव क्षीरादिशक्तिः साधनसामग्र्योपचीयत इत्यर्थः.” The nyāya is taken from *S'lokavārtika* ii. 47 (page 59), of which verse it forms the second line. The first line is “स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम्.” Dr. Gangānāth Jhā's rendering of the verse is as follows:—“You must understand that authoritativeness is inherent in all means of right notion. For a faculty, by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency.” The whole verse is quoted in *Nyāyakanikā*, page 168; and in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 165. Compare with the above maxim the following from *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 29:—“न हि यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य संभविष्यति.”

न ह्यन्धस्याज्यावेक्षणोपेते कर्मण्यधिकारोऽस्ति ॥

A blind man is not qualified for work involving the examination of butter. This is found in *Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā* 3. 4. 2 (sūtras 18-20), where it is followed by “नापि पङ्गोर्विष्णुक्रमाद्युपेते कर्मण्यधिकारः.” It was doubtless taken from *Tantravārtika* .1 4. 24 (page 332), where we read :—“नन्वेनेनैव न्यायेन यथा शक्त्यादिति वाक्यशेषादन्धादीनामाज्यावेक्षणादिरहितः कर्माधिकारः स्यात्.” This sūtra 24 is Jaimini’s sūtra 30, under which we have S’abara’s “आख्यातशब्दानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी” which see above.

न ह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति ॥

The falseness of one person does not prove somebody else to be false. This is from S’abara 1. 1. 2 (page 5, line 6):—“ननु सामान्यतोदृष्टं पौरुषेयं वचनं वितथमुपलभ्य वचनसाम्यादिदमपि वितथमवगम्यते । न अन्यत्वात् । न ह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति । अन्यत्वादेव । न हि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्यापि श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति”॥ See the same in verse in *S’lokavārtika*, page 100; on which Pārthasārathi says:—“न ह्यनाप्तवाक्यस्य वैतथ्ये सत्याप्तवाक्यस्यापि वैतथ्यम्.” That Kumārila, however, had a poor opinion of human veracity in general, is shown from the following verse on page 88:—“सर्वदा चापि पुरुषाः प्रायेणानृतवादिनः । यथाद्यत्वे न विश्वं भस्तथातीतार्थकीर्तने.” Again, on page 178:—“न च पुंवचनं सर्वं सत्यत्वेनावगम्यते । वागिह श्रूयते यस्मात्प्रायादनृतवादिनी.” Compare with this nyāya “न हि खदिरगोचरे परशौ पलाशे द्वैधीभावो भवति,” and “अन्यवेश्मस्थिताद्धूमात्र वेश्मान्तरमग्निमत्.”

न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति ॥

It is not the fault of the post that a blind man cannot see it. Vācaspatimis’ra quotes this on page 87 of his *Tātparyatīkā*, prefacing it with the words “यथाहुर्निरुक्तकाराः.” It will be found on page 112 of the second volume of the *Nirukta*. We meet with it again in the opening sentence of *Kusumāñjali* v.:—“नन्वीश्वरे प्रमाणोपपत्तौ सत्यां सर्वमेतदेवं स्यात्तदेव तु न पश्याम इति चेत् । न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति.”

नागृहीते विशेषणे विशिष्टबुद्धिरुदेति ॥

Particular [or distinguishing] *knowledge does not arise until that which particularizes* [or defines, the object in question] *has been grasped.* It is in this form that the *nyāya* is found in *Kusumāñjali* iii. 21 (page 527), but in *Tantravārtika*, page 258 it appears in the contracted form “नागृहीतविशेषणेतिन्यायेन,” and, on page 287, as “अगृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिर्न दृष्टा.” In Mādhava’s *Nyāyamālāvistara* 3. 1. 6, it is quoted as “नागृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिः,” and in *Saptapadārthī*, page 2, line 6, as “नागृहीतविशेषणा विशेष्यबुद्धिः.” In his commentary on *Tārkikakarakṣā*, Mallinātha twice (namely, on pages 47 and 107) cites the maxim in the contracted form adopted by Kumārila, whilst Raghunāthavarman’s version of it is “नाज्ञातविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेष्यं संक्रामति.”

In *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* ii. 126 (=2. 2. 58) it appears as नागृहीतविशेषणान्याय, and Dr. Ballantyne renders it, “Cognition which does not apprehend the distinction, cannot infer [the nature of] what is to be distinguished.” The *nyāya* occurs five times in *Nyāyamanjarī*, and each time in a different form! The references are as follows:—page 320, line 19; 433, line 4 from bottom; 449, line 3 from bottom; 538, line 6; and 543, line 7.

In Sir Monier Williams’ *Sanskrit Dictionary* विशिष्टबुद्धि is defined as “differenced or distinguishing knowledge (*e. g.* the knowledge of ‘a man carrying a staff’ which distinguishes him from an ordinary man)”; whilst Molesworth explains विशिष्टज्ञान as “knowledge of an object distinguished or characterized by something (whether a property or an accident) standing out in some speciality (inherent or attached).”

Identical in meaning with the above, though differing somewhat in form, is S’abara’s “न ह्यप्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टं के चन प्रत्येतु-मर्हन्ति” (1. 3. 33, page 82).

नासाधितं करणम् ॥

That which itself is not an accomplished fact cannot be an instrument [with which to bring about some other result]. In the *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, page 31, this nyāya is quoted in the discussion on the expression “अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति”. The passage is as follows:—“न च होमस्य प्रत्ययवाच्यायामर्थभावनायां करणत्वात्तन्नामत्वेऽग्निहोत्रेणेति तृतीया स्याज्ज्योतिष्टोमेनेतिवदिति वाच्यं द्वितीयाया एव लक्षण्या करणार्थकत्वात् । नासाधितं करणमिति न्यायेनासाधितस्य करणत्वायोगात्.” ॥ For a rendering of this, see page xxxi of Prof. Gangānātha Jhā's Introduction to his translation of *Sloka-vārtika*.

Kṛishṇa Yajvan perhaps took the nyāya from the *Jaiminiyanyāyamālāvistara*, where, in connection with the same subject, under the तत्प्रख्यन्याय, we find the following kārīkā:—

“नासाधिते हि धात्वर्थे करणत्वं ततोऽस्य सा ।
साध्यतां वक्ति संस्कारो नैवाशंक्यः क्रियात्वतः” ॥

नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलकर्षणन्यायः ॥

The figure of *pulling the root of the ear with the tip of one's nose!* It occurs in Sures'vara's *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika* 4. 3. 1184, as follows:—

“समस्तव्यस्ततामेवं सति व्याचक्षतेऽत्र ये ।
कर्षन्ति नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलं सुखेन ते” ॥

On which Ānandagiri remarks:—“असंभावितार्थवादिनां भ्रान्तत्वं दृष्टान्तेनाह कर्षन्तीति.” It may be compared with the acrobat's sitting on his own shoulders, and with the edge of a sword's cutting itself.

निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा ॥

What need has a healthy man of one skilled in the science of medicine? "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." In the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* (pages 106-7) there is a story about the poet Bāṇa and his brother-in-law the poet Mayūra, who were favourites of the King Bhoja. The former, owing to the curse pronounced by his sister (the wife of the latter), was attacked by leprosy; but being healed by the intervention of the Sun, he appeared at court—to quote from Mr. Tawney's translation—"with his body anointed with golden sandal-wood, and clothed in a magnificent white garment. When the king saw the healthy condition of his body, Mayūra represented that it was all due to the favour of the Sun-god. Then Bāṇa pierced him in a vital spot with an arrow-like speech. 'If the propitiating of a god is an easy matter then do you also display some wonderful performance in this line.' Mayūra replied as follows:—

“निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा तथापि तव वचः सत्यापयितुं निजपादौ पाणौ च क्षुर्या विदार्य त्वया षष्ठे काव्ये सूर्यः परितोषितोऽहं तु पूर्वस्य काव्यस्य षष्ठेऽक्षरे भवानीं परितोषयामीति प्रतिश्रुत्य सुखासनमासीनश्चण्डिकाप्रासाद-पश्चाद्भागे निविष्टो 'मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमम्' इति षष्ठेऽक्षरे प्रत्यक्षीकृतचण्डिकाप्रासादात्प्रत्यग्रप्रथमानवपुःपल्लवः स्वसंमुखं च तत्प्रासादमालोक्याभिमुखागतैर्नृपति-प्रमुखराजलोकैः कृतजयजयारवो महता महेन पुरं प्राविक्षत्.”

As pointed out by Mr. Tawney in a footnote, the poem here ascribed to Mayūra is the *Caṇḍīś'ataka* of which Bāṇa was the author. It was published in the *Kāvya-mālā* for 1887, and the first verse commences thus:—

“मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमं भ्रूरधर विधुरता केयमास्यास्यरागं
पाणे प्राण्येव नायं कलयसि कलहश्रद्धया किं त्रिशूलम्” ।

निषादस्थपतिन्यायः ॥

The topic of a *king who is a Niṣāda by caste*. This forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 1. 51, 52 and is thus expounded by Kunte (in *Ṣaḍdars'anacintanikā*, page 1788):—"The term *Nishādashapati* occurs in the Veda. The question is—how is it to be interpreted? Is the term *Nishādashapati* a Karma-dhāraya compound or Tatpuruṣa compound? The Karma-dhāraya overrules the Tatpuruṣa; because, in the latter, a case not directly seen has to be understood, and because metonymy is thus involved. A direct statement is always to be preferred to metonymy. The Karmadhāraya makes a direct statement and therefore does not involve metonymy. He who is a Niṣāda is a Sthapati; and therefore a superior Niṣāda is entitled to perform the Raudra sacrifice." In other words, the compound when dissolved is not निषादानां स्थपतिः but निषाद एव स्थपतिः.

In explaining the term ब्रह्मलोक in S'ankara's bhāṣya on *Vedāntasūtra* 1. 3. 15, Vācaspatimis'ra says (on page 213, line 3 from bottom):—"अत्र तावन्निषादस्थपतिन्यायेन षष्ठीसमासात्कर्मधारयो बलीयानिति स्थितमेव तथापीह षष्ठीसमासनिराकरणेन कर्मधारयस्थापनाय लिङ्गमप्यधिकमस्तीति तदप्युक्तं सूत्रकारेण"। The nyāya is quoted by Rāmānuja in his exposition of the same sūtra, and Dr. Thibaut translates as follows:—"That this explanation of the 'Brahma-world' is preferable to the one which understands by Brahma world 'the world of Brahman' is proved by considerations similar to those by which the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā sūtras prove that 'Nishāda-sthapati' means a headman who at the same time is Nishāda." The nyāya is also explained in full in *Vedāntakalpataru* on this passage, and again in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*. It is quoted by Ānandagiri on *Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 24, and by Nāges'a on Kaiyaṭa 1, 1. 3. For the origin of the Niṣāda, see Manu x. 8.

पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *a bird let loose from its cage*. Used to illustrate the upward flight of the soul when released from the body. It occurs in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 443, as follows:—"ऊर्ध्वगमनं जीवस्य स्वभावः । देहे स्थितिस्तत्प्रतिबन्धककर्माधीनेति मतमाश्रित्योक्तम् । केचित्तु चिरकालशरीरावस्थितप्रयुक्तबन्धमुक्तावूर्ध्वगमनं मन्यन्ते । ते खल्वेवमाहुः । बन्धमुक्तस्योर्ध्वगमनं दृष्टं यथा पञ्जरमुक्तशुकस्य यथा वा वारिनिर्भिन्नपरिणतैरण्डबीजस्य यथा वा दृढपंकलिसज्जलनिमज्जनप्रक्षीण-पंकलेपशुष्कालावूफलस्य." It will be noticed that there are three illustrations in the last clause,—the third being really the जलतुंबिकान्याय, which see above.

पदार्थानुसमयन्यायः ॥

Sir M. Monier-Williams defines it thus:—"The performance of one ritual act for all objects in orderly succession before performing another act for all objects in the same order." When it is not a matter of sacrificial ritual, but merely of the bestowal of gifts, the definition given by Captain Molesworth is more suitable; namely—"The order or method (when a set or number of things is to be given to each individual of a multitude) of giving first one article of the set to each person all round; going round again with another article; and again with a third; and thus, until all the articles composing the set shall have been received by each person." The *nyāya* summarizes the teaching of Jaimini 5. 2. 1, 2. See काण्डानुसमयन्याय, and Karkācārya on Kātyāyana's *S'rautasūtra* i. 114.

परतन्त्रं बहिर्जनः ॥

As to externals mind is dependent on others. This oft-quoted *nyāya* would seem to have originated with Maṇḍanamis'ra. It is found in the following verse of his *Vidhiviveka*, page 114:—

“हेत्वभावे फलाभावात्प्रमाणे सति न प्रमा ।

चक्षुराद्युक्तविषयं परतन्त्रं बहिर्भनः ” ॥

Students of the *Sarvadarśanasangraha* will remember that the second line is quoted (without mention of its source) in the first chapter of that work, and Prof. Cowell translated it thus—“The eye &c. have their objects as described, but mind externally is dependent on the others.” The dependence of *manas* is pointed out in three other passages of *Vidhiviveka*, on pages 120, 161, and 178. The *nyāya* is found in *Citsukhī* i. 12 (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv, page 513) in the words “न च मनसो बहिरर्थैः सम्बन्धः परतन्त्रं बहिर्भन इति न्यायात्.” It is employed also by the author of *Vidyāsāgarī* on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, page 307 :—“रजतज्ञानस्यैन्द्रियकत्ववादी वक्तव्यः किं तन्मानसमुत बहिरक्षजम् । नाद्यो मनसो बहिरर्थेऽस्वातन्त्र्यादेतच्च तत्त्वविवेके सर्वज्ञदूषणप्रस्तावे मण्डनमिश्रैरभिहितम्.” He then cites the verse “हेत्वभावे &c.” Is this *Tattvaviveka* identical with Maṇḍana’s *Vidhiviveka*, or is it the name given to a section of it ?

परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः ॥

This is the first line of *Kusumānjali* iii. 8, the second being “नैकतापि विरुद्धानामुक्तिमात्रविरोधतः ” ॥ The following is Professor Cowell’s translation of the verse and of a portion of Haridāsa’s explanatory comment :—“In the case of contradictions, there can be no middle course ; nor can you assume the two contradictories to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is directly asserted.” “‘There can be no middle course,’ i. e. you cannot make some third supposition different from either, from the very fact that they *are* contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true] ; nor can you assume them to be identical.” Raghunātha’s explanation of the first line, in his larger work, coincides with this. He says :—“न प्रकारान्तरस्य ताभ्यामन्यस्य प्रकारस्य स्थितिः किन्तु तदन्यतरस्येत्यर्थः ” ॥

The nyāya is quoted in the vṛitti on *Tattvamuktākālāpa* iii. 48, and in the last sentence of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* iii (page 561); and the whole verse in the commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvali*, page 47, and in the second chapter of *Sarvadarś'anasangraha*. In *Tattvadīpana*, page 234, line 13, it appears in a somewhat modified form, namely, “परस्परप्रतिस्पर्धिनोरन्यतरनिषेधेऽन्यतरव्यवस्थेति न्यायात्.”

पर्जन्यवत् ॥

Like the rain [which falls on all places alike]. It is found in the following passage of *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 2. 9 and 6. 1. 127:—“कृतकारि खल्वपि शास्त्रं पर्जन्यवत् । तद्यथा । पर्जन्यो यावदूनं पूर्णं च सर्वमाभिवर्षति” । This is quoted by Nāgojibhaṭṭa under paribhāṣā cxi—पर्जन्यवल्लक्षणप्रवृत्तिः,” which Professor Kielhorn translates thus:—“The rules of grammar are like the rain [in this that they are] applied [both where they produce a change and where they do not; just as the rain falls upon that which already is full of water as well as upon that which is empty].”

There is another example of this in the Pāṇini chapter of *Sarvadarś'anasangraha*:—“प्रकृत्यादिविभागकल्पनावत्सु लक्ष्येषु सामान्यविशेषरूपाणां लक्षणानां पर्जन्यवत्सकृदेव प्रवृत्तौ बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनोपलंभाच्च.” “And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots &c., (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words.” The translation is Prof. Cowell's. We meet with it again in a most interesting passage of *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 42, where S'ankara tells us that just as the rain causes the production of barley, rice, shrubs, &c., by its action on the seeds, so God, making use of men's previous works, impels them to either good or evil ! There can be little doubt that the mischievous saying, “कर्ता आणि करविता ईश्वर आहे,” current among the Marāṭhās, was derived from this source.

On page 226 of Merutunga's work the following verse is quoted as from *Kāmandakīyanītisāra*. It is not to be found, however, in the printed edition of that work, but stands as verse 161 of *Hitopades'a* i:—"पर्जन्य इव भूतानामाधारः पृथिवीपतिः । विकलेऽपि हि पर्जन्ये जीव्यते न तु भूपतौ " ॥ "The king is the mainstay of creatures, like the rain-cloud. For even if the rain-cloud be somewhat wanting, it is possible to live, but not if the king is wanting in any respect" (Tawney, page 138).

पर्णमयीन्यायः ॥

The simile of [the spoon] *made of the Parna wood*. Various spoons are used in the sacrifices, as described in the footnote to Professor Eggeling's translation of *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1. 3. 1. 1; and, of these, the *juhū* is *always* made of the wood of the Parna (*i. e.* the Palās'a) tree. This is in accordance with *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 3. 5. 7, where the praises of that tree are sung, and blessings promised in connection with the use of the *juhū* made of its wood, as pointed out in S'abara on Jaimini 3. 6. 1-8. The पर्णमयीत्व of the जुहु employed in the sacrifices is therefore used to illustrate something *invariably* present, in contradistinction to that which is so *occasionally*, as in the case of the *godohana*. For a passage containing both of these, see under गोदोहनन्याय. Other examples will be found in *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 61; *Parimāla*, pages 624 to 626; and *S'ālikā* page 157.

पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥

Seeing resemblance to an elephant in a heap of straw. An illustration of mere semblance of resemblance (सादृश्याभासता). A real likeness is said to be that which stands the test of a close examination. The figure is contained in Kumārila's *S'lokavārtika*, page 446.

“यत्र त्वसदृशादेव कल्पयित्वोपजायते ।
 सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्तत्र तदाभासत्वकल्पना ॥ ४० ॥
 बाधकप्रत्ययाच्चेष्टा सादृश्याभासता मता ।
 यथा पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥ ४१ ॥
 समीपस्थोऽपि जानाति सादृश्यं नेति तत्र हि
 न बाध्यते समीपादौ यत्तु सादृश्यमेव तत्” ॥ ४२ ॥

Prof. Gangānāth Jhā renders the passage thus:—

“40. In a case where a notion of similarity is brought about by means of objects that are not really similar, we have only a (false) semblance of similarity.

41—42. This is said to be a false semblance of similarity, because it is subsequently set aside by an idea to the contrary, *e. g.* the similarity of an elephant in a stack of hay; in which case when one is sufficiently near the stack, he realizes that there is no real similarity between the stack and the elephant. That notion of similarity which is not set aside even on close proximity to the object, is a case of real similarity.” Compare the दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्याय.

पश्यस्यद्रौ ज्वलदग्निं न पुनः पादयोरधः ॥

Thou seest the fire burning on the mountain, but not that which is under thy very feet ! “Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye?” The above is the first line of Hemacandra’s *Parisiṣṭaparvan* i. 382, the second line being “यत्परं शिक्षयस्येवं न स्वं शिक्षयसि स्वयम्.” The next verse continues the rebuke:—“का हि पुंगणना तेषां येऽन्यशिक्षाविचक्षणाः । ये स्वं शिक्षयितुं दक्षास्तेषां पुंगणना नृणाम्.” The teaching here is akin to that of the भूलङ्गन्याय, namely “Practise what you preach.”

पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशान्तिः ॥

Poisoned wounds will not heal without the use of the lancet. This is found in *Jaiminiyanyāyamālāvistara* 3. 8. 4, as follows:—"न हि दुःखरूपं तपो विना दुःखप्रदं पापं नश्यति । यथा लोके पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशान्तिः" ॥ This is, perhaps, the source of Raghunātha's व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायः which he makes use of thus:—"निरन्तरं दुःखमयसंसारपरिवृत्तिभ्रान्तानां जीवानां कंचित्कालं विक्षेपविगमसमुल्लसदात्मानन्दानुभवेन विश्रान्तिं संपादयितुकामस्य तस्य संहाराय तमोग्रहणस्य दुश्चिकित्सव्रणपीडितानां व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायेन

‘निदानज्ञस्य भिषजो रुग्णहिंसां प्रयुञ्जतः ।

न किंचिदपि नैर्घृण्यं घृणैवात्र प्रयोजिका’ ॥

इति शिवपुराणे व्याख्यातेन निरतिशयकरुणाम्बुधित्वलिङ्गात्” ॥ To understand this somewhat involved sentence, it is necessary to bear in mind that संपादयितुकामस्य refers to S’iva, whose benevolent intentions towards humanity are the subject of the immediate context. Contrast with the above the following saying of Sures’vara’s (in *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika* 4. 3. 176), “न दाहज्वर-नुत्तर्यमग्निना स्याद्विषकृत्तिया.”

पाठक्रमन्यायः ॥

The law of *textual sequence*. It forms the subject of Jaimini 5. 1. 4—7. According to the *Mīmāṃsā*, there are six kinds of sequence ; namely, (1) *S’rutikrama*, or ‘direct sequence,’ which is treated of in the first sūtra of this chapter. It is known as the *श्रुतिबलीयस्वन्याय*, and is regarded as the strongest of the six. Then (2) *Arthakrama*, or ‘logical sequence,’ which is discussed in sūtra 2, and in which the sequence is determined by the sense rather than by the order of the text. For example, take the sentence “अग्निहोत्रं जुहोत्योदनं पचति,” where the boiling of the rice must necessarily precede the offering of the agnihotra, although the former is mentioned first. Again when we read “जाते वरं ददाति, जातमञ्जलिना गृह्णाति, जातमभि-

प्राणिति," the logical sequence, as S'abara shows, is in the reverse order of the textual. Then comes (3) *Pāṭhakrama*, as above, which S'abara illustrates by the following Vedic passage:—"समिधो यजति तनूनपातं यजति इडो यजति बर्हिर्यजति स्वाहाकारं यजति इति." To quote Kunte:—"These are what are called the five Prayāja oblations; and the sequence in which these texts occur shows the order in which they are to be offered. This is the application of what is called *Pāṭhakrama*, or textual sequence." Under the राजपुरप्रवेशन्याय in the Second Handful, will be found a passage from *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 58 (vārt. 1) which furnishes a good example of the supersession of this kind of sequence by अर्थक्रम. The next is (4) *Pravṛttikrama*, which forms the subject of sūtras 8-12. Kunte calls it 'practical sequence.' "In a series of acts, to be performed upon a series of objects, a beginning is made from some one object; then, in performing all the acts, the same object is acted upon first. This sequence is called *Pravṛttikrama*, which signifies sequence determined by the conduct of the individual." It is known as the प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्याय. The remaining two varieties are the स्थानक्रम and मुख्यक्रम.

Kunte's notes on this portion are well worth a reference; and much help, too, is to be had from Dr. Thibaut's translation of the *Arthasangraha*, where (on pages 11-15) the six forms of *krama* are explained under प्रयोगविधि.

The use of these technical terms is not confined to the Mīmāṃsakas, but is very common amongst writers on Vedānta also. Four of the above varieties of *krama* are mentioned in *Bhāmati* 1. 1. 1, pages 47-49, beginning with the words "मा भूदग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकवदार्थः क्रमः &c.," and enlarged upon in *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 32-34; then, in *Bhāmati* 4. 3. 6, we read "पाठक्रमादर्थक्रमो बलवानिति यथार्थक्रमं पठ्यन्ते सूत्राणि," and so sūtra 12 is next explained, and afterwards sūtra 7. For the *pāṭhakrama* only, see Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 15 (page 620).

पुरस्तादपवादा अनन्तरान्विधीन्वाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

This grammatical nyāya is *paribhāṣā* LIX in Nāgojibhaṭṭa's treatise, and is taken from *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 89 (under *vārtika* 2). Professor Kielhorn translates as follows:—"Apavādas that precede [the rules which teach operations that have to be superseded by the Apavāda-operations] supersede only those rules that stand nearest to them, not the subsequent rules." It is found also in Patanjali 1. 1. 28; 3. 2. 1 (6); 3. 3. 95; 3. 4. 85; 4. 1. 55 (4); 4. 3. 132 (6); 4. 3. 156 (7); 6. 1. 102 (6); 6. 4. 163 (2); and 8. 3. 112. In not one of these examples, however, do the words "नोत्तरान्" appear.

पूर्वं ह्यपवादा अभिनिविशन्ते पश्चादुत्सर्गाः ॥

Special rules are taken into consideration first, and afterwards general rules. "The meaning is this that he who is guided solely by the rules (of grammar) first looks about to find out where the *Apavāda* applies, and having thus ascertained that a particular form does not fall under that (*Apavāda*), he employs for its formation the general rule." See Dr. Kielhorn's translation of Nāgoji's *paribhāṣā* 62. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 4. 85 (*vārt.* 11); 3. 1. 3 (*vārt.* 10); 3. 2. 124 (*vārt.* 10); 4. 1. 89 (*vārt.* 2); 6. 1. 5 (*vārt.* 2); 6. 1. 161 and 186.

प्रकल्प्य वापवादविषयं तत उत्सर्गोऽभिनिविशते ॥

This is another of Raghunātha's samples of grammatical rules and is closely connected with पूर्व ह्यपवादाः &c., to which it forms an alternative. Dr. Kielhorn's translation of it, in the *Paribhāṣendus'ekhara*, is as follows:—"Or (we may say that) first all forms which fall under the *Apavāda* are set aside, and that subsequently the general rule is employed (in the formation of the remaining forms)." It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 4. 85 (*vārt.* 11); 3. 1. 3 (*vārt.* 10); 3. 2. 124 (*vārt.* 10); 6. 1. 5 (*vārt.* 2); 6. 1. 161; and 6. 1. 186. In each case it is immediately preceded by the *paribhāṣā* पूर्व ह्यपवादाः &c., the latter standing alone only in 4. 1. 89 (*vārt.* 2).

प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः ॥

The base and the suffix jointly convey the meaning which is understood [from the word]. This is found in Patanjali 3. 1. 67, vārtika 2, and the rendering is that which was given me (in 1903) by my learned friend Dr. Kielhorn, who also explained that प्रत्ययार्थं is equivalent to प्रतीयमानार्थं. This seems to be the only reasonable explanation of the term. The nyāya is used in the above form by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 4. 13 (page 320), and 10. 8. 24 (page 677), and appears also in *Tantravartika* 3. 1. 12 (page 686). It is quoted, however, with a slight addition in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 4, line 14, where it becomes “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्राधान्येनेति न्यायेन”, and (in *Indian Thought* for January 1907, page 51) it is rendered by Dr. Thibaut, “According to the principle ‘that the root and the affix of a verb conjointly signify principally what the affix denotes’,”—a rendering which differs materially from that given above. In this altered form it is found again in the Rāmānuja section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, where Mr. Gough gives as its English equivalent “The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead.” This would seem to be based on an expression of Mādhava's in *Nyāyamālāvistara* 3. 4. 8, namely, “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतस्तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येनेति शाब्दिकैरुद्घोषणात्.” To say that whilst the root and the suffix unitedly convey the meaning, the latter is the more important factor, is a very different thing from asserting that the two parts together convey the meaning of one of them! Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, on page 403 of the *Nyāyamanjarī*, says truly, “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ परस्परापेक्षमर्थमभिधाते न च प्रकृत्या प्रत्ययार्थोऽभिधीयते नियोगस्य धातुवाच्यत्वान्न च प्रत्ययेन प्रकृत्यर्थोऽभिधीयते यागादेः लिङ्गवाच्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । न च तौ पृथक्पृथक् स्वकार्यं कुरुतः” ॥

One more example of the nyāya may be adduced from *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 1 (page 348), with Prof. Gangānāth Jhā's

translation :—“शास्त्रे तु सर्वत्र प्रत्ययार्थो भावनेति व्यवहारः । तत्रायमभिप्रायः ।

प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सदा ।

प्राधान्याद्भावना तेन प्रत्ययार्थोऽवधार्यते” ॥

“In the *Mīmāṃsā Sāstra*, however, the *Bhāvanā* is always held to be signified by the affix. The sense of this theory may be thus briefly explained. The sense of the affix is always expressed by the root and affix taken together; and as the *Bhāvanā* is the most important factor in this joint signification, it is held to be signified by the affix.”

The word *भावना* means ‘a creative energy,’ or ‘productive energy,’ or ‘tendency to realize something’. So Dr. Thibaut. In the *Arthasangraha* (page 2) it is defined as “भवितुर्भवनानुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः”, “the particular activity of some productive agent (*bhāvayitṛi*) which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to be (*bhavitṛi*); which is capable of future existence” (Trans p. 3). It is further declared to be twofold, as *शाब्दी* and *आर्थी*. For the meaning of these, see, specially, Professor Cowell’s translation of the *Jaimini* section of *Sarvadars’anasangraha*, page 182.

प्रतिनिधिन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the substitution* [of one material for another, in a sacrifice]. This subject is dealt with in *Jaimini* 6. 3. 13-17, the five sūtras being styled “नित्यकर्मणोऽनित्यप्रारब्धकर्मणश्च प्रतिनिधिना समापनाधिकरणम्.” Other aspects of *प्रतिनिधान* are discussed in all the subsequent sūtras of the pāda. Kunte’s summary of the teaching of this pāda is well worth reading.

The *nyāya* occurs in the following passage of S’ankara’s *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 40, and I append Dr. Thibaut’s translation :—“भोजनलोपेऽप्यद्विर्वान्येन वा द्रव्येणाविरुद्धेन प्रतिनिधान-

न्यायेन प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्यानुष्ठानमिति.” “Even in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered to the Prāṇas has to be performed by means of water or some other not altogether unsuitable material, according to the Mīmāṃsā principle that in the absence of the prescribed material some other suitable material may be substituted.” It must not, however, be supposed that the choice of the “suitable material” was left to the sacrificer; the substitute was as rigidly prescribed as that for which it might be substituted. For instance, the juice of the Pūtika plant was the only allowable substitute for that of the Soma plant, and Nivāra for rice. Rāmānuja mentions both in *S'rībhāṣya*, page 508, and Patanjali speaks of one, in his discussion of आदेश, in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 56 (vārt. 13). The passages from the two authors stand thus:—“सोमाभावे च पूतीकग्रहणं श्रुतिचोदितं सोमावयवसद्भावादिति न्यायविदो विदुः । व्रीह्यभावे च नीवारग्रहणं व्रीहिभावतः” ॥ (R)

“ वेदेऽपि सोमस्य स्थाने पूतीकतृणान्यभिषुणुयादित्युच्यते” ॥ (P)

प्रति प्रधानं गुण आवर्तनीयः ॥

A subordinate act is to be repeated in the case of each principle thing. The nyāya in this form is found in *Jaiminiṇyanyāyamālāvistara* 3. 1. 7, and in the *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, page 36, in connection with what is termed the ग्रहैकत्व-न्याय which is based on the Vedic injunction “दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं संमार्ष्टि.” Mādhava says:—“ग्रहमिति द्वितीयया ग्रहस्योद्देश्यतया प्रयोजनवत्तया च प्राधान्यं गम्यते । ग्रहं प्रति गुणः संमार्गः । प्रतिप्रधानं च गुण आवर्तनीय इति न्यायेन यावन्तो ग्रहाः सन्ति ते संमार्जनीयाः” ॥ In *Jaiminiṇyasūtravṛtti* the nyāya is quoted as “प्रतिप्रधानमङ्गावृत्तिः”. Prof. Gangānātha's rendering (on page xxx iii of the Introduction to his translation of *S'lokavārtika*) is, “with regard to each Primary, the Secondary is to be repeated”. See the ग्रहैकत्वन्याय in connection with this.

प्रत्यक्षे किमनुमानम् ॥

When there is sense-perception, what need is there of inference? So Raghunātha; but I have nowhere met with the saying in this form. It is a well-known principle however. Kumārila says in *Tantravārtika*, page 87:—“वेदवाक्यानुमानं हि तावदेव प्रवर्तते । तदर्थविषयं यावत्प्रत्यक्षं नोपलभ्यते ॥ प्रत्यक्षे श्रूयमाणे तु न विद्येतानुमानिकम् । न हि हस्तिनि दृष्टेऽपि तत्पदेनानुमिष्यते” ॥ Amalānanda, too, in *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 368:—“प्रत्यक्षे च यागविधावानुमानिकविधिकल्पनाऽनुपपन्ना”.

In S'abara 3. 1. 12 (page 216) we read प्रत्यक्षमनुमानाद्वलीयः, but Patanjali points out (in *Mahābhāṣya* 3. 2. 124) that this is not always the case. He says:—“भवति वै, प्रत्यक्षादप्यनुमानबलीयस्त्वम् । तद्यथा । अलातचक्रं प्रत्यक्षं दृश्यतेऽनुमानाच्च गम्यते नैतदस्तीति”. There are two references to this in *Nyāyamanjarī*. On page 461 (line 7 from bottom) we read:—“यद्यपि च नैष नियमः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षं बलीय इति त्वरिततरपरिभ्रमितचक्रीभवदलातग्राहिणः प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाधितत्वदर्शनादिति &c.”. And on page 609 (line 6 from bottom):—“अथ मनुषे नियम एवैष प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षमेव बलीय इति तदेवानुमानस्य बाधकमुचितं नानुमानान्तरमिति । तदसत् । अलातचक्रादौ प्रत्यक्षमप्यनुमानेनानन्यथासिद्धेन बाध्यत एव । ननु भ्रमणविरतौ परिमितपरिमाणोल्लुमुकग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमेव तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकं नानुमानमिति । मैवम् । अनवरतपरिभ्रमणसमुद्भूतचक्रावभाससमय एवानुमानेन तद्भ्रान्ततानि-श्रयात्” ॥ For अलातचक्र see also *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 2. 59; *Bhāmātī*, page 373, line 15; *S'ālikā*, page 36; and *Vākyapadīya*, i. 131.

With the quotation from Kumārila compare the following from *Nyāyakanikā* page 268, and *Tātparyatīkā*, page 27:—“न हि प्रत्यक्षेण करिणि दृष्टेऽपि चीत्कारेण तमनुमिमते प्रेक्षावन्तः” ॥ S'ankara Mis'ra cites this in his comment on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 10.

प्रपानकरसन्यायः ॥

The simile of *sherbet*. Used to illustrate the production of some new thing by the union of others, just as sherbet is the result of the commingling of various ingredients. It appears in *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 46, as follows:—"प्रतीयमानः प्रथमं प्रत्येकं हेतु-रुच्यते । ततः संवलितः सर्वो विभावादिः सचेतसाम् । प्रपानकरसन्यायाच्चर्न्यमाणे रसो भवेत् ॥ यथा खण्डमरिचादीनां सम्मेलनादपूर्वं इव कश्चिदास्वादः प्रपानकरसे सञ्जायते विभावादिसम्मेलनादिहापि तथेत्यर्थः". This is meant to show how Flavour is single, though spoken of as resulting from a composition of causes. Dr. Ballantyne translates thus:—"First each reason is mentioned separately as being perceived; and [then we say] let all this commingled—the Excitants and the rest—constitute, like the [composite] Flavour of sherbet, the flavour tasted by the intelligent. As from the commingling of sugar, pepper &c., a certain unprecedented relish is produced in the shape of the flavour of the sherbet, so is it here also, from the commingling of the Excitants &c., such is the meaning."

The same illustration is found in *Nyāyamanjarī* (page 372) with पानक instead of प्रपानक. "पदार्थेभ्योऽन्य एव वाक्यार्थः पानकादिवत् । यथा पानकं शर्करानागकेशरमरिचादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव यथा च सिन्दूरहरिताललाक्षादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव चित्रं...तथा पदेभ्यो वाक्यं पदार्थेभ्यो वाक्यार्थः" ॥ Also *Tātparyatīkā*, page 219, line 26.

प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यते ॥

Who can resist a stream [of argument] flowing [steadily on] because established by proof? This seems to be the sense of the *nyāya* as quoted at the beginning of the *Ārhata* section of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. The passage is as follows:—"अथ मन्येथाः प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यत इति न्यायेन यत्सत्तत्क्षणिक-मित्यादिना प्रमाणेन क्षणिकतायाः प्रमिततया &c." Professor Cowell renders it thus:—"But the opponent may maintain 'The un-

broken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, whatever is, is momentary &c.” In a footnote to page 62 of his translation of this portion of Sarvadaśānaśāngraha in *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin has recorded Professor Leumann's comment on the above rendering which he considers inaccurate in respect of the nyāya. The criticism is just,—but, unfortunately, the printer has made a mess of the rendering which the critic proposes to substitute for Mr. Cowell's.

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्याणि सुबहून्यपि ॥

Unseen influences [springing from actions, and eventually producing certain effects], *however numerous, may be assumed* [as the causes of those effects], *if of established credibility.* This nyāya is the first line of a verse in *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 5, where the important dogma of the existence of *apūrva* is discussed. The second line is “अदृष्टशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो ह्यप्रमाणकः” ॥ The whole verse is quoted in Sures'vara's *Bṛihad-āranyakavārtika*, page 1124, and again on page 1797; whilst the first line is found in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 437, as follows:—
 “न चानेकादृष्टकल्पनाभयान्मुख्यार्थपरित्यागो न्याय्यः प्रमाणसिद्धे नियोगपर्यनुयोगानुपपत्तेः । यथाहुः । श्रुतसिद्ध्यर्थमश्रुतोपलब्धौ यत्नवता भवितव्यं न तु श्रुतशैथिल्यमादरणीयमिति । तथा प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्याणि सुबहून्यपि.”
 There is another example in *Citsukhī* i. 23 (Paṇḍit, vol. v, page 27):—“एतेनोभयपदलक्षणास्वीकारे गौरवदोषो निरस्तो वेदितव्यः । बुभुत्सितार्थप्रतिपादनप्रयोजनतया गौरवस्यैवोचितत्वात्प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्याणि सुबहून्यपीति न्यायात्.” A third will be found in *Khaṇḍana*, page 74, on which the commentator says, “यत्रादृष्टे प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते तददृष्टमपि...प्रामाणिकैरभ्युपगम्यते.” See, too, *Tattvadīpana*, page 416, and *Bhāmatī*, page 463.

Raghunāthavarman gives the verse in a different form. According to him, the first line is “बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो निष्प्रमाणकः,” whilst “प्रमाणवन्ति &c.” is the second. In the numbered part of his larger work it is called the बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि nyāya; but, towards the end of the volume, he quotes (without acknowledgment) the above-cited passage of *Citsukhī* (together with a good deal of the context) which contains the nyāya in its proper form. On page 514 of his translation of the *Tantravārtika*, Prof. Gangānātha Jhā renders the whole verse thus:—“ It is a rule, in all cases, that a large number of unseen agencies may always be assumed, when all of them are justified by some authority; while even the hundredth part of an unseen agency should not be assumed, if there is no authority for it.”

It may be well to call attention here to this transcendental power *adr̥ṣṭa*, or *apūrvā*, invented by the philosophers in order to account for present things without divine intervention. In his article on *Mīmāṃsā* (*Essays*, vol. i, page 343), Colebrooke says:—“ The subject which most engages attention throughout the *Mīmāṃsā*, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A *virtue* meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect. That unseen virtue is termed *apūrvā*, being a relation superinduced, *not before* possessed.” Goldstucker (s. v. अपूर्व) quotes Kumāṛila to the effect that *Mīmāṃsakas* apply that term *exclusively* to the unseen influence which follows a *sacrificial* act; that attending action of other kinds being styled संस्कार. The passage will be found in *Tantravārtika* page 367. A helpful description of *apūrvā* is given also in *Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems* (pages 149 and 150), where it is rendered by Fitzedward Hall “ requitative efficacy.” In K. M. Banerjea’s excellent work *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*,

page 140, अदृष्ट is defined as follows:—"Technically, in the usage of philosophers, it means a power or influence inhering in things both animate and inanimate. As inherent in the former it implies an unseen power, both intellectual and active; as inherent in the latter it signifies a material power, perhaps partly the effect of previous combinations and motions.....This unseen moving power in men is again the consequence of works done in a previous life, and hence it stands sometimes for *dharma* and *adharma* (virtue and vice) and *karma* (works)." I imagine that it would tax the ingenuity of even a Mimāṃsaka to produce *proof* of अदृष्ट and its working; yet they tell us that it is not to be accepted without proof!

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ॥

Even a stupid person does not adopt a course of action without a motive. This oft-quoted line is found in the *S'lokavārtika* (page 653) in connection with an argument regarding a Creator of the universe. The need of a motive for action is pointed out on page 4 also of the same work. The following passage from *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 191, is a reminiscence of Kumārila's argument that if the Creator acted without a motive his intelligence would be at fault:—"किं किमपि प्रयोजनमनुसन्धाय जगत्सर्गे प्रवर्तते प्रजापतिरेव वा । निष्प्रयोजनायां प्रवृत्तावप्रेक्षापूर्वकारित्वादुन्मत्ततुल्योऽसौ भवेत्" ॥ On page 339 of the *Nyāyakanīkā* Vācaspati Miśra says:—"प्रेक्षावतां हि प्रवृत्तिः प्रयोजनवत्तान्यासा प्रयोजनवत्ताभावे न भवति शिंशपावत्त्वमिव तरुत्वाभाव इत्यर्थः" ॥

We find the *nyāya* quoted in full by Ānandagiri in his comment on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 1. The two passages are the following:—"तत्त्रिगुणं प्रधानं मृदुदचेतनं चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं स्वभावेनैव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना विवर्तत इति ॥" "चेतनस्येति । अर्थशब्दो भोगापवर्गार्थः । अचेतनस्य प्रयोजनपरिज्ञानाभावादप्रवृत्तिः । प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य मन्दोऽपि न प्रवर्तत इति न्यायादित्याशङ्क्याह स्वभावेनेति."

Patanjali (in *Mahābhāṣya* 3. 1. 26, vārt. 14) tells us that with whole classes of people *the motive* which actuates them is a purely selfish one. He says:—

“नेह कश्चित्परोऽनुग्रहीतव्य इति प्रवर्तते । सर्व इमे स्वभूत्यर्थं प्रवर्तन्ते । ये तावदेते गुरुशुश्रूषवो नाम तेऽपि स्वभूत्यर्थमेव प्रवर्तन्ते पारलौकिकं नो भविष्यतीह च नः प्रीतो गुरुरध्यापयिष्यतीति । तथा यदेतद्वासकर्मकरं नामैतेऽपि स्वभूत्यर्थमेव प्रवर्तन्ते भक्तं चेलं च लप्स्यामहे परिभाषाश्च न नो भविष्यन्तीति । तथा य एते शिल्पिनो नाम तेऽपि स्वभूत्यर्थमेव प्रवर्तन्ते वेतनं च लप्स्यामहे मित्राणि च नो भविष्यन्तीति ” ॥

Compare a passage from the same source under the *nyāya* “ न हि विधिश्चेतेनापि &c.”

Bhartrihari reproduces Patanjali's view in the following verse (*Vākya-padāya* iii. page 255):—

“निमित्तेभ्यः प्रवर्तन्ते सर्व एव स्वभूतये ।
अभिप्रायानुरोधेऽपि स्वार्थस्यैव प्रसिद्धये” ॥

प्रस्तरप्रहरणन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the throwing into the sacrificial fire of a handful of Darbha grass*. Kunte says:—“The *Prastara-praharaṇanyāya* is well known among the *Mīmāṇisakas*. *Prastara* is a handful of *Darbha*-grass ready for use before a sacrifice is begun. It is spread on the sacrificial ground (*Vedi*) and serves as a seat for the sacrificial vessels. When a sacrifice is finished it is thrown into the sacrificial fire as an offering. A *Vaidika* text states.—‘The handful of grass is to be thrown into the fire with the *Sūktavāka*.’” The *nyāya* forms the subject of *Jaimini* 3. 2. 11-14 which is otherwise termed “*सूक्तवाकस्य प्रस्तरप्रहरणाङ्गताधिकरणम्*.” The question which has to be decided is thus put by the author of the *S'āstradīpikā*:—
“दर्शपूर्णमासयोः श्रूयते सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं प्रहरतीति । तत्र संशयः । किं प्रस्तरप्रहरणस्य सूक्तवाकस्य च कालार्थः संयोगोऽथवाङ्गभिभावः ” ।

The decision is that the Sūktavāka mantra is subordinate to the act of offering up the grass, whilst the latter serves the double purpose of a resting-place for the vessels and an offering to the gods.

The term प्रतिपत्ति which is found in sūtra 14 is thus explained by Kunte:—"The rule is that all things connected with a sacrifice are somehow or other to be used in performing the same; nothing is to be thrown away, nothing is to be preserved. The final disposal of sacrificial things for the sake of getting rid of them is called Pratipatti."

प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

फलवत्सहकारन्यायः ॥

The simile of a *fruitful mango-tree*. Such a tree not only produces luscious fruit, but also affords shade and fragrance for the weary traveller in the hot season. Some of us know from experience how charming a camping-ground a mango-grove is! Raghunātha's explanation of the nyāya in connection with the worship of Ganes'a is as follows:—"एकफलाकांक्षया तदाराधनमन्य-दपि फलं प्रयच्छतीति विवक्षायां तु फलवत्सहकारन्यायः । यथा सहकार 'आम्रश्रूतो रसालोऽसौ सहकारोऽतिसौरभ' इत्यभिधानादतिसौरभ आम्रवृक्षोऽति-मधुरपक्वफलनमितशाखः स्वमुपसन्नाय छायार्थिने जनाय फलं परिमलं चाप्रा-र्थितमपि ददाति तथा प्रकृतेऽपीत्यर्थः ॥" The quotation here is from *Amarakoṣa*. IV. 33 (page 87). The thought expressed in the above seems to be that of *Āpastambadharmasūtra* 1. 7. 20. 3. viz. "आम्रे फलार्थे निमित्ते छाया गन्ध इत्यनूपद्येते," which see above.

बर्हिर्न्यायः ॥

The question of *Kus'a grass*. This is based on the sentence “बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामि,” “I cut grass as a seat for the gods,” which forms the subject of Jaimini 3. 2. 1. 2. The question is whether the word बर्हिस् is to be taken in its primary sense or in a secondary one; and the conclusion is “मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रत्ययः,” which see above in the form गौणमुख्ययोः &c.

बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेतः ॥

The mind of even those who are highly educated is distrustful of itself. This is the second line of the second verse in *S'akuntalānāṭak*. In *Tārṅkikarakṣā* (page 208), in an exposition of वाद, we find the following:—“वादे तु दैवादागताः सदस्या वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां संप्रतिपत्त्या प्रामादिककथाभासशंकाव्यावर्तनायाङ्गीक्रियन्ते न जल्पवितण्डयोरिव प्रमेयादिव्यवस्थापनार्थमङ्गत्वेनोपादीयन्ते” ॥ On which, Mallinātha comments as follows:—“वादे विशेषमाह वादे त्विति । दैवादागतानां वा किं प्रयोजनमत आह प्रामादिकेति । बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेत इति न्यायादिति भावः” ॥

For the benefit of any who may consult the original, I may add that the quotation from the *Nyāyavārtika* which immediately follows in Varadarāja's text, is found on page 161 of that work; and that from Vācaspatimisra's *ṭikā*, on page 224.

बहुराजकदेशन्यायः ॥

The simile of a country with several kings [working in opposition to one another]. It occurs in chap. XIX of the *Anubhūtiprakāśa*, which deals with the Kena Upaniṣad. The passage is contained in verses 12 and 13:—

“वाक्क्षुःश्रोत्रमुख्यानि प्रेरयेत्करणानि कः ।

ईश्वरश्चेत्किमेकोऽसौ बहवोऽमीत्युतेर्यताम् ॥

प्रवर्त्यानामनन्तत्वाद्वैलक्षण्याच्च नैकता ।

नैकमत्वं बहुत्वे स्याद्बहुराजकदेशवत्” ॥

The nyāya is sufficiently explained by the example. Raghunātha links it with the बहुवृत्ताकृष्टमृगन्याय which is otherwise unknown to me.

बहूनामनुग्रहो न्यायः ॥

The association of many is good policy. Raghunāthavarman explains thus:—"अनुग्रहः साहाय्यम् । न्यायो न्यायादनपेतोऽर्थात्तदुपेतः कार्यसाधक इति यावत्," and then quotes *Pancatantra* i. 331 by way of illustration:—"बहूनामप्यसाराणां मेलनं कार्यसाधकम् । तृणैः संपाद्यते रज्जुस्तया नागोपि बध्यते" ॥ For the many variants of this verse see *Indische Sprüche* 4425, and Peterson's *Subhāshitāvali* 2742. The maxim is found in *Jaiminiyanyāyamālāvistara* 7. 1. 5, and in Nāges'a on Kaiyaṭa, page 16.

बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः ॥

The burning of a city just by a child's playing with the wick of a lamp. "Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth." I assume that कलिका means the bud-like charred excrescence which often forms on the top of a wick in an open oil-light. The saying is found in *Kusumānjali* v. 3, page 89:—"ननु तस्य सर्वदा सर्वत्राविशेषे कार्यस्य सर्वदोषोत्पत्तिप्रसंग इति निरपेक्षेश्वरपक्षे दोषः, सापेक्षे उपेक्षणीय एवास्त्विति बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः परन्तु तन्न स्थेमभाजो जगत एवाकारणत्वप्रसङ्गात्."

Udayana seems to use the phrase ironically, but I do not quite grasp the drift of this. We meet with प्रदीपकलिका again in *Syādvādamanjarī*, page 157:—"सा च क्षणसन्ततिस्तद्दर्शनप्रसिद्धा प्रदीपकलिकावन्नवनवोत्पद्यमाना."

बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमन्त्रणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारव- श्रावणम् ॥

What need has a hungry man of a pressing invitation [to eat]; why direct the attention of a longing one to the cry of

the peacock? In the Kumārapāla chapter of *Prabandhacintāmani*, page 212, we are told that that king having given Hemacandra (a Jain) a pressing invitation to join him in a pilgrimage to the temple of Somanātha (dedicated to S'iva), the hermit replied as follows:—"बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमग्नणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारवश्रावणमिति लोकरुदेस्तपस्विनामधिकृततीर्थाधिकाराणां को नाम नृपतेरत्र निबन्धः" ॥ "What need is there to show much zeal about inviting one who is hungry? Why make one who is longing, listen to the cry of the peacock? So runs the popular proverb, and, in accordance with it, I ask, why does your Majesty exert yourself to press hermits, whose very profession is the visiting of sacred places?" This is Mr. Tawney's rendering, on page 130 of his translation. Indian writers often tell us that the cries of the peacock intensify the longings of separated lovers! For example, *Raghuvams'a* xiii 27:—"स्निग्धाश्च केकाः शिखिनां बभूवुर्यस्मिन्नसह्यानि विना त्वया मे."

ब्राह्मणग्रामन्यायः ॥

The figure of a village in which Brāhmins abound. This is in Raghunatha's list, but hardly deserves a place amongst nyāyas. In *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 188, a distinction is drawn between the expression प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्रामः and ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्रामः, the meaning, in the former case, being a village in which Brāhmins are more numerous than in some other village, and, in the latter, a village in which the Brāhmins outnumber the other castes. The passage is as follows:—"प्राचुर्यस्य धर्मविशेषणत्वेन निर्देश एव व्यधिकरणसजातीयाल्पत्वस्य निरूपकत्वं दृष्टम् । यथा प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्राम इत्यत्र प्राचुर्यस्य ग्रामान्तरगतब्राह्मणाल्पत्वं निरूपकं दृष्टमिति । तस्य स्वधर्मविशेष्यत्वे तु समानाधिकरणविजातीयाल्पत्वमेव निरूपकमत एव ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्राम इति प्रयोगे तद्ग्रामगतशूद्राल्पत्वापेक्षं प्राचुर्यं प्रतीयते." See also *Tantravārtika*, p. 1066 line 2. Akin to this is the मल्लग्रामन्याय.

भर्छुन्यायः ॥

The illustration afforded by *Bharchu*. We learn from the commentary on *Sankṣepas'ārīraka* i. 14 that *Bharchu* was a Brāhman and highly esteemed by the king of his country. This, however, brought him into disfavour with the jealous hangers-on at the royal court; and, to get rid of him, they one day blind-folded him and carried him off to a forest; at the same time telling the king that he was dead and had become a goblin! After a long time he returned to the town in company with some foresters, but was prevented by his enemies from entering it. On one occasion, when in a pleasure-ground outside the city, the king actually saw him; but, in consequence of the false statement that had been made, he supposed it to be his ghost! Eventually the whole thing came to light, and the king discovered that he had been deceived and that the supposed ghost was really his old protégé, *Bharchu* himself.

The verse containing the *nyāya* is as follows:—

“ पुरुषापराधमलिना धिषणा
निरवद्यचक्षुरुदयापि यथा ।
न फलाय भर्छुविषया भवति
श्रुतिसंभवापि तु तथात्मनि धीः” ॥

As under the next verse we have a further short comment on the illustration, and as the verse itself furnishes another good example of the *manimantranyāya* in the First Handful, I subjoin both:—

“ पुरुषापराधविगमे तु पुनः
प्रतिबन्धकव्युदसनात्सफला ।
मणिमन्त्रयोरपगमे तु तथा
सति पावकान्नवति धूमलता” ॥

“मानमेययोरुपनिषद्ब्रह्मणोर्निर्दोषत्वात्परिशेषात्प्रमातृदोष एव फलप्रतिबन्धक इति

शास्त्रीयेण विचारेण तस्यापगमे सत्यप्रामाण्यशंकारूपप्रतिबन्धाभावात्पुनस्तस्मादेव निर्दोषवेदवाक्यात्सफला धीरुदेति यथा भर्तुर्दुर्जनैररण्ये प्रक्षिप्तो जीवन्नेव पुनरागत इत्युपपत्त्या भर्तुर्ज्ञानाप्रामाण्यशंकाकारणपुरुषापराधविगमे सति तद्विषया भर्तुरेवायमिति सफला धीरुदेति.”

Raghunāthavarman gives a different version of the story, but names no authority in support of it. He calls it a “लौकिकी गाथा.”

भस्मन्याज्याहुतिः ॥

Offering clarified butter on ashes [instead of on the sacrificial fire]. An illustration of wasted, or misdirected, effort. *Upamitibhavaprapaṇcā Kathā*, page 240:—“अकार्यवारणोद्युक्तो मूढे यः परिखिद्यते । वाग्विस्तरो वृथा तस्य भस्मन्याज्याहुतिर्यथा ॥ नोपदेशशतेनापि मूढोऽकार्यान्निवर्त्यते । शीतांशुग्रसनात्केन राहुर्वाक्यैर्निवारितः” ॥ There is another instance in Hemacandra's *Paris'istaparvan* i. 58:—“दध्यौ चैवं स राजर्षिरहो तेषां कुमन्निणाम् । सन्मानो यो मयाकारि स भस्मनि हुतं ध्रुवम्.”

The nyāya was doubtless derived from *Chhāndogya Upaniṣhad* 5. 24. 1:—“स य इदमविद्वानग्निहोत्रं जुहोति यथाङ्गारानपोह्य भस्मनि जुहुयात्तादृक्तस्यात्.” It is found also in *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* i. 16:—

“अन्तरेण विधिं मोहाद्यः कुर्यात्साम्परायिकम् ।
न तत्स्यादुपकाराय भस्मनीव हुतं हविः” ॥

भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत् ॥

The simile of [a remnant of] *oil adhering to* [the sides of] *a vessel* [out of which oil has been poured]. In the *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 1. 8, there is a lengthy and important discussion as to whether, on returning to earth, in some new birth, after a residence in the moon, a man brings with him a remnant of the works which took him there,—this remnant being techni-

cally styled *anus'aya*. S'ankara affirms that he does, and says:—
 “कः पुनरनुशयो नामेति । केचित्तावदाहुः । स्वर्गार्थस्य कर्मणो भुक्तफलस्यावशेषः
 कश्चिदनुशयो नाम भाण्डानुसारिस्त्रेहवत् । यथा हि स्नेहभाण्डं रिच्यमानं न
 सर्वात्मना रिच्यते भाण्डानुसार्येव कश्चिस्त्रेहशेषोऽवतिष्ठते तथानुशयोऽपीति” ॥

The question is then asked, why does he not remain in that blissful region until the whole of his merit is exhausted? The answer is, that, just as a servant who has long served in a king's household, finds his wardrobe at last reduced to the slender proportions of a pair of shoes and an umbrella, and is therefore unfit to continue in that exalted position, so, too, a man is unworthy of a residence in the moon who has only a small balance of merit remaining to his credit! Here is this unique reply in S'ankara's own words:—“ननु निरवशेषकर्मफलोपभोगाय चन्द्रमण्डलमारूढाः । बाढम् । तथापि स्वल्पकर्मावशेषमात्रेण तत्रावस्थातुं न लभ्यते । यथा किल कश्चित्सेवकः सकलैः सेवोपकरणै राजकुलमुपसृतश्चिरप्रवासात्परिक्षीणबहूपकरणशूत्रपादुकादिमात्रावशेषो न राजकुलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोति । एवमनुशयमात्रपरिग्रहो न चन्द्रमण्डलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोतीति.”

This is a portion of the system which is regarded as the highest flight of the Indian mind, and to which some restless folk in Europe and America are betaking themselves, in order to find rest for their souls! There are not a few in India to-day, however, who have found that rest by turning from these gropings in the dark, to the midday light afforded by an accredited revelation. To quote a modern writer:—“The painful, toilsome, searching of the creature into things too high for it, only ends in perplexity and bitter disappointment.”

भाण्डालेख्यन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the design on a jar*. Used, apparently, of something variable at will. It is found in *Khandanakhandakhādyā* (page 289 of Medical Hall Press edition) in the following passage:—

“अथान्यत्रास्तु यद्वा तद्वा करणं प्रमाविवक्षितजातिविशेषव्यपदेशकं प्रमाणम् ।

चतस्रः खल्विमाः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमितयो भिन्नबुद्धिव्यपदेशभाजः । न च प्रमाता प्रमेयं वा तद्भेदेहेतुः । प्रमाणानि तु यथायथं चतसृष्वसाधारणानीति भिन्नबुद्धिव्यपदेशनिबन्धनानीति । मैवम् । विवक्षितपदं तावल्लक्षणे भाण्डालेख्यमिव पुरुषेच्छानामनियतविषयत्वात्” ॥

The commentator S'ankara Miśra explains the nyāya thus:—
“भाण्डालेख्यमिवेति । यथालेख्यं रेखोपरेखादि सर्वभाण्डसाधारणं न भाण्डविशेषलक्षणं तथा पुरुषाधीनविवक्षापि न विशेषिकेत्यर्थः” ॥

In the edition of S'rī-Harṣa's work, however, now in course of publication (together with the commentary *Vidyāsāgarī*) in the Chaukhambā Sanskrit Series (page 528), the form of the simile differs, and a different explanation of it is given:—
“मैवमिति । भण्डो विप्रलम्भकस्तस्यालेख्यं भाण्डालेख्यम् । देवदत्तस्य जाया किमपत्यं जनयिष्यतीति पृष्टे पुत्रो न पुत्रीति विप्रलम्भकस्य कुड्योपर्यालेख्यं न विषयविशेषनियतं निषेधस्योभयथा योजयितुं शक्यत्वात्तथा विवक्षितपदमपि पुरुषेच्छानामनियतत्वेन चतुष्टयजातीयस्य नियमेन प्रत्येतुमशक्यत्वात्कस्यचित्तस्रः प्रमितयो विवक्षिताः कस्यचित्पञ्चेति” ॥

The simile is found in *Tātparyatīkā* (page 496, last line) as भाण्डालेख्य.

भूतं भव्यायोपदिश्यत इति न्यायः ॥

It is declared [by Mimāṃsakas] that an accomplished [sacrificial] act is [not an end in itself, but] for the bringing about of a result in the future [such as the attainment of Heaven &c.]. And this, they say, necessitates belief in an Apūrva as a connecting link between the two. See the arguments for and against this theory, in Professor Gangānātha Jhā's translation of Tantravārtika 2. 1. 5. Most of us will be thankful for the aid of so able an interpreter of the teaching of that terribly difficult book !

The nyāya is found, in slightly different form, in the

Saṅkṣepas'ārīraka i. 143; and, in its usual form, in the commentary. I quote only the second half of the verse:—

“भूतं भव्यप्रधानं भवति हि न पुनः स्वप्रधानं कदाचि-
च्छास्त्रस्थाः शब्दशक्तिस्थितिनिपुणधियो विस्तरादेवमाहुः” ॥

“भूतं भव्यायोपदिश्यत इति जैमिनिशबरस्वामिनोर्मतं तौ च वेदार्थनिर्णयेऽधि-
कृताविति तदुक्तमेव ग्रहीतुमुचितमित्यभिप्रेत्याह । भूतमिति । सिद्धमित्यर्थः ।
भव्यं साध्यं प्रधानं यस्य भव्यशेषमित्यर्थः” ॥

In verse 312 of the same chapter we meet with it again, and also in the altered form in which a Vedantist would apply it to his system:—

“भव्याय भूतमिति किञ्च विधिप्रधाने
काण्डे नयोऽयमिह तद्विपरीतमाहुः ।
भूताय भव्यमिति भूतपरं हि सर्वं
वेदावसानमिति सूत्रकृदाचक्षे” ॥

“भव्याय भूतमिति । विधिः प्रधानं प्रतिपिपादयिषितो यस्मिन् काण्डे तस्मिन् ।
इह ब्रह्मकाण्डे । तद्विपरीतं भूतभव्यन्यायविपरीतम् । तद्वैपरीत्यमेवाह । भूताय
भव्यमिति । हिर्हेतौ । यतः भूतपरं सत्यसिद्धब्रह्मपरं वेदावसानं वेदान्तं सूत्रकृदा-
चक्षे समन्वयसूत्रप्रमुखैः सूत्रैरुक्तवानतो भाष्यकारादय एवमाहुरित्यर्थः” ॥

The above extracts will be found in *The Paṇḍit*, vol. iv, page 583; and vol. v. page 473.

The *nyāya* occurs again in i. 395 (*Paṇḍit*, vol. vi. p. 167) in a context dealing with *bhāvanā*, that topic so dear to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, for a right understanding of which nothing could be better than the perusal of Dr. Thibaut's translation of the *Arthasaṅgraha*, pp. 3-5. Verse 482 of the same chapter contains a fourth example. It appears also in *Tattvādīpana*, page 377, line 7 from bottom, and page 427, line 9 from bottom; also in the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, page 16, section 36.

भूमिरथिकन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the man who* [in order to become proficient] *makes drawings of a war-chariot on the ground.* This nyāya is found in S'abara's bhāshya on Jaimini 7. 2. 15, and again (in conjunction with शुष्केष्टिन्याय) in 9. 2. 13. The latter passage is as follows:—"यत्तावदुपाध्यायः शिष्यसन्निधावधीते तद्ग्रहणार्थम् । यच्छिष्यस्तद्धारणार्थम् । ग्रहणधारणे प्रयोगार्थं भूमिरथिकवत् शुष्केष्टिवद्वा । तद्यथा भूमिरथिको भूमौ रथमालिख्य शिक्षां करोति संग्रामे प्राशुभावो भवितेति यथा च छात्रः शुष्केष्टीः प्रयुक्ते प्रयोगे प्राशुकर्मा भवितासीति एवमेतद्द्रष्टव्यम्" ॥

In his *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* (page 186 b of India office MS. 582) Raghunāthavarman applies these two nyāyas and the शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्याय as follows:—"परमतनिराकरणं च शिष्याणामभ्यासदाढ्येनासंभावनादिसमुच्छेदाय न तु परद्वेषेणेति विवक्षायां भूमिरथिकन्यायः शुष्केष्टिन्यायः शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायश्च प्रवर्तते" ॥ His explanations of the three are taken from *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* 9. 1. 6 and 9. 2. 2.

अष्टावसरन्यायः ॥

The law that [something does not take place] *when the occasion* [for its taking place] *has once gone.* This is Prof. Kielhorn's rendering of the nyāya as it occurs under Nāgoji-bhaṭṭa's *Paribhāṣā* lxiv. The sentence is as follows—"अत एव निर्देशाद्वाष्टावसरन्यायस्यात्र शास्त्रे नाश्रयणम् । ध्वनितं चेदमिको गुण इति सूत्रे भाष्य इति भाष्यप्रदीपोद्घोते निरूपितम्" ॥ The reference is to the *Uddyota* on 1. 1. 3, and the nyāya will be found in vol. i. pages 185, 186, 190.

There is an instance of it in *Tantravārtika* 3. 5. 46 (page 1060):—"यदपि यजमानस्य अष्टावसरं क्रियमाणं विगुणं भवतीति तदपि गुणलोपे मुख्यस्येत्यनेन विरुद्धम्." The nyāya is expressive of a *lost opportunity*.

मदशक्तिवत् ॥

The simile of *the power of an intoxicant*. It is employed by S'ankara in his bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 53:—"अत्रैके देहमात्रात्मदर्शिनो लोकायतिका देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽभावं मन्यमानाः समस्तव्यस्तेषु बाह्येषु पृथिव्यादिष्वदृष्टमपि चैतन्यं शरीराकारपरिणतेषु भूतेषु स्यादिति संभावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवद्विज्ञानं चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुष इति चाहुः" ॥ Ānandagiri comments on the latter part thus:—"मदेति । यथैकैकस्मात्ताम्बूलादेरदृष्टापि मदशक्तिः संघाते दृश्यते तथेदं ज्ञानमेकैकस्मिन्नदृष्टमपि देहाकारपरिणतभूतेषु संहतेषु भवतीति चाहुरिति योजना." In the Lokāyatika section of *Śaṅkara's anasamuccaya*, kārikā 94 reads thus:—"पृथ्व्यादिभूतसंहत्यां तथा देहादिसंभवः । मदशक्तिः सुराङ्गेभ्यो यद्वत्तद्वत्स्थितात्मता." See, too, *S'ālikā*, page 146, line 7 from bottom.

The illustration is found also in *Nyāyamanjarī* (page 439, line 4 from bottom):—"यत्तु मदशक्तिवदित्युक्तं तत्र मदशक्तेर्दृष्टत्वादभ्युपगमो न तु ज्ञानस्य तत्र दर्शनम्."

मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं नानुपश्यसि ॥

O foolish one! thou seest the honey but dost not see the precipice. This is the second line of *S'āntiparva* ccxi. 7. (cccx Bombay edn.), the first being "स्वादुकामुक कामानां वैतृण्यं किं न गच्छसि." Ānandabodhācārya quotes it in his *Nyāyamakaraṇḍa* (page 77) as "मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं किं न पश्यसि." The editor of that work was apparently unaware of the existence of the passage in the *Mokṣadharmā*, for he considered the आभाणक to be based on the following verse of the *Devībhāgavata*:—"मधु पश्यति मूढात्मा प्रपातं नैव पश्यति । करोति निन्दितं कर्म नरकान्न बिभेति च."

Thanks to the St. Petersburg Lexicon, we can refer to five other passages of the *Mahābhārat* where the same illustration

is found. In *Vanaparva* ccxxxv. 21 (Calc.), we read:—
 “मधु प्रपश्यन्ति न तु प्रपातं यद्व्यूतमालंब्य हरन्ति राज्यम्.” In *Udyoga-*
parva L. 27:—“विषमं नावमन्यन्ते प्रपातं मधुदर्शिनः । संयुगं ये गमिष्य-
 न्ति नररूपेण मृत्युना.” In *Dronaparva* Li. 11:—“न लुब्धो बुध्यते
 दोषान्मोहाल्लोभात्प्रवर्तते । मधुलिप्सुर्हि नापश्यं प्रपातमहमीदृशम्.” Again
 in cxxxiii. 10:—“धनं धनेश्वरस्येव हत्वा पार्थस्य मे सुतः । मधुप्रेप्सुरिवा-
 बुद्धिः प्रपातं नावबुध्यते.” Lastly, in *Strīparva* i. 37:—“मधु यः
 केवलं दृष्ट्वा प्रपातं नानुपश्यति । स भ्रष्टो मधुलोभेन शोचत्येवं यथा भवान्.”

Compare the following from *Sāstradīpikā* 3. 6. 3, page 340:—
 “यो हि मधुन्येव दत्तदृष्टिर्दुर्बलां शाखामधिरोहति तस्य विनिपात एव भवति ।
 तद्वदिहापि । ‘मधुदृष्टिवदेवास्य गुणकामं प्रपश्यतः । क्रियाफलविनाशात्मा
 विनिपातः प्रसज्यते.”

मध्येऽपवादाः पूर्वान्विधीन्बाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

In the *Paribhāṣendus'ekkhara*, this *paribhāṣā* stands between
 पुरस्तादपवादाः &c., and अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा &c., which see above.
 Professor Kielhorn's translation of the present one is as fol-
 lows:—“*Apavādas* that are surrounded (by rules which teach
 operations that have to be superseded by the *Apavāda*-opera-
 tions), supersede only those rules that precede, not those that
 follow, them.” “The reason for (the validity of) this *Pari-*
bhāṣā is this that (an *Apavāda*, when it has become effective)
 by superseding the rule which presents itself first, no longer
 wants (to supersede something else).” It appears in *Mahā-*
bhāṣya 3. 2. 1 (vārt. 6); 4. 1. 55 (vārt. 4); 4. 1. 114 (vārt. 4
 and 6); 4. 3. 132 (vārt. 6); 4. 3. 156 (vārt. 7); 6. 1. 102 (vārt.
 6); 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vārt. 5); 6. 4. 148 (vārt. 5); and 7. 2.
 44 (vārt. 4). In no case, however, are the words नोत्तरान् found
 in the *paribhāṣā*.

मन्दविषन्यायः ॥

The simile of a *slow-poison*. It forms nyāya 150 of the Pūrvabhāga of *Laukikanyāyaratnākara*, and is used in opposition to तीव्रविषन्याय as follows:—“एवं हि संशयादिनिवृत्तिर्मन्दविषन्यायेन सुकरा । बोधादाब्धे प्रतिवाद्यापादितं तु संशयादि तीव्रविषन्यायेन दुष्परिहरं स्यात् । सद्योभुक्तं विषं मन्दमन्यथा तीव्रम्.” It occurs in *S'āstradīpikā* 1. 3. 4 (page 148, line 2 from bottom):—“इत्थं च संभवति प्रामाण्ये नाप्रामाण्यं युक्तमिति भवति केषांचिदाकांक्षा सापि मन्दविषन्यायेन निराकर्तव्येत्येवमर्थमिदमधिकरणम्.”

महतापि प्रयत्नेन तमिस्रायां परामृशन् । कृष्णशुक्ल-
विवेकं हि न कश्चिदधिगच्छति ॥

Not even by the most thorough examination, could one distinguish between black and white, in intense darkness. The verse is Kumārila's, and is used by him (in *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 1.) to illustrate the impossibility of tracing the sources from which Manu and other Smṛiti-authors derived their laws. Just before the s'loka he says:—“न च तद्विज्ञायते कीदृशाद्वाक्यादिदं मन्वादिभिः प्रतिपन्नं किं विधिपरादुतार्थवादरूपादिति.” Then, immediately after the verse:—“न च मन्वादिवचनाद्वेदमूलत्वं निश्चिनुमः.” This latter clause, as the *Nyāyasudhā* points out, is with reference to Manu's own statement, in chapter ii. 7, to the effect that every precept of his was deduced from the Veda.

महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामणु ॥

The very same face which looks large [when seen] in a large mirror, appears small [when reflected] in the pupil of the eye. The illustration is found in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 137 line 16:—“एकमपि व्यञ्जकभेदादुत्कर्षवन्निकर्षवद्दृष्टं यथा महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामण्विति.”

महार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणन्यायः ॥

This very curious simile is found in the commentary on S'āntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* i. 4, the first half of which reads thus:—"क्षणसंपदियं सुदुर्लभा प्रतिलब्धा पुरुषार्थसाधनी." The *ṭikā* commences as follows:—"अष्टाक्षणविनिर्मुक्तस्य क्षणस्य संपत्तिः समग्रता । इयं सुदुर्लभा । सुष्टु दुःखेन लभ्यत इति कथञ्चित्प्राप्या । महार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणोपमा." In a footnote, the editor tells us that Professor Kern was unable to get any satisfactory meaning out of the *nyāya*, but proposed the following:—"As the entering of the tortoise's neck into the hole of the yoke formed by the great ocean." Before him, Burnouf, who was equally puzzled, suggested, "It is as unlikely to happen as if a tortoise should put its neck into a hole opening every yuga in the world's ocean." This was all that I knew when writing on it early in 1904. A note, however, contributed to the *Journal of the Pali Text Society* for 1906-1907, by Mr. Harināth De, M. A., threw considerable light on the subject. He gave extracts from three Pali works in which the simile is more or less directly referred to, and one of them, namely that from the *Majjhima Nikāya*, is said by him to be "the original passage in which the comparison first occurred." Mr. De did not translate it, but I take the following to be the sense of it. "If a man were to throw into the sea a one-holed yoke, and it were tossed to and fro between north and south, and east and west, and if, once in a hundred years, a tortoise, blind of one eye, were to rise to the surface, would it be likely that its neck would enter that yoke?"

It was not until after I had made use of this in a note on the simile which I contributed to the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* in October 1909, that I became aware that my friend Mr. F. W. Thomas had really explained it six years previously ! It came about on this wise. In the September number of the *Indian Antiquary* for 1903, in an article entitled

Mātrīceta and the *Mahārājakanikalekha*, he quoted a verse from a Tibetan work, and gave the following translation:—
 “When like the neck of a tortoise, entering the hole of a yoke in the ocean, I had obtained the state of man, attended with the great festival of the good religion.” He then added this explanatory remark:—“The reference to the blind tortoise, which rises from the bottom of the ocean once in a hundred years, and by a rare chance happens to insert his neck into a yoke floating on the surface of the ocean, is used to illustrate the extremely rare chance by which a living creature is born as a human being.” After pointing out the recurrence of the simile in two other Buddhist works, he added:—“I have noted also a fourth recurrence of it in the Tibetan version of a work entitled *Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā*, and ascribed to Sūra. This reference will now be familiar to M. Lévi, who has himself discovered in Nepal the Sanskrit text of the work... The Sanskrit original here reads...as follows:—

ata evāha bhagavān mānuṣyam atidurlabham ।
 mahārṇavayugachhidre kūrmaḡrīvārpaṇopamaḡ ॥

Is it not probable that we have here a saying ascribed to Buddha, which we may hope also to find in the Pali literature? [I now learn from Prof. Rhys Davids that it does occur in the *Majjhima Nikāya*: see the edition of Mr. Chalmers iii. page 169].”

This is the passage of the *Nikāya* quoted by Mr. Harinātha De, but as he makes no reference to Mr. Thomas’ article I infer that he, too, in 1907, was as unacquainted with it as myself.

Orthodox writers, such as Kumārila, Vācaspati Miśra and others, have not hesitated to make use of illustrations employed by Buddhist writers, and that now under consideration forms no exception. I have recently met with a slightly modified form of it in the *Bodhasāra*, a modern Vedantic work by S’rī-Narahari, published, together with a commentary, in the

Benares Sanskrit Series in 1906. On page 223 the author quotes a verse from “*Vāsiṣṭha*” (probably the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*) which I subjoin together with the comment:—

“चलार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवाप्रवेशवत् ।

अनेकजन्मनामन्ते विवेकी जायते पुमान् ॥

चलेति । चलार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवाप्रवेशवत् । चलौ चञ्चलौ यावर्णवौ...तावर्णवौ तरङ्गौ...तयोर्युगं युगं तस्य च्छिद्रं मध्यवर्त्याकाशं तत्र स्थितो यः कूर्मः कमठस्तस्य कच्छपस्योभयपार्श्वे बहुकालं निरन्तरं तरङ्गकृतताडनेन विह्वलत्वे ग्रीवाप्रवेशो ग्रीवा कण्ठस्तदुपलक्षिततदाद्यङ्गप्रवेशो यथा जायते तद्वत्पुमान्पुरुषार्थ्यनेकजन्मनामनन्तजन्ममरणोपलक्षितसुखदुःखानां स्पर्शेन खिन्नस्तदन्तःकरणबाह्यकरणानि स्वस्वविषयेभ्यो व्यावर्त्य विवेक्यात्मानात्मविवेकवाञ्छायते भवति ॥”

According to this interpreter, then, we have the tortoise swimming between two boisterous seas (or *waves*, according to him), and becoming so distressed by the buffeting which it receives that it thrusts its neck (which is said to stand for the whole body) into something or other not specified! And this is intended to illustrate the distress caused to a man by the ills of endless existences in this *bhavasāgara*, and also his final enlightenment and restraining of his organs of sense from the external objects which formerly attracted them!

A propos of the above remark as to the adoption by orthodox writers of illustrations taken from so-called heretical authors, I may add that possibly even the great grammarian Patanjali borrowed his “आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे” from a Buddhist source; for, in Childer’s Pāli Dictionary under the word *Seyyathā*, we find the following quotation from the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*:—

“*Seyyathāpi, bhante, ambaṃ vā putṭho labujāṃ vyākareyya, labujāṃ vā putṭho ambaṃ vyākareyya, evam evaṃ, &c.*” “As a man, Sir, who was asked about a mango, might answer about a bread fruit, and vice versā, even so &c.”

महिषीस्नेहप्रतिबद्धभिक्षुदृष्टान्तः ॥

The illustration of a devotee who was hindered [in the religious life] by the affection which he had for a courtesan [when he was a householder]. It is said to be the subject of a *Gāthā*, and is cited to show that the past, equally with the present or future, may injuriously influence the seeker after the knowledge which leads to emancipation. It is found in *Pancadas'ī* ix. 41:—

“ अतीतेनापि महिषीस्नेहेन प्रतिबन्धतः ।

भिक्षुस्तत्त्वं न वेदेति गाथा लोके प्रगीयते ” ॥

We are told in the next verse that the Guru, making use of that self-same incident as an instrument for the conveyance of *Brahmajñāna*, brought about its removal and secured the man's emancipation ! The commentator puts it thus:—“गुरुस्तस्य तत्त्वोपदेष्टा तदीयं महिषीस्नेहमनुसृत्य तस्यामेव महिष्यां तत्त्वं तन्महिष्युपाधिकं ब्रह्मोक्तवान् ततः सोऽपि महिषीस्नेहलक्षणप्रतिबन्धकापगमेन गुरूपदिष्टं तत्त्वं यथावत् शास्त्रोक्तप्रकारेणैव ज्ञातवानित्यर्थः ” ॥

The three verses immediately preceding the above will be found under the *हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तः*.

मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते ॥

A sage meditates [on Brahman] and a fool is emancipated ! An impossible sequence. Compare *Ezekiel* xviii. 2:—“The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge.” The *nyāya* forms part of an interesting passage on page 37 of *Vedāntatattvarivēka*:—“एतेनेदमपास्तं मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यत इत्येतच्छास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरीति न्यायविरुद्धम् ॥ तथा चाभाणकः । काचिन्निपादी तनयं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निपादस्तु कषायपायीति । मुनिकर्तृकश्रवणादिविधिफलस्य साक्षात्कारस्य मूर्खेऽनभ्युपगमात् । तत्फलस्याप्यविद्यानिवृत्तेर्मुनिप्रत्यङ्घान्नगततया तावन्मात्रतया मूर्खेनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । दृष्टफलानां यथादर्शमुपपत्तेश्च.” For the *nyāya* शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तिरि, see below.

य एव करोति स एव भुङ्के ॥

He who performs an action will himself reap the fruit thereof [whether in the form of reward or retribution]. This doctrine, common to all the orthodox schools, is found in *Nyāya-vārtika* 3. 1. 4 and is directed against the belief that the body is the soul, and that when the body is cremated, the man, with all his deeds, ceases to exist. This is reasserted in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 403, thus :—“य एव कर्मणः कर्ता स एव तत्फलस्य भोक्तेति सर्वैरास्तिकपथानुसारिभिरभ्युपेयम्.” The emphasis, therefore, here is not so much on the fact that *whatsoever* a man soweth that shall he also reap, as that *whosoever* soweth the same shall also reap. This, of course, implies that the reaper will be *conscious* of the fact that he was the sower, for otherwise the precept would be of no moral value. It is difficult to see how any one can hold with the above, and at the same time be a believer in the doctrine of transmigration, the advocates of which are compelled to admit that the subjects of those repeated births have absolutely *no consciousness* of previous existences. I am not unmindful of the fact that the followers of the Yoga system [*sūtra* iii. 16] profess to attain to a knowledge of the past and the future by means of संयम (that is, by धारणा, ध्यान, and समाधि collectively); but, even if that were so, the number affected would be infinitesimal.

यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे निवध्यते ॥

That for which there is no room on a camel's back is tied to his neck! Illustrates the piling up of misfortunes almost beyond endurance. Perhaps akin to our “It is the last straw which breaks the camel's back.” It occurs in *Upamitibhava-prapañcā Kathā*, page 394 :—“मया चिन्तितम् । अहो हता दैवेन वयं मन्दभाग्याः । तदिदमाभाणकमायातम् । यदुत यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे

निबध्यत इति । तथाहि वैश्वानरपापमित्रयोगेणैव कुमारस्य गाढमुद्वेजिता वयं यावतेयमपरा कृयेवास्य भार्या सम्पन्नेति.” *Kṛityā* is a female deity who is invoked for evil purposes. There is another example on page 895 of the same:—

“महाभारसमाक्रान्तमूर्तेराराटिकारिणः ।

यत्पृष्ठे माति नोष्टस्य गलके तन्निबध्यते ” ॥

यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणाः ॥

Where there is a good outward appearance, there also are good qualities. This is found in Hemacandra's *Paris'īṣṭa-parvan* iii. 233 :—“अस्याकृत्यनुसारेण गुणानपि हि निश्चिनु । यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा इति लोकेऽपि गीयते.” It is contained also in verse 5076 of *Indische Sprüche*, but whether as a quotation or not, I cannot say:—“यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा वसन्ति नैतद्धि सम्यक्कविभिः प्रणीतम् । केनातिचार्य्यपि मे हृदिस्था दुनाति गात्रं विरहे प्रियासौ.” Professor Böhtlingk took it from Kosegarten's edition of the *Pancatantra* (i. 208), but I cannot find it in the Bombay edition. Some work on *शृङ्गाररस* is a much more probable source.

यदभिधित्सितं तदभिधीयतां फले व्यक्तिर्भविष्यति ॥

Say what you wish to say about a thing, but its real value will be shown by the advantage derived from it. In the opening part of the *Tārkikakarakṣā* the author says:—“प्रारिप्सितस्य ग्रन्थस्य प्रेक्षावदुपादित्साप्रयोजिकामभिमतफलसाधनतामभिधाय श्रोतृबुद्धिमनुकूलयन्वार्तिष्यमाणमेवाग्रे दर्शयति ।

निःश्रेयसफलं प्राहुर्येषां तत्त्वावधारणम् ।

प्रमाणादिपदार्थास्ते लक्ष्यन्ते नातिविस्तरम् ॥”

On which Mallinātha comments thus:—

“ननु यदभिधित्सितं तदभिधीयतां फले व्यक्तिर्भविष्यतीति न्यायात्किं सृष्ट्याग्रे वक्ष्यमाणार्थप्रतिज्ञाडंबरविलम्बैरित्याद्यश्लोकाक्षेपमाशङ्क्य समाधत्ते प्रारिप्सितस्येति । प्रेक्षावतां धीमतामुपादित्सा स्वचिकीर्षां तत्र प्रयोजिकां हेतुभूतामित्यर्थः । प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तेः प्रयोजनज्ञानाधीनत्वात्तज्ज्ञापनायाग्रे प्रतिज्ञा कार्येति भावः ॥”

यद्गहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षते ॥

That on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the nyāya in the Aulukya chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 126, Jivānanda's edn.) :—“ न चालोकाभावस्य घटाद्यभाववद्रूपवदभावत्वेनालोकसापेक्षचक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्यादित्येवमित्यं । यद्गहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षते इति न्यायेनालोकग्रहे आलोकपेक्षाया अभावेन तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षाया अभावात्.” “And you need not assert that this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour [i. e. light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark], as we see in the case of a jar's absence; because, by the very rule on which you rely, namely, that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence.”

Most probably Mādhava took this from Udayana's *Kiraṇāvali* where it stands (on page 18) in a similar context. It occurs also in *Lakṣaṇāvalitīkā*, page 12.

यववराहाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

In Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 45 we read :—“ यववराहाधिकरणन्यायेन लोकप्रसिद्धिः शास्त्रीयप्रसिद्ध्या बाध्येत्याह.” There is no *adhikaraṇa* of this name in *Mīmāṃsā* or *Vedānta*, but the reference is doubtless to the शास्त्रप्रसिद्धार्थग्रामाण्याधिकरण, otherwise styled the आर्यभट्टेच्छाधिकरण, which comprises Jaimini's sūtras 1. 3. 8 and 9, under which the words यव, वराह, and others having a double meaning, are discussed by the bhāṣyakāra. These two sūtras are quoted by S'ankara on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 4. 42, and explained by Ānandagiri. The matter is well put

in Colebrooke's *Essay on Mīmāṃsā* (page 339) :—" A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the *Mīmāṃsā*, on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are *yava*, signifying in Sanskrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named *priyangu*; *varāha* in the one a hog, and in the other a cow [or, rather, a crow]; *pīlu*, a certain tree, but among barbarians an elephant; *vetasa*, a ratten cane and a citron [or, rose-apple, *jambu*]. The *Mīmāṃsā* concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (*Āryas*), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (*Mlechha*), who are apt to confound words or their meanings." The above is of importance to students of Vedānta; for, in addition to the passages named above, it is discussed in *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 52, and enlarged upon in *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 461, 462. The brief allusion, too, to the same thing, in *Bhāmatī* 1. 3. 22, in the words :—" न हि गावो वराहमनुधावन्तीति कृष्णविहङ्गानुधावनमुपपद्यते गवामपि तु तादृश-सूकरानुधावनम्," is quite unintelligible alone. See too, *S'ālikā* page 192; *Tātparyatīka*, page 292; *Kusumāñjali*, vol. 2, pages 130, 154; and *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 288, line. 26.

यश्चोभयोः समो दोषो न तेनैकश्चोद्यो भवति ॥

When the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the *nyāya* in the Pāṇini chapter of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (page 142, Bib. Ind., and 161 Jīvānanda's edn.) It originated, however, with Patanjali, and is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 9 (vārt. 2) as "यश्चोभयोर्दोषो न तमेकश्चोद्यो भवति." S'abara (on sūtra 8. 3. 14) quotes it as "यश्चोभयो-

दीपो नासावेकस्य वाच्यः.” In a form differing slightly from these it is quoted in *Nyāyakanikā* (page 225, line 4 from bottom), and is still further changed in the following verse of Anirudha’s on *Sāṅkhyasūtra* i. 6 :—

“यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि तादृशः ।

नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे” ॥

For other references to the nyāya, see *Tantravārtika*, page 947 ; *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 95, line 10 from bottom ; and (in the poetical form) *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 88. The *Khaṇḍanakāra* cites the first two words of the nyāya, on page 531, and ascribes it to Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila).

यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य पुत्रस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते ॥

Toys are not made for the son of a man who has no son! This is used by S’abara to illustrate Jaimini’s sūtra 10. 3. 5—
“न चाङ्गविधिरनङ्गे स्यात्.” He says:—“न ह्यनङ्गे कर्मण्यङ्गस्य विशेषः विधिः स्यात् । भवति च विशेषविधिः ‘आश्रयबालः प्रस्तर’ इति । न ह्यसति प्रस्तरे प्रस्तरविशेषः शिष्येत यथा यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य पुत्रस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते.”

Then, in Pārthasārathi’s *Nyāyaratnamālā*, page 111, we find the expression सर्वमिदमजातपुत्रक्रीडनकमापद्यते.”

यस्याज्ञानं भ्रमस्तस्य भ्रान्तः सम्यक् च वेत्ति सः ॥

He who has Nescience [as an upādhi] is the subject of delusion ; [but though] deluded he is also possessed of sound knowledge. This is affirmed of the individuated Self, who, though a portion ‘as it were’ of the undivided and indivisible Self, is also the आश्रय of Nescience. This is one of the mysteries of the *advaitavāda*. For a full description of जीव as found in S’ankarācārya’s famous bhāṣya, see Notes to my edition of the *Vedāntasāra*.

The above nyāya is found in Raghunātha’s two treatises, but his exposition of it is extremely meagre since he ignores the

second pāda of the line. He says :—“यस्यानात्मनि देहादावात्मभ्रमोऽस्ति तस्याज्ञानमिति कल्प्यते.”

The verse of which it forms the first line is quoted in full by Rāmātīrtha in his discussion of the term *adhyāropa* in Section 6 of *Vedāntasāra*. In the Calcutta editions of 1829 and 1886, the reading of the second pāda is “भ्रान्तः सम्यक्करोति सः,” whilst Prof. A. E. Gough, in his translation published in *The Paṇḍit* of August 1872, followed the reading “भ्रान्तोऽसम्यक्करोति सः.” In my edition of 1894 (page 104) I adopted the reading “भ्रान्तः सम्यक् वेत्ति सः,” but I now see that in so doing I was exemplifying the truth of the first pāda ! There was manuscript authority for it, however, and so *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 443.

In its true form the *nyāya* is found in the commentary on *Sankeśepas'ārīraka* iii. 8 (The Paṇḍit, vol viii. page 660), and again in *Tattvadīpana*, page 179 (with the mislection भ्रान्ति- for भ्रान्तः). The former passage is as follows :—

“ननु मिथ्यातत्त्वज्ञानयोर्विषयवैषम्येऽपि यस्याज्ञानं भ्रमस्तस्य भ्रान्तः सम्यक् च वेत्ति स इति न्यायादज्ञानभ्रान्तितत्त्वबोधानामेकाश्रयत्वनियमादज्ञानाश्रयचिन्मात्राश्रयत्वमेव भ्रान्त्यादेः स्यात् &c.”

If any one can trace Rāmātīrtha's verse to its source I shall be glad. The *Yogavāsistha* is a very likely *ākara*; but with the weight of seventy summers upon me I am not myself prepared to join in the search.

यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वम् ॥

He who is bent on destroying another must be stronger than he. This is contained in an extract (given by Prof. Kielhorn) from Bhairavamis'ra's comment on Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa's *paribhāṣā* cxii, namely निषेधाश्च बलीयांसः (=प्रतिषेधाश्च बलीयांसो भवन्ति of Patanjali 1. 1. 63, *vārtika* 6), which runs thus :—“इयं च परिभाषा लोकसिद्धन्यायमूलिकेत्याह । विध्युन्मूलनायेति । प्राप्तस्य विधेर्निवर्तनायेत्यर्थः । एतेन येन नाप्राप्तन्यायेन विधिशास्त्रस्य निषेधशास्त्रेण बाध इति दर्शितम् । लोकेऽपि यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वं कंसा-

कृष्णस्येव.” The example given here, of one of superior might overcoming a less mighty one, is that of Kṛiṣṇa and the demon Kāṁsa. The death of the latter is described in Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, Book V, chapter xx. Those who are familiar with the English Bible will call to mind the words “When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils.” The ‘strong man,’ here is the Prince of this world—“that old Serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world”—his ‘goods’ are human souls and bodies; the ‘stronger than he’ is Christ, the Prince of Peace,—to whom has been given the commission “*to bring out the prisoners from the prison.*”

येन नाप्राप्ते यो विधिरारभ्यते स तस्य बाधको भवति ॥

Here is another of Raghunātha's grammatical nyāyas. It forms paribhāṣā 57 in Nāgojibhaṭṭa's work, and is rendered by Professor Kielhorn as follows:—“A rule which is given (in reference to a particular case or particular cases) to which another (rule) *cannot but apply* (or, in other words, which all fall already under some other rule), supersedes the latter.” “The meaning of the words येन नाप्राप्ते is ‘while another rule is *necessarily* applying,’ for the two negatives (न and अ) import more force to the word (प्राप्ते, than this word would possess without them).” The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—“This paribhāṣā teaches us the meaning of the term *apavāda*, and in doing so tells us the reason why an *apavāda* possesses greater force than *antaranga* and other rules. An *apavāda* is a *special* rule; it is given in reference to particular cases which all fall under some *general* rule (*utsarga*); as it is not applicable in any case which does *not* fall under the general rule, it must necessarily supersede the latter, because it would otherwise not serve any purpose whatever.” Kaiyaṭa and Nāges'a generally quote it in the shortened form of येन नाप्राप्तिन्याय.

Under this paribhāṣā Nāgojī introduces and discusses the तक्रकौण्डिन्याय, namely “ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय.” The paribhāṣā is found in the following passages of the *Mahābhāṣya*:—1. 1. 6. (vārt. 1.); 1. 1. 28; 3. 4. 85 (vārt. 2); 6. 1. 2 (vārt. 4), where the तक्रकौण्डिन्याय is brought in; 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vārt. 5); 6. 4. 163 (vārt. 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्याय again; 7. 2. 44 (vārt. 4); 7. 2. 117 (vārt. 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्याय; 8. 2. 23 (vārt. 5); 8. 2. 72; and 8. 3. 112.

रथकारन्यायः ॥

The simile of the *Rathakāra*. There is a Vedic text which says, “In the rainy season a Rathakāra ought to establish a sacred fire.” The question then arises, what is meant by the word Rathakāra? Does it mean a chariot-maker, or is it a member of the caste produced by the marriage of a Māhiṣya (the offspring of a Kshatriya and a Vais'ya-woman) with a Karaṇī (the offspring of a Vais'ya and a S'ūdra-woman), which is called Rathakāra? The question is discussed in Jaimini 6. 1. 44–50, and is decided in favour of the latter. The discussion is thus summarized in *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāristara*:—“आधाने श्रूयते । वर्षासु रथकार आदधीतेति । तत्र रथं करोतीति व्युत्पत्त्या त्रैवर्णिको रथकार इति चेत् । नैवम् । संकीर्णजातिविशेषे रूढत्वात् । वैश्यायां क्षत्रियादुत्पन्नो माहिष्यः । शूद्रायां वैश्यादुत्पन्ना करणी । तस्यां करण्यां माहिष्यादुत्पन्नो रथकारः । तथा च याज्ञवल्क्यः । ‘माहिष्येण करण्यां तु रथकारः प्रजायत’ इति । तस्य च रथकारस्याधानकालो वर्षर्तुः” ॥

The nyāya is quoted by Nāgojībhaṭṭa in his *vṛitti* on the ninety-eighth paribhāṣā (अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी), which Prof. Kielhorn renders thus:—“The (conventional) meaning which a word conveys when taken as a whole, is stronger than the (etymological) meaning derived from (a division of the word into) its parts.” In other words, रूढियो-गमपहरति, which Raghunātha exemplifies by this word Rathakāra. The vidhi on which this is based is quoted in full in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 140, line 3.

रात्रिसत्रन्यायः ॥

The rule as to a *night-sacrifice*. This is the topic of Jaimini 4. 3. 17-19, and is largely used by writers on Vedānta as a type of scripture-passage conveying no direct promise of reward, and therefore dependent on an arthavāda-passage for such promise. Though S'ankara does not mention the nyāya in his bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 38, it is evident that he has it in view, and Ānandagiri, and Amalānanda (in the *Kalpataru*), expressly connect his remarks with it. So also the *Kalpataruparimala*. The last-mentioned work quotes it again on page 255 (in connection with *Brahmasūtra* 1. 2. 24):—"तथा सर्वपापप्रदाहोऽपि ब्रह्मलिङ्गप्रश्नोत्तराभ्यां प्राधान्येन प्रतिपिपादयिषिततयोपक्रान्तस्योपासनस्य फलाकांक्षया रात्रिसत्रन्यायेनार्थवादिकफलविपरिणामे कर्तव्ये प्रधानार्थवाद इवाङ्गार्थवादे श्रुतस्यापि फलस्य ग्रहणौचित्यात्."

The nyāya is found also in *Pancapādikāvivarana*, page 122, line 8 from bottom, and again on page 134, line 9 from the bottom. The latter passage is as follows:—"ननु रात्रिसत्रन्यायेनार्थवादगतमेव मोक्षं ब्रह्मज्ञानं वा प्रयोजनं साध्यत्वेन परिणमय्य मोक्षकामो ब्रह्मज्ञानकामो वा विचारयेत् &c." See, too, *S'ālikā*, p. 7 and 157; and *Tattvamuktākalāpa* v. 81.

राधावेधोपमा ॥

The simile of *piercing the central figure of a target*. That is, hitting the bull's eye. It is used of something difficult of accomplishment, and requiring great skill. "In Prākṛit the *rādhā* is generally called *puttaliyā*, literally 'a little figure,' as apparently a little human figure was painted in the middle of the butt." This note, contributed by Professor Leumann to Mr. Tawney's translation of Merutunga's work, is probably a correct explanation of the word राधा, rather than the dictionary meaning, "an attitude in shooting." The illustration appears on pages 412, 420, and 434 of *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, as follows:—"सा चेयती भवेत्कस्य सामग्रीयं सुदुर्लभा । राधावेधोपमानेन धर्म-

प्राप्तिः प्रकीर्तिता” ॥ “एनं संसारविस्तारं विलंघ्य कथमप्यदः । मानुष्यं प्राप्य दुष्प्रापं राधावेधोपमं जनः ” ॥ “ भो भव्याः प्रविहाय मोहललितं युष्माभिराकर्ण्यतामेकान्तेन हितं मदीयवचनं कृत्वा विशुद्धं मनः । राधावेधसमं कथंचिदतुलं लब्ध्वापि मानुष्यकं हिंसाक्रोधवशानुगैरिदमहो जीवैः पुरा हारितम्.” Two more examples will be found on pages 575 and 981 of the same.

The above meaning of *rādhā* fully explains the epithet *rādhābhedin* as applied to the renowned archer Arjuna.

रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसम्पदः सम्पन्नाः ॥

On acquiring the mountain Rohaṇa one acquires the wealth of gems contained in it. This occurs in the Pratyabhijñā-section of Sarvadarśanasangraha (page 106 of Jivānanda's edn.):—“परमेश्वरतालाभे हि सर्वाः सम्पदस्तन्निप्यन्दमय्यः सम्पन्ना एव रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसंपद इव । एवं परमेश्वरतालाभे किमन्यत्प्रार्थनीयम् । तदुक्तमुत्पलाचार्यैः । ‘भक्तिरक्ष्मीसमृद्धानां किमन्यदुपयाचितम् । एनया वा दरिद्राणां किमन्यदुपयाचितमिति.’” Professor Gough renders it thus:—“For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken ; as if a man acquired the mountain Rohaṇa (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpalācārya says—‘What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?’”

For a story in connection with the mountain Rohaṇa as a mine of wealth, see *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 3.

वटे यक्षन्यायः ॥

The belief as to a *Yakṣa* in a *Banyan tree*. A popular belief, based solely on the tradition of the elders, that a *Yakṣa*, or goblin, lives in every *Banyan tree*. It is used as an illustration of ऐतिह्य (‘tradition’), which some regard as a *pramāṇa*, but which *Gautama* rejects as such. See *Nyāyasūtra* 2. 2. 1. The *Nyāyasūtravivāraṇa* expounds the term thus:—“ऐतिह्यमिह वृक्षे यक्षः प्रतिवसतीति लोकप्रसिद्धिः । तत्र मूलवक्रनिर्देशेनाप्तोक्तवानिश्चयेन तादृश-निश्चयस्य शाब्दबोधहेतुतया नास्य शब्दप्रमाणेऽन्तर्भावः” ॥ This is the position of the objector who maintains that tradition is a distinct *pramāṇa*; the refutation is contained in *sūtra* 2. In *Ballantyne’s Aphorisms of Nyāya Philosophy*, Book ii, page 66, we have the following rendering of a portion of the *Nyāya-sūtravṛtti*:—“A rumour (*aitihya*) is what is expressed in this way—‘thus indeed people say’ &c. for it is an assertion which has come from one to another, without any first assertor being indicated:—for example, ‘In every Bengal fig-tree there is a goblin,’ and the like.” In a foot-note to page 329 of *Colebrooke’s Essays*, vol. i, Professor Cowell gives to *aitihya* the meaning of “fallible testimony (as opposed to infallible *s’ruti*),” whilst *Colebrooke* himself, on page 427, renders it by ‘tradition.’ In *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 194, the *nyāya* is applied in the following way by the disbeliever in the existence of God:—न च प्रसिद्धि-मात्रेण युक्तमेतस्य कल्पनम् । निर्मूलत्वात्तथा चोक्तं प्रसिद्धिर्वैयक्षवत्. ” And at the top of page 64, there is the following, forming the second half of a verse:—

“ऐतिह्यं तु न सत्यमत्र हि वटे यक्षोऽस्ति वा नेति वा
को जानाति कदा च केन कलितं यक्षस्य कीदृग्वपुः” ॥

In *S’lokavārtika* (page 492) we read “जगति बहु न तथ्यं नित्य-मैतिह्यमुक्तं भवति तु यदि सत्यं नागमाद्भिद्यते तत् ” which *Prof. Gangā-nātha Jhā* renders by “Much of what is known in the world as

‘Tradition’ is not always true; and whatever happens to be true that does not differ from ‘Valid Testimony.’” Pārthasārathi’s comment on this is—“पुरुषवचनपरंपरा ऐतिह्यं वटे वटे वैश्रवण इत्यादि । तच्चानिर्णायकत्वात्प्रमाणमेव न भवति । तद्भावेऽप्यागमान्तर्भावात्.” See, too, *Tārkikarakṣā*, page 117.

वध्यतां वध्यतां बालः ॥

As Raghunāthavarman had the temerity to include this in his list of nyāyas, I introduce it in order to show its origin and its worthlessness. At the bottom of page 53 of the Benares edition of *Laukikanyāyasangraha*, it stands thus:—“तथा च ‘वध्यतां वध्यतां बालो नानेनार्थोऽस्ति जीवता । स्वपक्षहानिकर्तृत्वाद्यः कुलाङ्गारतां गत’ इति न्यायविषयतां नातिवर्तते.” This verse, and the words which follow it, are taken bodily, from *Citsukhī* i. 16 (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv, page 534); but the real source of the s’loka is *Vishnu Purāṇa* 1. 17. 31, where it reads “दुरात्मा वध्यतामेव;” the remainder being the same as the above. I got the clue from the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara*, where Raghunātha apologetically says:—“इदं विष्णुपुराणे प्रह्लादमुद्दिश्य हिरण्याक्ष-वचनं पूर्वैर्न्यायत्वेनोदाहृतत्वात्तत्त्वेनोदाहृतम्.”

वर्चोन्यायः ॥

The topic of *glory* [or splendour]. This forms the topic of Jaimini 3. 8. 25-27. The point discussed is whether in using the mantra “ममाग्ने वर्चो विहवेष्वस्तु,” “Fire! let there be glory for me in the offerings,” the officiating priest (at the new and full moon sacrifices) is to enjoy the fruit, or whether it falls to the sacrificer. The pūrvapakṣin holds the former view, but the decision is that it goes to the latter. In this adhikaraṇa there is mention of *karāṇa-mantras*, but the term is not explained. Kunte says that a *karāṇa-mantra* is that which regulates sacrificial operations; and that one which is merely chanted in the course of a sacrificial operation is called *akarma-karāṇa-mantra*.

विलूननासिकस्यादर्शदर्शनम् ॥

Showing a looking-glass to a man whose nose has been cut off! An incitement to wrath! It occurs in *Prabandhacintā-maṇi*, page 291, as follows:—"प्रायः सम्प्रतिकोपाय सन्मार्गस्योपदेश-नम् । विलूननासिकस्येव यद्वदादर्शदर्शनम्." "As a general rule, pointing out the right way leads to immediate wrath, as the showing of a mirror to one whose nose has been cut off." This is Mr. Tawney's rendering, and I have adopted the reading of his manuscripts in the first line. In the second line, the Mss. read विशुद्धादर्शदर्शनम्.

विश्वजिज्ञ्यायः ॥

The law regarding the *Vis'vajit-sacrifice*. It forms part of the great sacrifice called *Gavām ayana* which lasts for a year; for a description of which see Dr. Eggeling's translation of *S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, vol. 2, page 427. A quite new explanation of this sacrificial session is propounded in a book by the learned Librarian of the Mysore Govt. Oriental Library, entitled *Gavām Ayana, the Vedic era*. It was favourably reviewed by Prof. L. D. Barnett in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for April 1909. The *Vis'vajit* is discussed in *Jaimini* 4. 3. 10-16, and 6. 7. 1-20. In the former, the question is raised of the reward which is to follow the offering of the sacrifice, since none is mentioned in the scripture prescribing it; and the decision is that in this, and in all similar cases, heaven is to be understood to be the reward. This is somewhat quaintly put by S'abara under sūtra 16:—"अनादिष्टफले कर्मणि स्वर्गः फलम् । इति प्रत्ययो लोके । एवमुच्यते । आरामकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्गः । तडागकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्ग इति । इत्थमनेन न्यायेन स्वर्गे संप्रत्ययो भवति यस्मात्स्वर्गफलेषु कर्मसु कर्तव्येषु फलवचनं नैवोच्चारयन्ति गम्यत एवेति । तस्मादप्यवगच्छाम एवंजातीयकेषु स्वर्गः फलमिति." The offerer of the *Vis'vajit* is required to surrender all his property to the sacrificing priests, a point which gives rise to a very curious

discussion in the Sixth Book. Is he then to give away his father and mother; or, if a reigning monarch, is he to part with all the lands of his kingdom? These and many other interesting points are fully argued out by S'abara; and, for some of them, the English reader may with advantage refer to Colebrooke's Essay on the Mimāṃsā, vol. i., page 345.

This nyāya is very frequently quoted by writers on Vedānta and Nyāya. The following are examples. *Bhāmatī*, page 86 :—“न च ब्रह्मभूयादन्यदमृतत्वमार्थवादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति येन तत्काम उपासनायामधिक्रियेत, विश्वजिज्ञ्यायेन तु स्वर्गकल्पनायां तस्य सातिशयत्वं क्षयित्वं चेति न नित्यफलत्वमुपासनायाः”। *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 430:—“सन्निहितकरणोपकारे संभवति न विश्वजिज्ञ्यायेन स्वर्गकल्पना नापि दर्शपूर्णमासफलस्वर्गस्यानुषङ्गः”। See, too, *Pancapādikāvivarana*, pages 134 (line 9), 137 (line 13), and 164 (line 6 from bottom). *Nyāya-manjarī*, page 524, line 13 from bottom:—“परप्रकरणपरिपठणविरहाच्च नास्य संपदादिविधिवत्प्रधानाधिकारनिवेशित्वमतो विश्वजिदधिकरणन्यायेन स्वर्गकाममधिकारिणमिह यावदुपात्तमध्यवसामस्तावदेव च न पुनरावर्तते &c.” There is another good example of it in the early part of the Jaimini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*.

विषकुम्भं पयोमुखम् ॥

A bowl of poison with milk on the surface. A wolf in sheep's clothing. The illustration is found in Merutunga's work the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 153:—“परोक्षे कार्यहन्तारं प्रत्यक्षे प्रियवादिनम् । वर्जयेत्तादृशं मित्रं विषकुम्भं पयोमुखम्.” “The friend who behind one's back tries to impede one's business, but in one's presence speaks kindly, such a friend one should avoid, a bowl of poison with milk on the surface.” This is Mr. Tawney's rendering (on page 92), and he points out in a footnote that the verse is quoted in Böttlingk's *Indische Sprüche*, and ascribed by him to Cāṇakya.

व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिः ॥

This highly technical nyāya is found in both of Raghunātha-varman's works. I have taken it from a passage in the Bauddha section of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (page 11 in Jivānanda's edition), and subjoin Professor Gough's rendering (italicizing the words which represent the maxim):—"तत्र क्षणिकत्वं नीलादि-क्षणानां सत्त्वेनानुमातव्यम् । यत्सत्त्वक्षणिकं यथा जलधरपटलम् । सन्तश्चासी भावा इति । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य नीलादि-क्षणानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिन्यायेन व्यापकक्रमा-क्रमव्यावृत्तावक्षणिकात्सत्त्वव्यावृत्तेः सिद्धत्वाच्च."

"Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue and so forth, is to be inferred from their existence; thus, whatever *is* is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all these things *are*. Nor may any one object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that *exclusion of the continent is exclusion of the contained*." In *S'ālikā* page 119, line 14, we find the nyāya as "व्यापकनिवृत्तिर्हि व्याप्यनिवृत्त्या व्याप्ता," and, on page 67, line 2 "व्यापकाभावे व्याप्यं नास्ति."

शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the movements of a bird-catcher*. It is found in *S'abara* on *Jaimini* 9. 1. 22, as follows:—"यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य शकुनिं जिघृक्षतश्छद्मना गतिर्भवति शनैः पदन्यासो दृष्टिप्रणिधानमशब्दकरणञ्च कथमनवबुद्धः शकुनिर्गृह्येतेति एवमिहाप्यनवबुद्धमिव ग्रीहीतुं यज्ञं प्रच्छन्नगति-रूपांशुत्वं नाम । यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य यस्मिन्देसे शनैः पदन्यासो न स तद्देशा-र्थोऽपि तु तद्देशाभिगतस्य शकुनेरर्थेन क्रियत एवमिहाप्युपांशुत्वं न तद्देशानां पदार्थानामर्थेन क्रियते तद्देशाभिगतस्य यज्ञस्यार्थेन गम्यते"॥ See also भूमिरथिकन्याय.

शंखन्यायः ॥

The simile of [the time for sounding] *the conch-shell*. An offering called उपांशुयाज, or 'low-voiced offering,' is performed *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Agni-Soma at the full-moon, and *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Indra-Agni at the new-moon (Dr. Eggling's trans: of Sata-patha-Brāhmaṇa, vol. i. page 192). Sometimes, however, the second oblation is omitted; and then the question arises how is the Upāms'uyāja to be offered, since that comes *between* the two? The subject is discussed in Jaimini 10. 8. 62-70, and the above question is answered by S'abara as follows:—"यो हि द्वयोः पुरोडाशयोर्मध्य इति कालोऽवगम्यते स एव पूर्वस्मादुत्तर इति । एवं चेद्यद्यप्येकपुरोडाशायां द्वौ पुरोडाशौ न स्तस्तथापि स पूर्व आप्नेयोऽस्ति तस्मादुत्तरः स एव कालो योऽसावन्तरालेन लक्षितः । यथा 'नागवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'पटहवेलायामागन्तव्यं' इति यस्मिन् ग्रामे न नागा न शंखा न पटहस्तस्मिन्नपि स एव कालस्तत्र ह्यागमनं क्रियते । एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । तस्मादेकपुरोडाशायामुपांशुयाजः कर्तव्य इति."

The simile might well be called शंखध्वनिवेलान्याय, but I have adopted the name given in the Nyāyamālāvistara on this *adhikarṇa*, which also explains it more fully:—"शंखन्यायेनोपलक्षकस्याग्नीषोमीयपुरोडाशस्यैवाभावेऽप्युपलक्ष्ये काले यागोऽस्ति । यथा शंखध्वनिवेलायां राजसेवार्थं प्रतिदिनमागन्तव्यमित्युक्ते कस्मिंश्चिद्दिने तं शंखं धमतः पुरुषस्याभावेनोपलक्षकस्य ध्वनेरभावेऽप्युपलक्षिते तस्मिन्काले सेवकाः समागच्छन्ति तथात्रापि द्रष्टव्यम्."

This is very clear, but what is the meaning of नागवेला? To be in harmony with the rest of the sentence it ought to indicate something which, like the sounding of the *s'ankha* or the beating of the *paṭaha*, takes place regularly every day; but how can any such sense be got out of *nāga*, unless it refers to the trumpeting of the royal elephants at some particular time

of the day? The S'āstradīpikā, Nyāyamālāvistara, and Jaiminīyasūtravṛtti ignore the expression altogether.

In Appai Dikṣita's *Vidhirasāyana*, page 22, we have an instance of the शंखन्याय as follows:—"उपलक्षणापायेऽप्युपलक्ष्यानपायस्य प्रतिदिनं शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यमित्यादौ प्रसिद्धत्वात् । न हि कालविशेषोपलक्षणतयोपात्ते शंखध्वनौ कचिद्विसे दैवादकृते सति तदुपलक्षितः कालो नास्तीति नावगम्यते." See also *Vidhiviveka*, page 7.

Compare the expression "Cockshut-time," in Shakespeare's *Richard iii* (Act V. Scene 3):—"Thomas the Earl of Surrey, and himself, Much about cock-shut time, from troop to troop. Went through the army, cheering up the soldiers." In Chambers' *Twentieth Century Dictionary* the expression is said to mean "Twilight; probably referring to the time when poultry are shut up." Webster's *International Dictionary* gives a different explanation.

शलभन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the moth*. The destruction of the silly moth by flying into a lighted lamp is a figure often met with in Sanskrit works; as for example in *S'is'upālavadha* ii. 117, *Kumārasambhava* iv. 40, *Rājataranginī* vii. 375, and *Kāmandaki* i. 43. According to Merutunga, however, the poor moth is moved with envy at the brilliance of the light, and so seeks to diminish it! He says (on page 211, at the bottom):—"उज्ज्वलगुणमभ्युदितं क्षुद्रो द्रष्टुं न कथमपि क्षमते । दग्ध्वा तनुमपि शलभो दीपं दीपार्चिषं हरति." "The mean man cannot anyhow endure to behold the exaltation of the man of radiant merit; the moth even burns its own body to extinguish the bright flame of the candle." (Tawney's translation, page 130).

शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयः ॥

When the [prescribed] ritual [for the removal or prevention of evil] is at an end, up comes a goblin! This implies ultimate failure in spite of effort. It occurs in Citsukha Muni's comment on *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 16, as follows:—"ननु सोऽयं शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयोऽभेदं साधयितुं प्रवृत्तेन भेदश्रुतेरुदाहृतत्वात्." In *Bhāmati*, page 93, line 17, the *nyāya* is quoted as "शान्ति-कर्मणि वेतालोदयः," which makes the goblin appear during the performance of the शान्ति, the rite to avert evil. So, too, in Maṇḍana-Miśra's *Vidhiviveka*, page 210. The purport, however, is the same as in the other case. In Āśvalāyana's *Gṛihyaśūtra* 4. 6. 1, शान्तिकर्म is prescribed when a *guru* dies, or on the loss of a son or of cattle.

शब्दाकांक्षा शब्देनैव पूर्यते ॥

Verbal expectancy is satisfied [or fulfilled] by words only. This *nyāya* of Raghunātha's is very frequently met with. It occurs in the last chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 157 of Bib. Ind. and 177 of Jivānanda's edn.) with पूर्यता as the last word; in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 680, line 7; in Vaidyanātha's comment on *Kāvya-pradīpa* page 232 (in the erroneous form शब्दा साकांक्षा); in Haridāsa's *vṛitti* on *Kusumāñjali* iii. 15 (page 35), also in Rucidatta's commentary on the same portion (page 478); and, finally, in *Sāhityadarpaṇa* ii. 18 (with प्रपूर्यते).

In paragraph 70 of the *Tarkasangraha* we are told that there are three requisites to the intelligibility of a sentence, namely, expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), compatibility (*yogyatā*), and juxtaposition (*sannidhi*). In para 71, the first of these is thus explained:—"Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning, this being occasioned by the

absence of another word [which, when it comes as expected, will complete the construction and the sense].” Then in para 72 we read:—“a collection of words devoid of expectancy &c., is no instrument of right knowledge; for example, ‘cow, horse man, elephant,’ gives no information, from the absence of expectancy; [the words having no reference one to another, and not looking out for one another].” This is Dr. Ballantyne’s translation, accompanying the text; and the same subject is explained by him in his lucid rendering of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* i. 6.

शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिह-
तिर्भवति ॥

*A blow with an instrument such as a pestle, directed towards the rice, falls instead on the śyāmāka grain. Aiming, at a pigeon and killing a crow. It occurs in Nyāyavārtika, page 46:—“कथं पुनरन्यविषयं करणमयविषयां क्रियां करोति । शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिहतिर्भवति । नानियमादिति यद्विषयं करणं तद्विषया क्रियेति न नियमोऽस्ति । दृष्टा हि वृक्षादिविषयस्य छेदनस्यावयव-
क्रियेति । वृक्षश्छिद्यतेऽवयवे क्रियेति ” ॥*

शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तारि ॥

The fruit promised in Scripture [in connection with a sacrificial or other act] is for the performer [of that act]. These are the first words of Jaimini’s sūtra 3. 7. 18. They are quoted as a nyāya in a passage of Vedāntatattvaviveka, for which see “मुनिर्मनुते, मूर्खो मुच्यते.” It is cited by Vācaspati Miśra, also, in Tātparyatīkā, page 296, line 6 from bottom, and page 403, line 4, and in his Bhāmatī, pages 28 and 492. Also in S’rī-bhāṣya 2. 3. 33 (p. 1688), and 3. 4. 45 (p. 2028), where Dr. Thibaut renders it, “the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent.” The first part of Tattvamuktākālāpa ii. 59 reads thus:—

“अन्यश्चेदन्यकर्मप्रजनितफलभुक् शास्त्रवैयाकुली स्यात् &c.,” on which the author comments as follows:—“अन्यस्यान्यकृतकर्मफलभोगे शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरीति व्यवस्थाभङ्गाच्छास्त्रस्य व्याकुलता स्यात् &c.” Compare Patanjali on Pāṇini 1. 3. 72.

शिविकोद्यच्छन्नरवत् ॥

The simile of *men carrying a palanquin*. Used by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa to show how all the words in a sentence *unitedly* convey the sense of the latter. It occurs in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 397, line 12:—“यथा हि बाह्यानि करणानि काष्ठादीनि पाके व्याप्रियन्ते यथा च शिविकाया उद्यन्तारः सर्वे शिविकामुद्यच्छन्ति यथा त्रयोऽपि प्रावाण उखां विभ्रति तथा सर्वाण्येव पदानि वाक्यार्थमवबोधयन्ति.” Again, on page 400, line 11 from bottom:—“शिविकोद्यच्छन्नरवत्सर्वाणि पदानि कार्ये संहत्य व्याप्रियन्ते इत्येतदपि सत्यमेव.” Cf. *Bṛihadārṇyavārtika*, 1. 4. 1600.

शिरोवेष्टनेन नासिकास्पर्शन्यायः ॥

The simile of *touching the nose by encircling the head* [with one's arm]. That is, putting the arm round the head instead of bringing it directly to the face. Raghunāthavarmā classes it with *nyāyas* expressive of a round-about way of doing things. It is quoted by Vijnānabhikṣu on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 37, in the form शिरोवेष्टनेनांगुल्या नासिकाप्रवेशवत्.

Raghunātha tells us that, by some, it is styled *द्रविडप्राणायामन्याय*, and in Molesworth's *Marāṭhī Dictionary* we find *द्रविडप्राणायाम* defined as “a circuitous or devious mode of speaking or acting, ambages, tortuous procedure.” This is not the first time that this fine dictionary has come to our aid when the more-pretentious Sanskrit lexicons have failed us!

But we should like to know how the expression came to have the meaning here assigned to it. Doubtless hereby hangs a tale; can our Indian pandits throw light on it?

शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत् ॥

The simile of *the shining-forth of a thousand lamps standing in the midst of solid rock!* It occurs in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 2. 2. 28, near the end:—“किंचान्यत्प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानमवभासकान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वयमेव प्रथत इति ब्रुवताप्रमाणगम्यं विज्ञानमनवगन्तृकमित्युक्तं स्यात् । शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत्.” Dr. Thibaut renders it thus:—“Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves.”

शुष्केष्टिन्यायः ॥

The figure of *a sham-sacrifice*. That is, the performance of sacrificial ceremonies, by a pupil, with a view to his becoming proficient in them, without the offering of a real sacrifice. This is classed with भूमिरथिक in S'abara's bhāṣya on Jaimini 9. 2. 13, and an extract from the passage will be found under that nyāya. The term शुष्केष्टि, as adopted in Marāṭhī, is thus explained by Molesworth:—“Dry exercise or blank practising; performance or doing, antecedently to the occasion, of a work or matter in which the performer is ignorant or inexpert (in order that the necessary knowledge or ability may be acquired in provision for occasions anticipated).”

श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

श्वः कार्यमद्य कुर्वीत ॥

One should do to-day that which one intends to do tomorrow. "Boast not thyself of tomorrow; for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth." The verse containing this nyāya of Raghunātha's occurs three times in *S'āntiparva*, namely in chapters CLXXV, CCLXXVIII, and CCCXXIII of Calcutta edition. It reads as follows:—

श्वःकार्यमद्य कुर्वीत पूर्वाह्ने चापराह्निकम् ।

न हि प्रतीक्षते मृत्युः कृतं वास्य न वा कृतम् ॥

It is quoted in the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 111, and Mr. Tawney (on page 68 of his translation) renders it thus:— "One should do to-day the duty of tomorrow, and in the forenoon the duty of the afternoon, for death will not consider whether one has done one's work or not."

Compare the following well-known story. "An old Rabbi was once asked by his pupil when he should fulfil a certain precept of the law, and the answer was 'The day before you die.' 'But,' said the disciple, 'I may die tomorrow.' 'Then,' said the master, 'do it to-day.'"

श्वपुच्छोन्नामनन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the attempt to straighten a dog's tail*. An illustration of wasted effort. It occurs in the following verse of the *Upamitibhavaprapaṇcā Kathā*, page 448:—

न चैष शक्यते कर्तुं नम्रो यत्नशतैरपि ।

को हि स्वेदशतेनापि श्वपुच्छं नामयिष्यति ॥

See also under अरण्यरोदनन्याय in the second Handful.

श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥

Like a milky preparation that has been licked by a dog. Used of something which has become impure and therefore unacceptable. It is found in the following verse of the last chapter of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha* :—"फलाभिसन्धेरुपघातकत्व-मभिहितं भगवद्भिर्नीलकण्ठभारतीश्रीचरणैः ।

अपि प्रयत्नसम्पन्नं कामेनोपहतं तपः ।

न तुष्टये महेशस्य श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥

Compare with this the *nyāya* "न हि पूतं स्याद्भोक्षीरं श्वदत्तौ दूतम्."

श्वा कर्णे वा पुच्छे वा छिन्ने श्वैव भवति नाश्वो न गर्दभः॥

A dog, when an ear or its tail has been cut off is still a dog, not a horse or a donkey ! This is Patanjali's illustration of the *vārtika* एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत् (which see above) and is referred to by Nāges'a in his comment on Kaiyaṭa (under S'iva sūtra 2, *vārtika* 4), as the छिन्नपुच्छश्वदृष्टान्त. Compare also Nāgojibhaṭṭa's *paribhāṣā* xxxvii. Akin to this illustration is Kumārila's "न हि गोरगडुनि जाते विषाणे वा भग्ने गोत्वं तिरोधीयते," which is found in *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 34, page 418; and "न हि केवलभोजी देवदत्तोऽन्यैः सह पंक्त्यां भुञ्जानोऽन्यत्वं प्रपद्यते," on page 617.

षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायः ॥

The rule as to the use or omission of the *Ṣoḍaś'istotra* [at the *Atirātra*-sacrifice]. In very common use as an indication of option being allowable in regard to something. From the introduction to the third volume of Dr. Eggeling's translation of the *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa*, we learn that "the distinctive feature of the *Atirātra*-sacrifice, as the name itself indicates, is an 'over-night' performance of chants and recitation...At the end of each round, libations are offered, followed by the inevitable potations of Soma-liquor...and the performance partook largely of the character of a regular nocturnal carousal." Then, as to the

S'odas'in, he says (page xviii)—"As regards the ceremonies preceding the night-performance, there is a difference of opinion among ritualists as to whether the S'odas'i-stotra is or is not a necessary element of the Atirātra...As'valāyana (5. 11. 1) refers incidentally to the S'odas'in, as part of the Atirātra, though it is not quite clear from the text of the sūtra whether it is meant to be a necessary or only an optional feature of that sacrifice." There can be little doubt, however, that the learned writers who use the nyāya, regard the use of the stotra as optional. For example, as illustrations of option in action, S'ankara, in his bhāṣya on sūtra 1. 1. 2 (page 37), and again on sūtra 2. 1. 27 (page 471), quotes the Vedic sentences "अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति" "नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति." Then at the close of 1. 4. 13, he says:—अपेक्षाभेदाच्च समानेऽपि मन्त्रे ज्योतिषो ग्रहणाग्रहणे । यथा समानेऽप्यतिरात्रे वचनभेदात्षोडशिनो ग्रहणाग्रहणे तद्वत्"; and in 3. 3. 2, "न हि षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयोरतिरात्रो भिद्यते." In his comment on 3. 3. 26 (page 893, line 5 from bottom), Ānandagiri makes use of the expression "षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणवद्विकल्पे प्राप्ते," and repeats it three lines lower down. In *Vedāntakalpataruparimāla*, page 539 (line 7 from bottom), we read "षोडशिग्रहणन्यायेन विकल्पो भविष्यति," and on page 656 (line 4), षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायसञ्चारणे तथैव विरोधपरिहाराय विकल्पोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः." The optional character of the stotra is made use of by Laugākṣibhāskar also, in *Arthasaṅgraha*, page 24, from line 14 ; and by Nāges'abhaṭṭa in the *Pradīpoddya* on Mahābhāṣya 1. 1. 44 (vārt. 7).

सकृद्भूतिन्यायः ॥

This is Nāgojībhāṭṭa's shortened form of the paribhāṣā सकृद्भूतिविप्रतिषेधे यद्वाधितं तद्वाधितमेव, which Professor Kielhorn renders thus:—"When (two rules), while they apply (simultaneously), mutually prohibit each other, that which is once superseded is superseded altogether." This is illustrated by the following from ordinary life:—"यथा तुल्यबलयोरेकः प्रेक्ष्यो भवति स तयोः पर्यायेण कार्यं

करोति यदा तमुभौ युगपत्प्रेष्यतो नानादिक्षु च कार्ये तदोभयोर्न करोति यौग-
पद्यासंभवात्” ॥ The paribhāṣā is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 56
(vārt. 25, 26, 27); 1. 4. 2 (vārt. 7); 6. 3. 42 (vārt. 5); 6. 3. 139;
6. 4. 62 (vārt. 2); 7. 1. 26; 7. 1. 54; and 7. 1. 73. The illustra-
tion is met with in 1. 4. 2 (vārt. 5), and 6. 1. 85 (vārt. 3).

सत्रन्यायः ॥

The rule regarding a *sacrificial session*. For this kind of sacrifice, lasting several days, not less than seventeen sacrificers are absolutely necessary. But what if one of them should leave or die before the completion of the ceremony? In such a case he *must* be replaced by a substitute, or the whole thing becomes null and void. This, however, cannot be done when there is only one sacrificer engaged in a sacrifice. The nyāya is the subject of Jaimini 6. 3. 22. In sūtras 23 to 26 it is laid down that the substitute does not reap the benefit of the sacrifice,—but that it goes to the man whose place he has taken. It is very clear, from the above, that the mention of the सत्रन्याय on page 430, line 5 of *Vedāntakalpataru*, is wrong, and that the reference is really to the रात्रिसत्रन्याय which see above.

संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णयः ॥

The meaning of an ambiguous expression is to be determined from the context. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 3. 14 there is a discussion as to the meaning of the ‘small ether’ of Chhāndogya Upaniṣad 8. 1. 1, and Ānandagiri makes the following comment on the closing part of it:—“समुच्चयेति । संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णय इति न्यायादादौ तस्मिन्त्यदन्तरिति तच्छब्दोऽनन्तरमप्याकाशमभिलक्ष्य ह्युण्ड-
रीकं परामृशति तत्र यदन्तराकाशं तदन्वेष्टव्यं विजिज्ञासितव्यं चेत्युपसंहरति.” The nyāya is quoted again in his ṭikā on 3. 3. 52. It is taken from Jaimini’s sūtra 1. 4. 29, “संदिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात्,” which is quoted and applied by the author of the *S’āstradīpikā*, in his

discussion, under 1. 3. 8, of such words as यव, वराह, पीलु and others, to which the Āryas attach one meaning and the Mlecchas another. We find it, too, in Kumārila's lengthy exposition of the same portion, in the words:—"संदिग्धेषु च सर्वेषु वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयम्" (page 148); and again under 3. 4. 36 (page 1003):—"संदिग्धं वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयमवधारितम् । विध्युद्देशेन निर्णीते किं तु शेषः करिष्यति." See also *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 34 (page 641).

समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः ॥

For this paribhāṣā, see under गर्गशतदण्डनन्याय.

संभवत्येकवाक्यत्वे वाक्यभेदश्च नेष्यते ॥

When a sentence can suitably be regarded as one, it is not right to divide it. This oft-quoted line of Kumārila's was directed against an older writer, named Bhavadāsa (so Pārthasārathi tells us), who proposed to divide Jaimini's sūtra 1. 1. 4 into two parts. The line is found in *S'lokavārtika*, page 135. It is quoted in *Bhāmatī* 1. 1. 28 (page 159), 1. 2. 13 (page 206), 1. 4. 3 (page 286), 1. 4. 16 (page 308), 3. 3. 57 (page 668), and 3. 4. 20 (page 678). In Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 2. 15, we read—"वक्तृभेदेऽप्येकवाक्यता साकांक्षत्वात्पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकार्थत्वं वाक्यैक्यसंभवे तद्भेदस्यायोगादित्यर्थः," and, in the latter part of the bhāṣya on 1. 4. 3, S'ankara himself has a good deal to say on एकवाक्यता. Then Ānandagiri quotes the nyāya in his comment on 2. 3. 2 and 3. 3. 14. "A vākyabheda—split of the sentence—takes place according to the Mīmāṃsā when one and the same sentence contains two new statements which are different." (Dr. Thibaut's Translation of Sankara's bhāṣya, vol. i. page 177 note). See, too, Prof. Cowell's long note on page 68 of his Translation of S'āṇḍilya sūtras.

सम्भवे व्यभिचारे च स्याद्विशेषणमर्थवत् ॥

A qualifying word is of use when it is appropriate [that is, when it suits the विशेष्य], and when [without it] a wrong meaning would be conveyed.

The nyāya is quoted as above in the commentary on *San-kṣepas'ārīraka* i. 347 (The Paṇḍit, vol. v. page 676), and on page 401 of *Vidyāsāgarī* (a comment on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khāḍya*); whilst, on page 215 of the latter, it appears without स्यात्. There is another good example on p. 592.

I have traced it, however, as far back as Kumārila, but cannot say whether he was its author or not. In *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 18 (=Jaimini 1. 3. 24.) there is a discussion (as a *pūrvapakṣa*) of the reasons assigned by Patanjali for the study of grammar. One of these is that, without a knowledge of grammar, the performance of the injunction “ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणो धर्मः पङ्क्तो वेदोऽध्येयः” would be impossible; on which the *pūrvapakṣin* says:—

“पङ्क्तो वेद इत्युक्तं श्रुतिलिङ्गाद्यपेक्षया ।

तैः पङ्क्तिः प्रविभक्तः सन्स हि कर्मविबोधनः ॥

ननु बाह्याङ्गानपेक्षत्वे वेदस्वरूपान्तर्गतश्रुत्याद्यपेक्षया विशेषणमनर्थकं प्रसज्यते ।
तथाहि ।

संभवव्यभिचाराभ्यां स्याद्विशेषणसंभवः ।

श्रुत्याद्यव्यभिचारात्तु तैरङ्गैः किं विशेष्यते” ॥

Dr. Gangānāth Jhā renders this (and the preceding clause) as follows:—

“We must explain the expression ‘the Veda with its six subsidiary sciences’ as referring to its constituent parts, in the following manner. The ‘six subsidiaries’ referred to must be taken to be the six means of interpretation—Direct Assertion &c.; as it is only when interpreted through these that the Veda becomes capable of rightly pointing out *Dharma*. An objec-

tion is here raised :—If the subsidiaries referred to be taken as those contained in the Veda itself (i. e. Direct Assertion, &c.), and not anything outside it (as grammar, Nirukta, &c.), then in that case the qualification *with the six subsidiaries* would be absolutely meaningless. Specially as we can have a qualification, only when such a one is possible, and when a qualification is actually needed for the purpose of setting aside certain incongruities (or contradictions); and as there is certainly no incongruity in the Veda with regard to Direct Assertion &c. what could be specified by a qualification of these subsidiaries? [That is to say, Grammar not being invariably concomitant with the Veda, a qualification is needed in order to make it an object of study together with the Veda; while Direct Assertion &c., are always contained in the Veda, and hence any qualification of these would be absolutely meaningless].” Page 281.

Another good example is furnished by Sures'vara in his *vārtika* on *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*. At the beginning of the second Brāhmaṇa of the sixth Chapter, referring to the prayer “अग्ने नय सुपथा राये &c.,” at the end of the *seventh* chapter of the *āraṇyaka* (the *fifth* of the *Upaniṣad*), he says:—

“सप्तमावसितायुक्तं मार्गप्रार्थनमग्निः ।

सुपथेति श्रुतं तत्र श्रुत्या मार्गविशेषणम् ॥ २ ॥

संभवे व्यभिचारे च विशेषणविशेष्ययोः

दृष्टं विशेषणं लोके यथेहापि तथेक्ष्यताम्” ॥ ३ ॥

Ānandagiri explains verse 3 as follows:—

“संभव इति । नीलमुत्पलमित्यत्र विशेषणविशेष्ययोः संभवे विशेषणं विना विशेष्यस्य व्यभिचारे प्रसक्ते नीलमिति विशेषणमर्थवद्दृष्टम् । तथा सुपथा नयेत्यत्रापि व्यभिचारसंभवे विशेषणमर्थवज्ज्ञेयमित्यर्थः” ॥ ३ ॥

The fourth verse of the *vārtika* still further elucidates it:—

“सुपथेति ततो युक्तं संभवे भूयसां पथाम् ।

विशेषणमतो वाच्याः पन्थानः कर्महेतवः” ॥ ४ ॥

सर्वं बलवतः पथ्यम् ॥

Everything is suitable [or proper] for the strong. "Might is right." In other words, a strong man may be lawless with impunity; or, to quote Prof. Gangānātha Jhā's explanation of it, "for a pious man all actions are equally lawful." This is quite in accord with the teaching of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* x. 33. 30, 31 :—

“धर्मव्यतिक्रमो दृष्ट ईश्वराणां च साहसम् ।
तेजीयसां न दोषाय बह्वैः सर्वभुजो यथा ॥
नैतत्समाचरेज्जातु मनसापि ह्यनीश्वरः ।
विनश्यत्याचरन्मौढ्याद्यथारुद्रोऽब्धिजं विषम्” ॥

Kumārila quotes the nyāya (in *Tantravārtika*, page 134, line 14) in the course of a long explanation of the evil doings attributed to certain holy personages; but, in order to discourage persons of less piety from imitating them, adds:—“मन्दतपसां गजैरिव महावटकाष्टादिभक्षणमात्मविनाशायैव स्यात्.”

In the opening part of the *Tātparyatīkā*, Vācaspati Miśra reproduces Kumārila's warning in the following words :—“तपःप्रभाव एव हि तादृशस्तेषां यत एवंविधाः पाप्मानो विलीयन्त इति । न चास्मदादीनां मन्दतपसामयं प्रसंगः । न हि गजानामुदर्य्यं तेजो वटकाष्टमशितं पचतीत्यस्मदादीनामप्युदर्य्येण तेजसा तथा भवितव्यम्.”

सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययमेकं कर्म ॥

All the different schools of a Veda acknowledge one and the same sacrificial action. The followers of the Mimāṃsā evidently regard this as an important point, for Jaimini devotes 25 sūtras, viz. 2. 4. 8-32, to the discussion of it. Kunte's remarks on the bearings of the question, in his *Saḍdars'anacintanikā*, are worthy of perusal. The nyāya is frequently quoted in the philosophical works. Instances of it will be found in *Tantra-*

vārtika, page 84, line 7; in *Pancapādikāvivarana*, page 167, line 3 from bottom; in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 256, line 16; in *Vivaranaprameyasangraha*, page 169, line 17; and in *Srībhāṣya* 3. 3. 53. Raghunāthavarman makes use of the *nyāya* but does not include it in his numbered list.

साकमेधीयन्यायः ॥

The law relating to the *Sākamedha* offerings. This is the topic of Jaimini 5. 1. 19-22. The group of offerings called *Sākam-edhāḥ* form the third of the three seasonal, or four-monthly (*cāturmāsya*), sacrifices which are performed at the *parvans* (or commencement of the spring, rainy, and autumn seasons), and which, in this case, last for two days; three of the group (consisting of seven) being offered on the first day, and the remainder on the second day. An objector urges that two days are required for each of the group, but this is set aside, and the ruling is as above. For a full description of these four-monthly sacrifices, see Dr. Eggeling's translation of the *S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, vol. i. pages 383 and 408.

साक्षः पुरुषः परेण चेन्नीयते नूनमक्षिभ्यां न पश्यति ॥

If a man with eyes is led by somebody else, it is clear that he does not see with his eyes! This is found in *S'abara* on Jaimini 1. 2. 31 and is used by an objector to illustrate his argument that it is not necessary to understand the meaning of Vedic sentences employed in sacrificial rites, since the way in which they are to be used is clearly laid down in works prepared for the purpose. The illustration is quoted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 286, line 12.

सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः ॥

An injunction in general terms is indefinite. It appears as a nyāya in the second part of the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* (I. O. MS, page 319 a), where Raghunāth applies it thus:—
“लोके कंचिद्देशं जिगमिषुं प्रति तत्रत्यानि वस्तून्यानेयानीति सामान्यतो विधा-
येदमानेयमिदमानेयमिति स्पष्टीक्रियते.” It is doubtless derived from the following verse in *Tantravārtika* 3. 4. 47 (page 1020):—

“सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः संहियेत विशेषतः ।

स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नान्यैरुपसंहारसंभवः” ॥

The verse is cited in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* (page 253), where the second line reads “स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नैवमुपसंहार इष्यते,” and the first line is quoted by the author of the *Nyāyasūdhā* in his comment on *Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 42 which defines the term परिसंख्या (‘limitation,’ or ‘exclusive specification,’ as Dr. Thibaut and M. M. Kunte respectively render it).

The lack of definiteness in general statements is alluded to by S’abara, also, on Jaimini 10. 8. 16, where he says “न हि सामान्यवाची शब्दो विशेषानभिवदति,” but Kumārila points out (on page 1027) that the विशेष requires the सामान्य. He says:—“न तु निःसामान्यः कश्चिद्विशेष उपपद्यते । ततश्च वृक्षमानयेत्युक्ते शिंशपामित्यविरोधात्पश्चादुच्यमानं न विरुध्यते.”

सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयान् ॥

That [injunction] which leaves no room [for others] is stronger than one which does. For example, an injunction directing animal sacrifice [“अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत”] and which leaves no room for option, overpowers the more general one forbidding the taking of life [“न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानि”]. In this way one Smṛiti may prevail over another. The nyāya is found in Raghunātha’s list, and is applied by him as follows:—

“न चानुभवेन श्रुतेर्बाधः शक्यः श्रुतेर्निरवकाशत्वात् । निरवकाशस्य च सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयानिति न्यायाद्बाधकत्वोपपत्तेः” ॥ A reference to *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 1 will fully explain the two terms of this expression. In his comment on it Ānandagiri quotes the nyāya twice, and again under 2. 1. 4, 6, and 13. In immediate connection with the first of the five, Ānandagiri quotes also the nyāya “सापेक्षनिरपेक्षयोर्निरपेक्षस्य बलवत्त्वम्,” and the two occur together in the following verses of Yāmuna-cārya's *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, page 63:—“सापेक्षनिरपेक्षत्वे न हि बाधस्य कारणम् । शुक्तौ रजतबोधस्य निरपेक्षस्य बाधकम् ॥ नेदं रजतविज्ञानं तत्सापेक्षमपीष्यते । सेयं ज्वालेति संवित्तेस्त्रैलवर्तिविनाशजा ॥ अनुमा बाधिका दृष्टा सापेक्षाप्यक्षजन्मनः । अतो निरवकाशेन सावकाशं निषिध्यते ” ॥ See also Citsukha Muni on *Nyāyamakaranda*, pages 7 and 148; and “सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवति” in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 1. 69 (vārt. 6) and *Syādvāda-manjarī*, page 19.

सिंहस्यैकपदं यथा ॥

Like a lion's first step. This obscure nyāya occurs in Merutunga's work, page 278:—“विचार्याविचार्यं वा कृतप्रयाणोऽयं महानरेन्द्रश्चालितः । सिंहस्यैकपदं यथेति न्यायाच्चलित एव राजते.” Mr. Tawney renders it thus (on page 174):—“Whether with due consideration or not, this great king has been set in motion, and has started on his expedition; on the principle of the lion's first step, he cuts a good figure on the march.” Does the illustration mean that a lion in motion presents a finer appearance than one at rest?

सिकताकूपवत् ॥

The simile of a well [dug] in sandy soil [the sides of which are incessantly falling in]. Used of an argument that will not hold water. It is found in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 32:—“किं बहुना सर्वप्रकारेण यथा यथायं वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते तथा तथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव । न कांचिदत्रोपपत्तिं पश्यामः” ॥

सिकतातैलन्यायः ॥

The figure of *oil from sand*. A non-entity like a hare's horn. The following is from Bhartṛihari's *Nṛtis'ataka* (verse 5):—

“लभेत सिकतासु तैलमपि यत्नतः पीडयन्
पिबेच्च मृगतृष्णिकासु सलिलं पिपासार्दितः ।
कदाचिदपि पर्यटञ्छशविषाणमासादये-
न्न तु प्रतिनिविष्टमूर्खजनचित्तमाराधयेत्” ॥

In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 16, we read:—“यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते न तत्तत् उत्पद्यते यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलम्.” Compare with this, *Yogavāsīṣṭha* 2. 5. 23, “न यत्नेनापि महता प्राप्यते रत्नमश्मतः”, where तैलमश्मतः is given as a variant. American rock-oil was not known in those days! There are two good examples of this illustration in *Nyāyamanjarī*. On page 493, line 1:—तैलार्थी हि तिलसर्षपानुपादत्ते न सिकताः । असत्त्वे च तैलस्य को विशेषः सर्षपाणां सिकताभ्यः” ॥ On page 494:—“तैलार्थी सिकताः कश्चिदाददानो न दृश्यते । अदृष्ट्वा चाद्य नान्योऽपि तदर्थी तासु धावति.”

Compare also *Paris'isṭaparvan* viii. 152:—

“व्याहार्षीन्मुनिरप्येवं प्रसीद मृगलोचने ।
अस्मासु भवति द्रव्यं किं तैलं वालुकास्त्रिव” ॥

सूक्तवाकन्यायः ॥

The law as to the *Sūktavāka* [or song of praise]. This is the topic of Jaimini 3. 2. 15-18, and immediately follows the *Prastara-praharanyāya* with which it is closely connected. Both form a part of the New and Full Moon sacrifices in connection with which there is the direction “सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं प्रहरति.” The question then arises as to whether the whole of the mantras which comprise the *Sūktavāka* are to be repeated on each of the two occasions, or only a part. S'abara's argument is thus paraphrased by Kunte:—“Though the Veda mentions positively

that certain mantras are to be used in certain sacrifices, yet they are not to be so used blindly. The mantra which serves some purpose of a sacrifice is to be used. Though the Veda prescribes the use of the whole mantra, yet it is not to be obstinately maintained that the whole is to be recited. A whole mantra like the Sūktavāka, or a part only, is to be recited according as it is necessary. This is to be ascertained by the sacrificer himself. Hence it cannot be said that the whole Sūktavāka is to be recited on the occasion either of the new or of the full moon day." Again :—"That portion of the Sūktavāka which is recited at the new or full moon sacrifice is the whole of it in reference to the sacrifice itself; because the Veda never prescribes a certain text as constituting the Sūktavāka, and because the Veda simply states that the Sūktavāka, is to be recited... The Sūktavāka is not one text only, but is composed of different texts. The principal god connected with a sacrifice is mentioned in the middle of the Sūktavāka, while something connected with the sacrifice to be performed is described at its beginning and end.....All that is sought is the accomplishment of the new or full moon sacrifice. Hence there is no necessity for discussing whether the whole Sūktavāka or a portion of it is to be recited; because whatever mantras are sufficient to accomplish a sacrifice constitute the whole Sūktavāka so far as the sacrifice is concerned."

सूत्रबद्धशकुनिन्यायः ॥

The simile of a bird tied by a cord. It is found in the *Chhândogya Upaniṣad* 6. 8. 2, namely :—"स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्धो दिशं दिशं पतित्वान्यत्रायतनमलब्ध्वा बन्धनमेवोपश्रयत एवमेव खलु सोम्य तन्मनो दिशं दिशं पतित्वान्यत्रायतनमलब्ध्वा प्राणमेवोपश्रयते प्राणबन्धनं हि सोम्य मन इति."

Vidyāranya versified the above in his *Anubhūtiprakāśa* (iii. 81) and *Pancadas'ī*. (xi. 47) respectively as follows:—

“शकुनिः सूत्रबद्धो यः स गच्छन्विविधा दिशः ।
अलब्ध्वाधारमाकाशे बन्धनस्थानमात्रजेत्” ॥

“शकुनिः सूत्रबद्धः सन्दिक्षु व्यापृत्य विश्रमम् ।
अलब्ध्वा बन्धनस्थानं हस्तस्तम्भाद्युपाश्रयेत्” ॥

I have omitted, in each case, a second verse relating to the *dārṣṭāntika*.

सूत्रशाटिकान्यायः ॥

The simile of *the thread* [about to be woven into a] *garment* [and already regarded as a garment]. Raghunātha explains it thus:—“यत्र तु भाविसंज्ञया निर्देशो यथा नारुद्रो वसेत्काश्यामित्यत्र तत्र सूत्रशाटिकान्यायावतारः । सूत्रस्य शाटिकां वापयतीत्यत्र यथा सूत्रावस्थायां भाविन्या शाटिकेतिसंज्ञया निर्देशस्तथा दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपीति बोध्यम्.”

It is no doubt derived from the following passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 3. 12 (vārtika 2):—“आत्मनेपदेषु चापि नेतरतराश्रयं भवति । कथम् । भाविनी संज्ञा विज्ञास्यते सूत्रशाटकवत् । तद्यथा । कश्चित्कञ्चित्तन्तुवायमाह अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेति । स पश्यति यदि शाटको न वातव्योऽथ वातव्यो न शाटकः शाटको वातव्यश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । भाविनी खल्वस्य संज्ञाभिप्रेता स मन्ये वातव्यो यस्मिन्नुते शाटक इत्येतद्भवतीति.” This is repeated in 2. 1. 51 (vārtika 4). Kumārila employs the illustration in *Tantravārtika* 3. 7. 33 (page 1145):—“यथैवास्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेत्युक्ते वानेन शाटकः क्रियत इति हि भाविसंज्ञाविज्ञानादविरोधो विज्ञायते तथैवात्र प्रत्येतन्वम्.”

Light is thrown upon this by the following extract from Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyāya*, ii. 127. The sūtra so numbered is “सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यं &c.” “Though its meaning be not so and so, it is figuratively so employed in the case of a Brāhman, a scaffold, a mat.....in consideration of association,

place, design.....‘Though it be not so and so,’ i. e., though such be not the direct meaning of the word, it is figuratively employed; for example, the word ‘staff’ &c., is employed for a Brāhman &c., because of association.....In like manner..... from the ‘design’ (*tādarthya*), ‘He makes a mat’ (*kaṭa*) implies his aiming after a mat; for the mat, inasmuch as it is a thing non-existent [*until* made] can have [at the time when one is spoken of as making it] no maker.”

Again, under sūtra 4. 1. 50 [बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत्], the author of the *vṛitti* says (as interpreted by Dr. Ballantyne):—“ The weaver sets himself to work, having considered, that, ‘ In these threads [i. e., constituted by these threads] there *will* be a web,’ but not with the understanding that ‘ there *is* a web’; for, if *that* were the case, then, the product being supposed extant, there would be no setting one’s self to work, because desire [precluded by possession] would be absent.” See also a passage in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 254, beginning at line 14; and *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* on *karikā* 9, pages 52, 53.

सोपानत्के पादे द्वितीयामुपानहमशक्यत्वान्नोपादत्ते ॥

A man does not [attempt to] put a second shoe on a foot already shod, for it would be an impossibility. This is found in the *bhāṣya* on *Jaimini* 1. 2. 33, where the *pūrvapakṣhin* objects to certain Vedic texts as unnecessarily setting forth things already known.

स्थावरजङ्गमविषन्यायः ॥

The simile of *vegetable* [or mineral] *poison* and *animal poison* [जङ्गमविष]. An illustration of one thing being counteracted by another. In his smaller work *Raghunāthavarman* places this amongst the purely grammatical *nyāyas*, immediately after the

पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्याय, and describes it as follows:—"स्थावरजङ्गम-विषन्यायश्चेह बोध्यः । रजतादिज्ञानतद्बाधज्ञानयोः सर्पवत्सनाभादिरूपजङ्गम-स्थावरविषयोश्चोत्तरेण पूर्वबाधः प्रसिद्धो यथा तथा प्रकृतेऽपि" ॥ In the larger work, it stands amongst miscellaneous nyāyas near the end of the *uttarabhāga*, and is numbered 242. I extract from it the following:—"स्थावरेण वत्सनाभादिविषेण जङ्गमस्य सर्पविषादेर्बाधो जङ्गमेन च स्थावरस्येति प्रसिद्धम् । सामान्येन परस्परबाध्यबाधकभावविवक्षायां सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायविषयेऽस्य प्रवृत्तिः । पूर्वं निवर्त्यान्यस्य स्वयमेव निवृत्तौ विवक्षितायां दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्यायविषयेऽस्यावतरणम् । परेण पूर्वबाधमात्रविवक्षायां पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्यायस्येति बोध्यम् । अपच्छेदन्यायस्त्वस्पष्टमुदाहरणमुभयत्रानियतपूर्वापरीभावेनानियतबाध्यबाधकभावात्" ॥

An example of animal poison proving an antidote to the other kind is found in *Ādiparva*, chap. cxxviii (Calc.). The wicked Duryodhana mixed some *kālakūṭaka* in Bhima's food and, when he had eaten it and become unconscious, threw him into the water. The story then continues thus:—"स निःसंशो जलस्यान्तमथ वै पाण्डवोऽविशत् । आक्रामन्नागभवने तदा नागकुमारकान् ॥ ततः समेत्य बहुभिस्तदा नागैर्महाविषैः । अदश्यत भृशं भीमो महादंष्ट्रैर्विषोल्बणैः ॥ ततोऽस्य दश्यमानस्य तद्विषं कालकूटकम् । हतं सर्पविषेणैव स्थावरं जङ्गमेन तु" ॥ Compare the विषनाशकविषन्याय in *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattva-muktākālāpa* ii. 53.

स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालया परं दिधक्षुः स परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वा-
ङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति ॥

A man who tries to burn his enemy by setting fire to his own fingers, may or may not burn the enemy but certainly burns his own fingers! It occurs in *Nyāyavārtika* 2. 1. 12 in reference to a person who denies the validity of Proof. Sūtras 8 and 12, as translated by Dr. Ballantyne, are as follows:—"[Perhaps some one will say] the nature of a Proof

does not belong to sense &c., for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into which Time is divided].” “[If there be no such thing as Proof] because [forsooth] nothing can be such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot be established.” On this the author of the *vārtika* says:—“यस्खलु त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न साधकं तदसाधनमिति ब्रुवता प्रतिषेधस्यासाधकत्वं स्ववाचैवाभ्युपगतं भवति । यथा कश्चित्स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालाया परं दिधक्षुः स च परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वाङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति.”

स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *throwing away a garment because of a louse in it!* It occurs in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā* (page 160 line 10):—“यतोऽहमनन्तापत्यापि दुर्जनचक्षुर्दोषभयादविवेकादिभिर्मन्त्रिभिर्वन्ध्येति प्रख्यापिता लोके ममैवापत्यान्यन्यजनापत्यतया गीयन्ते । सोऽयं स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः” ॥ Compare Raghunātha's *यूकाभिया कन्थात्यागन्यायः* ॥

हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तः ॥

The illustration afforded by *buried treasure* [over which men may walk again and again, unconscious of its existence]. It is found in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* 8. 3. 2 as follows:—“यथापि हिरण्यनिधिं निहितमक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि सञ्चरन्तो न विन्देयुरेवमेवेमाः सर्वाः प्रजा अहरहर्गच्छत्य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यनृतेन हि प्रत्यूहाः” ॥

Sures'varācārya makes use of it in *Sambandhavārtika*, verses 294 and 295 :—

“कुतस्तज्ज्ञानमिति चेत्तद्धि बन्धपरिक्षयात् ।

असावपि च भूतो वा भावी वा वर्ततेऽथवा ॥

अधीतवेदवेदार्थोऽप्यत एव न मुच्यते ।

हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तादिदमेव च दर्शितम्” ॥


The translator of the *vārtika*, Mr. S. Venkaṭaramaṇa Aiyar, gives "the illustration of the golden mine," as the rendering of the *nyāya* in verse 295; and adds in a footnote, "people, other than professional detectives of mines, will not discover a rich mine of gold hidden deep beneath the surface of the earth"; but I think that my rendering is more in accord with S'ankarācārya's interpretation of it in the Vedic passage. He says:—

“हिरण्यनिधिं हिरण्यमेव पुनर्ग्रहणाय निधातृभिर्निधीयत इति निधिस्तं
हिरण्यनिधिं निहितं भूमेरधस्तान्निक्षिप्तम्” ॥

There is no thought here of a *mine*, but of treasure buried in the ground with a view to its being taken up again on a future occasion.

The two verses from the *Vārtika* reappear as *Pancadaś'ī* ix. 39, 40, preceded by the following:—

“पुनःपुनर्विचारेऽपि त्रिविधप्रतिबन्धतः ।
न वेत्ति तत्त्वमित्येतद्वातिके सम्यगीरितम्” ॥



ALPHABETICAL LIST
OF
NYĀYAS EXPLAINED IN PARTS I, II & III,

The Nyāyas being arranged in alphabetical order
in each handful, it is not necessary
to quote the pages.

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ERRATA.

Page 6, lines 7 and 9 from bottom :—

For युगपद्ज्ञा read युगपज्ञा

Page 29, line 8 from bottom : —

Put the inverted commas *before* वसन्ताय.

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
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